References:

a) National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Advisory Memorandum (NSTISSAM) TEMPEST/2-95A, C3 DOD NSA, 3 Feb. 2000.
    1. Section 3, Recommendation I, Installing NSTISSAM TEMPEST/I-92 (Level III), Zone C or all other Red equipment in a TEMPEST Zone C Facility, Page 27.
    2. Section 4, Guidance For Tempest Integrity, Page 29
    3. Section 5, Secure Voice Systems, Page 43
    4. Section 9, Ships, Page 53.
b) IA Pub 5239-31
c) Department of the Navy (DON) Information Security Program (ISP) Regulation, SECNAVINST 5510.36
d) Installation Standards, Electrometric Interface, MIL-STD-1310G, 7 Sept. 2001.
e) Automated Information System (AIS) Security Manual, COMDTINST M5500.13A, 7 Sept. 2001
f) Communications Security Material System (U), CMS-4 , 7 Sept. 2001
g) Policy and Procedures (U), Cryptographic Security, 7 Sept. 2001.
h) Industrial Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information, DOD 5220.22-M, 7 Sept. 2001.
i) Implementation Manual for Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartments Information Facilities, DCID 1/21.

TEMPEST Policy:

The official reference (a) policy is; "The RED/BLACK guidance contained in this document will be considered by the inspector along with other measures to determine the most cost-effective countermeasures to achieve TEMPEST security. Only those RED/BLACK criteria specifically identified by the inspector will be implemented."

TEMPEST Posture:

This author is unfamiliar with the teachings of today's TEMPEST inspector, however when MIL-STD-1680C, predecessor to reference (a), was the guiding document the need to resolve a discrepancy was based on the following credo, "When a situation arises that classified information can be disseminated/compromise due to a TEMPEST discrepancy, the discrepancy shall be repaired to the point that is financially feasible to prevent the dissemination/compromise. All remaining discrepancies shall be adjudicated by the governing authority". In this case, the governing authority would be the United States Coast Guard (USCG).

Assumptions:

- None of the equipment racks have been through a TEMPEST inspection process.
- There is no Sensitive Compartment (SC) space nor is there an obligation to meet the requirements of a future SC space.

- In accordance with reference (a2), Recommendation I, Installing NSTISSAM TEMPEST /1-92 (Level III) ,Zone C or all other RED equipment in a TEMPEST Zone C Facility will be used as the guiding requirements.
- The Identification Friend-Foe (IFF) circuit is to be treated as BLACK. This is a standard TEMPEST practice and is being mentioned for clarification.
- A CTTA ruling on how to treat the Sea Fiber Linked Infrared (Sea FLIR) Circuit is pending. Due to time constraints, for the purpose of this report the circuit shall be considered BLACK.
- The distance from the ARC-210 RF Tray (LC031524), Bridge ISDN Phone (LC030119) and the LAN Drop associated with cable W6029 to the Bridge Console is not 300 cm., but it is at a distance that meets the intent of the obligation.

How to Read the Table:

Issue #: REQ = Summary of the requirement. A number is a unique numerical identifier for tracking the discrepancy.

VTTI Issue #: This is a comprehensive report. It defines all of the TEMPEST issues. There is a correlation between the given amount of inspection time and the number of violations identified. Eventually, follow-on inspections will identify all of the issues. This column is to help the reader associate the master list with the latest VTTI list.

Repair Complexity: The level of difficult based on the author's experience, to make corrections at this point in the products development.

- Hard — an impact to the schedule and/or cost budgets will be incurred. Recommend resolution post sell off.
- Medium — an impact to the schedule and/or cost budgets will be incurred if no support is committed immediately. Recommended resolution between Builders Trial (BT) and sell off.
- Easy — an impact to the schedule and/or cost budgets will be incurred, but the correction is achievable and simplistic in scope that the repair can be made prior to deadline. Recommend immediate resolution.
- Contest — no impact to schedule and/or cost budgets will be incurred. We believe that we have a response that addresses the requirement without any work effort.

Requirement: The paragraph number either in the DITSCAP (8510.1-M), NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95, SECNAVINST 5510.36 or MIL-STD-1310

TEMPEST Criticality: A scalable measure of the severity of the violation based on the authors experience.

- Red (1); Issue will be expected to be corrected prior to custody transfer.
- Orange (2); Issue should be corrected prior to custody transfer. It will be up to the USCG if they will be willing to accept this as a known problem.
- Yellow (3); It will be up to the inspector if he/she will make this an issue that must be corrected.
- Green (4); It is a common issue and should be repaired; however the inspector (if in a good mood) may overlook the issue.
- Blue (5); A requirement in reference (a) that we could get cited for, but most likely the inspector will only make a verbal comment without a written violation.
- Grey (6); A requirement that is virtually impossible to meet given the environment. It is this author's opinion that some of the reference (a) criteria can only be met if invoked on a capital vessel.

Action: From a programmatic perspective, which activity should get the action to make corrections?

- BSI: Bollinger Shipbuilding
- MS2: Lockheed Martine Maritime Systems and Sensors
  - SI: Ship Integration IPT
  - Comm: Communications IPT
  - Net: Networks/Infrastructure IPT
  - C2: C2/Sensors/NAV

In order to reduce the level of effort in understanding the requirements of the references, this author will use paraphrase the requirement in order to convey the issue. In addition, this author will only address the issues that should be identified by the Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA). There is no assurance as to what the VTTI or the CTTA may consider a priority.

Issue #	VTTI Issue #	Repair Complexity	Issue	Location	Requirement	TEMPEST Criticality	Action To	Recommended Action
REQ.			There shall be a 300cm separation between Red Processors and RF Transmitters.		Ref (a1), Para 6 Ref. b Para A.1.1.1.b			
1.	1/2/16	HARD	• All Non-TEMPEST qualified hardware hosted within Electronic Cabinets #1,#2 & #3 violates this requirement due to their proximity to the SSR Model 211 PC-RP in Cabinet #2 and the RT-1794(C)/ARC-210 transceiver in Cabinet #3.	TEMPEST		1	Net Mech SI	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Relocate RT-1794(C) to the bridge hosted in a locked structure. Relocate the PCRP to the Bridge. 3. Request waiver.
REQ.			There shall be a 100 cm. separation between RED processors and Black processing equipment having a nonmetallic enclosure with signal lines connected to an RF transmitter.		Ref (a1), Para 2a Ref b, Para A.1.1.1.a.3			
2.	20	EASY	• The RED LAN Drops associated with cables W6031-33 are mounted next to the BLACK LAN Drops associated with W6067 & W6068.	TEMPEST		1	Net Mech SI	1. Change LAN Drop housing to a SYM 406.1 with a metallic face plate and ground the unit. Separate units by 20 cm. 2. Request waiver.
3.	29	EASY	• The RED LAN Drops associated with cables W6028 is mounted next to the BLACK LAN Drops associated with W6070.	Co Cabin		1	Net Mech SI	1. Change LAN Drop housing to a SYM 406.1 with a metallic face plate and ground the unit. Separate units by 20 cm. 2. Request waiver.
4.	21/ 22	MED	• The following hardware violates this requirement due to their proximity to the UHF/VHF Digital Wireless Spectra W9, HF Guard Rcv SR501, WEFAX Rcv FAX-207, Transceiver (LC 032501), DF Processor 4400, Radar Display 1933/RDP139/NT, Faxphone Switch TT-3617A, TT-334B, VHF Marine Radios DCS500Pro-M: o LC 060482 o LC 060472 o LC 060416 o LC 060497 o LC 060477 o LC 060487	Bridge Console		2	Net Comm Mech SI	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Shield all RED processing equipment either with Stainless Steel grounded insert, steel/aluminum cup or MU-Metal. 3. Request waiver.
5.	23	MED	• The MES Cellular Wireless Telephone, LC031401, is collocated with the RED LAN Drop associated with cable W6029.	Bridge		1	Comm Mech Net	1. Relocate LAN Drop. 2. Request waiver.
REQ.			There shall be a 100 cm. separation between RED Processors and unshielded Black signal lines connected to an RF transmitter.		Ref (a1), Para 2a Ref b, Para .a.1			
6.	15	HARD	• The following hardware violates this requirement due to their proximity to the SSR Model 211 PC-RP: o LC060481 (A8)	TEMPEST Cabinet #2		1	Sensor SI	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Relocate the PCRP to the

			o LC060471 (A5) o LC060415 (A10) o LC060503 (A9) o LC030520 (A14) o LC060443 (A6) o LC060444 (A2) o LC060445 (A11) o LC020110 (A1)					Bridge. 3. Request waiver.
7.	4	HARD	• The following hardware violates this requirement due to their proximity to the RT-1794(C)/ARC-210 transceiver: o LC 060401 (A2) o LC 031121 (A8) o LC 060422 (A10) o LC 031531 (A11)	TEMPEST Cabinet #3		1	Comm SI	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Relocate RT-1794(C) to the bridge hosted in a locked structure. 3. Request waiver.
REQ.			There shall be a 100 cm. separation between RED Processors and unshielded Black power lines connected to an RF transmitter.		Ref (a1), Para 2b Ref b, Para A.1.1.1.a.2	1		
8.	3	HARD	• The following hardware violates this requirement due to their proximity to cable LW306: o LC 060401 (A2) o LC 031121 (A8) o LC 060422 (A10) o LC 031531 (A11)	TEMPEST Cabinet #3		1	Mech Net SI	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Relocate RT-1794(C) to the bridge hosted in a locked structure. 3. Request waiver.
REQ.			RED processing equipment shall not be connected to the same AC distribution panels as RF Transmitters.		Ref (a1), Para 6 Ref. b, Para A.1.1.2			
9.	6	HARD	• The following hardware violates this requirement due to because the power source is the same as the SSR Model 211 PC-RP: o LC 060481 (A8) o LC 060471 (A5) o LC 060443 (A6)** o LC 060432 (A7)** o LC 060444 (A2)** o LC 060433 (A3)** o LC 020110 (A1)** ** Not applicable if the AC/DC power supply can demonstrate a 100db of data suppression.	TEMPEST Cabinet #2		1	Sensor SI	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Relocate the PCRP to the Bridge. 3. Request waiver.
10.	6	HARD	• The required change to install a SP-320-27 power supply for the RT-1794C inadvertently resolved one TEMPEST issue. By sourcing the power from Power Strip 1B has created a violation for the KYV-5. If the AC/DC power supply can demonstrate a 100db of data suppression, then this is not an issue.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3		2	Comm SI	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Relocate RT-1794(C) to the bridge hosted in a locked structure. 3. Request waiver.
REQ.			RED metallic wire cables shall be shielded with the exception of desktop computer cables provided by the manufacturer.		Ref (a2), Para 4.4 Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.1			

					Ref. b, Para A.1.1.7.1			
11.	5/26	MED	▪ The following thru-ship RED metallic cables are not shielded: o W1090 o W2005 o W1006 o W1103 o W1092 o W2023 o W1020 o W2017 o W2025 o W3001 o W3002 o W3003 o W3004 o W3005 o W3006 o W3007 o W3008 o W3009 o W3010 o W3014 o W3048 o W3019 o W3044 o W3020 o W3065 o W3049 o W3041 o W3070 o W3137 o W3073 o W3074 o W3067 o W3079 o W3087 o W3134 o W3162 o W3168 o W3102 o W3101 o W3085 o W3224 o W3083 o W3087 o W3066 o W3086 o W6019	Various		2	SI Sensor Net Comm	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Request waiver. 3. Replace cables.

			○ W6020 ○ W6021 ○ W6022 ○ W6023 ○ W6024 ○ W6025 ○ W6057 ○ W6027 ○ W6028 ○ W6029 ○ W6030 ○ W6031 ○ W6032 ○ W6033 ○ W6036 ○ W6036a ○ W6039 ○ W6039a ○ W6140 ○ W6140a ○ W6049 ○ W6142 ○ W6054 ○ W6054a ○ W6051 ○ W6051a ○ W6055 ○ W6082 ○ W6140 ○ W6140a ○ W6132					
12.	5	MED	▪ The following RED metallic cables are not shielded: ○ LW142 ○ LW130 ○ LW131 ○ LW132 ○ LW133 ○ LW134 ○ LW135 ○ LW136 ○ LW137 ○ LW138 ○ LW139 ○ LW140 ○ LW141 ○ LW143 ○ LW151## ○ LW152## ○ LW154## ○ LW153##	TEMPEST Cabinet #1		2	Mech Net SI	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Request waiver. 3. Replace cables.

			○ LW149## ○ LW150## ○ LW145## ○ LW146## ○ LW147## ## Items are exempt from shielding if provided by manufacturer. A TEMPEST instrument inspection may waive the requirement for the shielding.					
13.	5	MED	▪ The following RED metallic cables are not shielded: ○ LW231## ○ LW232## ○ LW242## ○ LW234## ○ LW235## ○ LW237## ○ LW238## ○ LW239## ○ LW240## ○ LW241## ## Items are exempt from shielding if provided by manufacturer. A TEMPEST instrument inspection may waive the requirement for the shielding.	TEMPEST Cabinet #2		2	Mech Net SI	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Request waiver. 3. Replace cables.
14.	5	MED	▪ The following RED metallic cables are not shielded: ○ LW301## ○ LW311## ○ LW344 ○ LW303 ○ LW304 ○ LW305 ○ LW306## ○ LW330** ○ LW331** ○ LW332** ○ LW333** ○ LW334** ○ LW335** ○ LW336** ○ LW337** ○ LW338** ○ LW345** ○ LW346** ○ LW352** ○ LW353** ○ LW311** ○ LW347** ○ LW348** ○ LW349** ○ LW354**	TEMPEST Cabinet #3		2	Mech Net SI	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Request waiver. 3. Replace cables.

			○ LW350** ○ LW351** ○ LW352** ○ LW353** ** Item requires an individually shielded pairs IAW Ref. b, Para A.1.1.7.2.a or A1.1.7.2.b ## Items are exempt from shielding if provided by manufacturer. A TEMPEST instrument inspection may waive the requirement for the shielding.					
REQ.			RED Secure Voice Cables shall have balanced twisted pair nonferrous shielded transmit and receive audio lines. The shields shall be insulated from each other.		Ref. b, Para A.1.1.7.2.a			
15.	18/25	MED	▪ The following cables do not have isolated individually shielded transmit and receive audio pairs: ○ LW330 ○ LW331 ○ LW332 ○ LW333 ○ LW334 ○ LW335 ○ LW336 ○ LW311	TEMPEST Cabinet #3		1	Mech SI	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Request waiver. 3. Replace cables.
16.	26	MED	▪ The following cables do not have their shields isolated from each other: ○ W3092 ○ W3087	TEMPEST/ Bridge		1	SI Comm	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Request waiver. 3. Replace cables.
REQ.			Equipment having RED/BLACK signal and/or control lines interface shall be limited to the following: a. Prior TEMPEST approval b. Port-to-Port Isolation: 1) No prior approval, but 100 db. audio isolation between 0.3 and 1.5 kHz.. 2) No prior approval, but 80 db. video isolation up to 5Mhz. 3) No prior approval, but 60 db. digital isolation up to 10x the data rate. c. NSA Cryptographic equipment. d. Approved TEMPEST equipment with approved isolation device between the RED and BLACK circuits. f. RED and BLACK processing that received data from a BLACK navigation system. i. Junction boxes installed IAW A.1.1.7.4.3. j. Combined radio and secure systems shall be installed in boats and craft IAW: 1) The system shall have prior TEMPEST installation approval, where radio transceiver and secure processing equipment share common circuitry. 2) The system shall have prior TEMPEST installation approval, where the radio transmitter performs the		Ref (a2), Para 4.3.b Ref. b, Para B.1.2.2.			

			function of switching between RED/BLACK transmissions.					
17.	19	HARD	• The following hardware has not been qualified as equipment authorized to have RED and BLACK interfaces: o MARCOM IVCS Switch (LC031101)** o RT-1794(C)/ARC-210 (LC031502)## o Disconnect Panel #1 (LC031121) o Disconnect Panel #2 (LC031122) o Disconnect Panel #1 (LC031531) ** L3 Baltimore has forwarded a letter that qualifies the unit if used in a specific manner. This configuration voids that letter. ## At the time of this writing an unsubstantiated rumor is circulating that the AN/ARC-210 has failed NSA testing as a RED/BLACK encryption device.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3		2	Comm	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Request waiver.
REQ.			RED metallic wire shielded cables shall meet the applicable requirements of MIL-C-17, MIL-C-915, MIL-C-24640 or MIL-C-24643.		Ref (a1), Para 4 Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.3 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.5.			
18.	5	HARD	• The following thru-ship cables do not meet the MIL-C classification requirements of reference (b) Para B.1.2.5 o W1090 o W2005 o W1006 o W1103 o W1092 o W2023 o W1020 o W2017 o W2025 o W3001 o W3002 o W3003 o W3004 o W3005 o W3006 o W3007 o W3008 o W3009 o W3010 o W3014 o W3048 o W3019 o W3044 o W3020 o W3065 o W3049 o W3041	Various		2	SI Net Sensor Comm	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Request waiver. 3. Replace cables.

			o W3070 o W3137 o W3073 o W3074 o W3067 o W3079 o W3087 o W3134 o W3162 o W3168 o W3102 o W3101 o W3085 o W3224 o W3083 o W3066 o W3086 o W6019 o W6020 o W6021 o W6022 o W6023 o W6024 o W6025 o W6057 o W6027 o W6028 o W6029 o W6030 o W6031 o W6032 o W6033 o W6036 o W6036a o W6039 o W6039a o W6140 o W6140a o W6049 o W6142 o W6054 o W6054a o W6051 o W6051a o W6055 o W6082 o W6140 o W6140a o W6132					

19.	5	MED	• The cabinet cables do not meet the MIL-C classification requirements of reference (b) Para B.1.2.5 o LW142 o LW130 o LW131 o LW132 o LW133 o LW134 o LW135 o LW136 o LW137 o LW138 o LW139 o LW140 o LW141 o LW143 o LW151 o LW152 o LW154 o LW153 o LW149 o LW150 o LW145 o LW146 o LW147	TEMPEST Cabinet #1		2	Mech Net	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Request waiver. 3. Replace cables.
20.	5	MED	• The cabinet cables do not meet the MIL-C classification requirements of reference (b) Para B.1.2.5 o LW231 o LW232 o LW242 o LW234 o LW235 o LW237 o LW238 o LW239 o LW240 o LW241	TEMPEST Cabinet #2		2	Mech Net	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Request waiver. 3. Replace cables.
21.	5/26	MED	• The cabinet cables do not meet the MIL-C classification requirements of reference (b) Para B.1.2.5 o LW330 o LW331 o LW332 o LW333 o LW334 o LW335 o LW336 o LW337 o LW338 o LW345 o LW346	TEMPEST Cabinet #3		2	Mech Net	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Request waiver. 3. Replace cables.

			o LW352 o LW353 o LW311 o LW347 o LW348 o LW349 o LW354 o LW350 o LW351 o LW352 o LW353 o LW301 o LW311 o LW344 o LW303 o LW304 o LW305 o LW306					
REQ.			Within the electrical perimeter barrier of a secure space RED processing cable, equipment, various parts, units and assemblies shall be bonded to ground IAW reference (d).		Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6			
22.	11	EASY	• Equipment Cabinet #1 is not bonded to ground using a Class C Type IV bond strap.	TEMPEST Cabinet #1	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.4. Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/8/11	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
23.	12	EASY	• Equipment Cabinet #1 grounding stud is not IAW reference (d). Specifically, remove the external tooth washers and the all thread bolt.	TEMPEST Cabinet #1	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. d, Para A.5	1	Mech	1. Install correct hardware. 2. Request waiver.
24.	11	EASY	• Unit A1 (LC060412) is not bonded to the hosting sliding tray via Class B or C Type III bond.	TEMPEST Cabinet #1	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
25.	11	EASY	• The hosting sliding tray for Unit A1 is not bonded to Equipment Cabinet #1 using a Class C Type IV bond strap.	TEMPEST Cabinet #1	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.4	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
26.	11	EASY	• Unit A3 (LC060478) is not bonded to the hosting sliding tray via Class B or C Type III bond.	TEMPEST Cabinet #1	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.

27.	11	EASY	• The hosting sliding tray for Unit A3 is not bonded to Equipment Cabinet #1 using a Class C Type IV bond strap.	TEMPEST Cabinet #1	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.4	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
28.	11/13	EASY	• Unit A6 (LC060431) is not bonded to Equipment Cabinet #1 using a Class C Type III bond strap.	TEMPEST Cabinet #1	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
29.	11	EASY	• Equipment Cabinet #3 is not bonded to ground using a Class C Type IV bond strap.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.4. Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/8/11	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
30.	12	EASY	• Equipment Cabinet #3 grounding stud is not IAW reference (d). Specifically, remove the external tooth washers and the all thread bolt.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3	Ref. d, Para A.5	1	Mech	1. Install correct hardware. 2. Request waiver.
31.	11/16	EASY	• Unit A5 (LC030604) is not bonded to Equipment Cabinet #3 using a Class C Type III bond strap.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.5 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.13.I	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
32.	11/16	EASY	• The AC/DC PS of Unit CB1 (LC061057) is not bonded to the hosting sliding tray via Class B or C Type III bond.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
33.	11/16	EASY	• The DC Breaker of Unit CB1 (LC061057) is not bonded to the hosting sliding tray via Class B or C Type III bond.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
34.	11/16	EASY	• The hosting sliding tray for Unit CB1 is not bonded to Equipment Cabinet #1 using a Class C Type IV bond strap.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.4	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
35.	11/16	EASY	• Unit A3 (LC060205) is not bonded to Equipment Cabinet #3 using a Class C Type III or IV bond strap.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.5 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.13	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
36.	11/16	EASY	• Unit A7 (LC030631) is not bonded to Equipment Cabinet #3 using a Class C Type III or IV bond strap.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.5	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.

					Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.13			
37.	11/16	EASY	• Unit A8/ARC-210 is not bonded to Equipment Cabinet #3 using a Class C Type III or IV bond strap.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.5 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.13 Ref. b, Para A.1.1.10	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
38.	11/16	EASY	• Unit CB1 (LC061057) is not bonded to Equipment Cabinet #3 using a Class C Type III bond strap.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
39.	8	EASY	• The strain relief of the connectors to Unit A5 is clamped to shrink wrap around the cable pairs vice to the jacket of the cable.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3	Ref b, Para 5.1.2.6	1	Mech	1. Remake the connector. 2. Request waiver.
40.	11	EASY	• Equipment Cabinet #2 is not bonded to ground using a Class C Type IV bond strap.	TEMPEST Cabinet #2	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.4. Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/8/11	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
41.	12	EASY	• Equipment Cabinet #2 grounding stud is not IAW reference (d). Specifically, remove the external tooth washers and the all thread bolt.	TEMPEST Cabinet #2	Ref. d, Para A.5	1	Mech	1. Install correct hardware. 2. Request waiver.
42.	11	EASY	• Unit A1 (LC020110) is not bonded to the hosting sliding tray via Class B or C Type III bond.	TEMPEST Cabinet #2	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3.	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
43.	11	EASY	• The hosting sliding tray for Unit A1 is not bonded to Equipment Cabinet #2 using a Class C Type IV bond strap.	TEMPEST Cabinet #2	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.4.	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
44.	11	EASY	• Units A2/A6/A7/A3/A11/A12 host slide strays are not bonded to Equipment Cabinet #3 using a Class C Type IV bond strap.	TEMPEST Cabinet #2	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.4.	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
45.	11	EASY	• Unit A6 (LC060443) is not bonded to the hosting sliding tray via Class B or C Type III bond.	TEMPEST Cabinet #2	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.

46.	11	EASY	• Unit A7 (LC060432) is not bonded to the hosting sliding tray via Class B or C Type III bond.	TEMPEST Cabinet #2	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
47.	11	EASY	• Unit A2 (LC060444) is not bonded to the hosting sliding tray via Class B or C Type III bond.	TEMPEST Cabinet #2	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
48.	11	EASY	• Unit A3 (LC060433) is not bonded to the hosting sliding tray via Class B or C Type III bond.	TEMPEST Cabinet #2	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
49.	11	EASY	• Unit A11 (LC060445) is not bonded to the hosting sliding tray via Class B or C Type III bond.	TEMPEST Cabinet #2	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
50.	11	EASY	• Unit A22 (LC060434) is not bonded to the hosting sliding tray via Class B or C Type III bond.	TEMPEST Cabinet #2	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.3/5/12 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
51.	11	EASY	• Power splice boxes associated with the following cables are not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap o W6036 & W6036A o W6039 & W6039A o W6051 & W6051A o W6054 & W6054A o W6140 & W6140A o W6107 & W6107A	TEMPEST	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Net SI	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
52.	11	EASY	• Power Panel 2-29-2 is not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap.	TEMPEST	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	SI	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
53.	9/11	EASY	• IFF Enclosure (LC011314) is not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap.	TEMPEST	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para	1	GFE?	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.

					5.1.3.3.3			
54.	11	EASY	• The LAN Drop boxes associated with the following cables are not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap: o W6031 o W6032 o W6033	TEMPEST	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	SI	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
55.	11	EASY	• The LAN Drop box associated with cable W6028 is not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap	CO Cabin	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	SI	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
56.	11	EASY	• The LAN Drop box associated with cable W6029 is not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap	Bridge	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	SI	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
57.	11	EASY	• The LAN Drop box associated with cable W6030 is not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap	Bridge	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	SI	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
58.	11	EASY	• The Main Deck ISDN Phone #3 (LC030105) is not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap.	CO Cabin	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
59.	11	EASY	• The STE is not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap.	Aft Electronics Space	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. B, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
60.	11	EASY	• KITE No.1 (LC031107) is not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap.	Bridge	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. B, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
61.	11	EASY	• KITE No.2 (LC031107) is not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap.	Bridge	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. B, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.

					5.1.3.3.3			
62.	11/24	EASY	• The ARC-210 RF Tray (LC031524) is not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap.	Bridge	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. B, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
63.	11	EASY	• The C-12561A/ARC-210 (LC031501) is not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap.	Bridge	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. B, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
64.	11	EASY	• The Unclassified Printer (LC060360) is not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap.** ** At the time of this writing the status of the MARCOM switch and associated distribution panels qualifications were unauthorized. Subsequently, making this interface unauthorized.	Ship's Office	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. B, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
65.	11	EASY	• The following hardware within the Bridge Console are not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap: o LC060472 o LC060482 o LC060416 o LC060495 o LC060496 o LC060497	Bridge	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. B, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
66.	11	EASY	• Interior Speaker (LC030209) must be bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap due to its proximity to a RED LAN Drop.	CO Cabin	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. B, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	SI	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
67.	11	EASY	• Interior Speaker (LC030216) must be bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap due to its proximity to the Unclassified Printer.. Note: This would not be an issue if the compartment printer was not on the RED circuit.	Ship's Office	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. B, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	SI	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
68.	11	EASY	• Interior Speaker (LC030217) must be bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap due to its proximity to a the STE processor.	Aft Electronics	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. B, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	SI	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.

69.	11	EASY	• The Printer (LC060438) is not bonded to ground via a Class C Type III bond strap. Note: At the time of this writing, no printer was installed.	TEMPEST	Ref (a4), Para 9.2.1.4 Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.15 Ref. d, Para 5.1.3.3.3	1	Mech	1. Install correct bond strap. 2. Request waiver.
REQ.			RED and BLACK cables shall have their shields bonded to ground at both ends of the cable either by a terminal strip within an enclosure, at a lug within the enclosure, via the connector back shell (not strain relief) or via a pin tied to ground within the connector.		Ref. b, Para B.1.2.6.16.b			
70.	26	EASY	• The shields of the individual pairs within cables W3087 and W3092 are tied to the overall shield vice to ground or to a grounded pin within the connector.	TEMPEST/ Bridge		1	SI	1. Remake the connector. 2. Request waiver.
71.	7	EASY	• The shields of cable LW335 must be tied to the terminal connection on backshell.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3		1	Mech	1. Remake the connector. 2. Request waiver.
REQ.			The RED data cable of a Secure telephone shall be shielded with the shield bonded to the connector at both ends.		Ref. b, Para A.1.1.4			
72.	5	MED	• Cable W3020 is an unshielded cable.	Aft Electronics Space		1	SI Comm	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Request waiver. 3. Replace cables.
REQ.			There should be a 5 cm. separation between Red Cables and Black cables that exit the space or are connected to an RF transmitter.		Ref (a1), Para 3a			
73.	14/28	HARD	• Listing all of the cables that violates this requirement will have little value to the intent of this report. The ship size is the limiting factor and that can not be resolved. The magnitude of the offense will be up to a CTTA to determine.	Various		3		1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. 2. Request waiver. 3. Reroute cables.
REQ.			There should be a 5 cm. separation between RED and BLACK wire lines and they should not use a common distribution vehicle.		Ref (a1), Para 3 Note 2			
74.	20	HARD	• The RED interfaces, W3003 & W3049 share a common distribution panel, Unit A9, with BLACK interfaces.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3		2	SI Comm	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. Site that there is a restricted access to panels and that the panel is fixed connections vice a patching device 2. Request waiver. 3. Create separate RED and BLACK distribution panels and redesign the rack to separate the panels by 20-50 cm.
75.	17	HARD	• The RED interfaces, LW347 & LW350 share a common distribution panel, Unit A6, with BLACK interfaces.	TEMPEST Cabinet #3		2	Mech	1. Wait for results of instrument test and CTTA authorization. Site that there is a restricted access to panels and that the panel is fixed connections vice a patching device

								2. Request waiver. 3. Create separate RED and BLACK distribution panels and redesign the rack to separate the panels by 20-50 cm.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
United States Coast Guard

Commander
U.S. Coast Guard
Telecommunication & Information 3b)
Systems Command

7323 Telegraph Road
Alexandria, VA 23115
Staff Symbol: TISCOM (isd-

Phone: 703.313.5631
Fax: 703.313.5640

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2241
05 March 2004

MEMORANDUM

From: Mr. Ronald T. Porter
CG TISCOM (isd-3b)

Reply to TISCOM (isd-3b)
Attn of: Ronald T. Porter
703.313.5631

To: DIRECTOR, TISCOM Deepwater Systems

Subj: USCGC MATAGORDA VISUAL TEMPEST INSPECTION

Ref: (a) NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95
(b) IA PUB 5239-31 INFORMATION ASSURANCE SHIPBOARD RED/BLACK INSTALLATION PUBLICATION

1. The Secure Electrical Information Processing System (SEIPS) on CGC MATAGORDA was inspected by Ronald Porter (TISCOM) on 19 and 21 February 2004. The inspection was conducted using criteria listed in references (a) and (b), and the SEIPS was found not to be in compliance. Discrepancies are listed in the enclosure.

2. This summary provides a record of the installation at the time of inspection. The correction of installation discrepancies is required as specified in reference (a) and (b); however, other modifications or changes to the SEIPS shall not be made without approval of Commander, TISCOM (isd-3d) or the appropriate MLC.

3. This summary and amendments to this summary shall be retained in the unit's SEIPS (TEMPEST) documentation file.

#

Enclosure: Visual Tempest Inspection Report

Copy: Maintenance and Logistics Command Atlantic (t)
Maintenance and Logistics Command Pacific (t)

Subject: Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

1. This Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary is for the FTA Visit

2. The entire Secure Electrical Information Processing System was inspected.

3. List of spaces with secure processing equipment inspected by the visual TEMPEST inspector:

    A. Visited space

4. Discrepancy form legend:

    Column A: Sequential discrepancy number

    Column B:

SF	Correction of the discrepancy is within the capability of ship's force.
IAC	Correction of the discrepancy was completed by ships force prior to completion of inspection visit.
IA	Indicates that the assistance of an industrial activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
IAC	Indicates that an industrial activity corrected the discrepancy.
SA	Indicates that the assistance of a support activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
SAC	Indicates that a support activity corrected the discrepancy.
CA	Indicates that the Contractor Activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.

    Column C: Reference of the paragraph in designated manuals to which the installation does not conform.

    Narrative: A brief description of the discrepancy found.

5. Discrepancy

A	B	C	Narrative
01	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a/pg16 para 5 IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.1 a, b	Cabinet 3: Black RF transmitter (RT-1794) in same rack as Red Processors. Recommend moving 3 meters away or in adjacent Black Equipment Room. Explore option of putting on Bridge. If so, then distributive Key scheme may pose a problem.
02	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 27 Para 2a/pg16 para 5 IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.1 a, b	Cabinet 2: RF transmitter (PCRP 211/802) in same rack as Red Processors. Recommend moving 3 meters away or in adjacent Black Equipment Room.
03	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2b	Cabinet 3: Red processor less than one meter away from power line to black transmitter (RT-1794 p/o ARC-210)
04	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 27 Para 2a	Cabinet 3: Red processor less than one meter away from black signal lines connected to RF transmitter (RT-1794)
05	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 27 Para 4 IA PUB 5239-31 Para A.1.7.1 IA PUB 5239-31 MIL-STD 188-124B Para 5.2.12	Signal cable used with RED processors, BLACK processors, ISDN telephones, and not terminated. Request additional information on CAT 5E cable. Red data cables for RED Lan contain questionable shielding. Manufacturer data: DARKA COMTEQ (F) ShipLan Cable 4PR 24 AWG Screened 307650. Cable contains what seems to be mylar foil. A TEMPEST hazard exists if RED cables are run with BLACK cables, or with wirelines or power lines connected to an RF transmitter. NSTISSAM 2-95. RED processors meeting the requirements of NSTISSAM TEMPEST/1-92 (Levels I, II, or III) must use optical or shielded wire cables if specified as part of the manufacturer's installation specification, or if specified for compliance with TEMPEST certification. IA Pub 5239-31: RED Shielded Metallic Wire Cable. RED metallic wire cables in all locations shall be shielded, with the exception of desktop computer cables that are provided by the manufacturer, where there is not an offered shielded cable option. This requirement is not applicable to RED fiber optic cables. B.1.2.5 (5239): Approved cables. Mil-C-17 (ref k), or MIL-C-915 (reference(l)), MIL-C-24640(reference(n)) or MIL-C-24643 (reference (o)). MIL-STD-188 “Foil shiels are not acceptable for peripheral bonding and do not provide mechanical durability” IA Pub 5239-31 pg B-9 Para d. Note: “If both ends of the cable will not have the shield taken to ground, approval by the cognizant

			CTTA should be obtained prior to installation."
06	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 28 Para 6	RED processors and RF transmitters in Cabinet RED processors should not be powered from the same circuits as RF transmitters.
07	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.16 pg B-8 and B-9	Missing pins on CRYPTO cable to KYV-5. Missing ground terminal connection on backshell.
08	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.16 pg B-8 and B-9	ANDVT cable has no ground terminal connection on backshell. Strain relief clamp is not on outer coating of cable. Redo connection.
09	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.10	AN/UPX-28 has inadequate green wire ground. Replace with Class C bond strap.
11	CA		Install ground cables per IA 5239-31. Where required, use soldered connectors vice crimping.
12	CA	IA Pub 5259-31	Remove external tooth washers on ground connectors to cabinets. Use lock washers and lug nuts per IA Instruction 5239-31 Figure B-5.
13	CA	IA Pub 5239 B.1.2.6.12	Keyboard and Monitor in Cabinet #1 has non –manufacturer supplied power cable. Bond shelf to rack.
14	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Para 3 Notes 3	RED/BLACK cable separation. Two inch minimum separation requirement. Six inch separation requirement for RED/BLACK cables that run in parallel for 100 ft runs. No way to physically identify RED/BLACK data cables from each other or from the ISDN phone lines.
15	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 Recommendation I Pg 27	PCRP (Model 211/802) is Black transmitter in RED Cabinet #3. PCRP (RADAR) is less than three meters away from RED processing equipment. Recommend moving outside of C4ISR Classified Room.
16	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.10	Remove green wire grounds from CRYPTO rack and replace with Class C solid bond strap.
17	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.3	Telephone cables connected to shore tie via telephone switch cannot be routed with red cables. More info on MARCOM switch required.
18	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.	ARC-210 Secure voice cables. Transmit and receive audio lines need to be shielded.
19	CA		Request info on Marcom Compact IVCS Switch with PABX. Issue is port isolation for RED/BLACK connections. All ISDN phones, cellular wireless, shore connection box and KITEs have inputs to MARCOM. TISCOM TEMPEST program manager will check on configuration on SIPRNET. Wireline inputs to MARCOM in current configuration appear to be unshielded.
20	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	Operator position in Classified C4ISR room has cables from two UNCLAS LAN and three CLASSIFIED LAN connections. Require 2 inch (5 cm) separation.

Bridge

21	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a	Motorola VHF FM DES transceiver less than three meters from C2 Network flat panel display monitors LC 06-04-16, LC 06-04-72 and LC 06-04-84. Pending Instrumented Test.
22	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a	Ross VHF FM transceiver less than three meters from C2 Network flat panel display monitors LC 06-04-16, LC 06-04-72 and LC 06-04-84. Pending Instrumented Test
23	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a	Cel phone next to Secure Lan junction box less than three meters from LC 06-04-82 and LC 06-04-72. Request composition of enclosure.
24	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.13	No metal-to-metal contact for ground strap from ARC 210 Tray to ground on shelf. Recommend use Class C ground strap and remove paint for proper bonding.
25	CA	IA Pub 5239 A.1.1.7.2a	Not clear if Shielded Twisted Pair is used for voice and control wirelines.
26	CA	IA Pub A.1.1.7.2 Pg A-3	Unshielded cable connected to connector J3 on ARC-210 Tray. Twisted red wires (four) runs to C4ISR Cabinet #3.
27	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95	Wireless bridge for RHIB comms is RF transmitter?? Is this just a radio with mic on cutter?? PDAs??

Other:

28	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	CO's cabin. RED and BLACK LAN ports have no cable separation. Recommend 2 inch separation.
29	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 1	CO's cabin. Proposed RED laptop on desk top less than 20 inches (20 cm) apart.

Cabinet #3

Derived From: NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95

Department of the Navy (DoN) Information Assurance (IA) Publication Module 5239-31

MIL-STD-188-124B Grounding Bonding Shielding for Common Long Haul/Tactical Communications Systems

MATERIAL INSPECTION AND RECEIVING REPORT

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0248

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR COMPLETED FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
SEND THIS FORM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN THE DFARS, APPENDIX F-401.

1. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION (CONTRACT) NO.	ORDER NO.	6. INVOICE NO./DATE	7. PAGE	OF	8. ACCEPTANCE POINT
DTCG23-02-2DW001	F-2DW079	ICGS0300-0008/ 03/01/04	1	2	D

2. SHIPMENT NO.	3. DATE SHIPPED	4. B/L NA / TCN NA	5. DISCOUNT TERMS
NA	1 Mar 04		None

9. PRIME CONTRACTOR CODE 1UYZ2	10. ADMINISTERED BY CODE
Integrated Coast Guard Systems, 1530 Wilson Blvd., Suite 400, Arlington, VA 22209, USA	Commandant (G-ACS-6) U.S. Coast Guard Deepwater SIPO, 1530 Wilson Blvd., Suite 400, Arlington, VA 22209
11. SHIPPED FROM *(If other than 9)* CODE / FOB:	**12. PAYMENT WILL BE MADE BY CODE**
Bollinger Shipyards Lockport, L.L.C. PO Box 250 8365 Highway 308 Lockport, LA. 70374-0250	Commandant (G-ACS-6) U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, 2100 Second St. SW, Room 5208, Washington, DC 20591-0001, USA
13. SHIPPED TO CODE WPB - 1303	**14. MARKED FOR CODE**
USCGC Matagorda (WPB - 1303), C/O Coast Guard 8365 Highway 308 Lockport, LA. 70374-0250	LCDR Driscoll

15. ITEM NO.		16. STOCK/PART NO. DESCRIPTION *(Indicate number of shipping containers - type of container - container number.)*	17. QUANTITY SHIP/REC'D*	18. UNIT	19. UNIT PRICE	20. AMOUNT
0055	D	Services and Supplies: Matagorda, WPB 123 conversion, Item short shipped of the following components: Details on Certificate of Conformance	1/1	Lot	$14,875,235.00	$14,875,235.00
	01	Trial Cards	1	Lot	$196,815.00	$196,815.00
	02	Provisioning and Spares	1	Lot	$71,000.00	$71,000.00
	03	Training	1	Lot	$10,000	$10,000.00
	04	CDRL Exceptions	1	Lot	$243,500.00	$243,500.00

21. CONTRACT QUALITY ASSURANCE

a. ORIGIN

☐ CQA ☐ ACCEPTANCE of listed items has been made by me or under my supervision and they conform to contract, except as noted herein or on supporting documents.

DATE | SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE

TYPED NAME: Certificate of Conformance

TITLE:

MAILING ADDRESS:

COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE NUMBER:

b. DESTINATION

☐ CQA ☐ ACCEPTANCE of listed items has been made by me or under my supervision and they conform to contract, except as noted herein or on supporting documents.

DATE | SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE

TYPED NAME:

TITLE:

MAILING ADDRESS:

COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE NUMBER:

22. RECEIVER'S USE

Quantities shown in column 17 were received in apparent good condition except as noted.

3/1/04 — DATE RECEIVED | SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE

TYPED NAME: Catherine Martindale

TITLE: Contracting Officer

MAILING ADDRESS:
U.S. Coast Guard Deepwater SIPO
1530 Wilson Blvd., Suite 400, Arlington, VA

COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE NUMBER: 571-218-3293

** If quantity received by the Government is the same as quantity shipped, indicate by (X) mark; if different, enter actual quantity received below quantity shipped and encircle.*

23. CONTRACTOR USE ONLY

DD FORM 250, AUG 2000 PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE.

MATERIAL INSPECTION AND RECEIVING REPORT - *CONTINUATION SHEET*	PAGE 2	OF 2	*Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0248*

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR COMPLETED FORM TO EITHER OF THESE ADDRESSES.
SEND THIS FORM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN THE DFARS, APPENDIX F-401.

SHIPMENT NO.	DATE SHIPPED	PROC INSTRUMENT IDEN. (CONTRACT)	(ORDER) NO.	INVOICE NO.
NA	20040301	DTCG23-02-2DW001	F-2DW079	ICGS0300-0008/ 03/01/04

ITEM NO.	STOCK/PART NO. DESCRIPTION *(Indicate number of shipping containers - type of container - container number.)*	QUANTITY SHIP/REC'D	UNIT	UNIT PRICE	AMOUNT
55	Continued				$0.00
5	Tempest and Classified Testing	1	lot	$121,000.00	$121,000.00
6	LIMS Testing	1	lot	$10,000.00	$10,000.00
7	Low Smoke Cable	1	lot	$10,000.00	$10,000.00
8	C005 3.2 Verification	1	lot	$500.00	$500.00
9	Control Cable for Engine	1	lot	$1,000.00	$1,000.00
	Total Invoice Amount Due	1	lot	$14,211,420.00	$14,211,420.00
					$0.00
					$0.00
					$0.00
					$0.00
					$0.00
					$0.00
					$0.00
					$0.00
					$0.00

ICGS Certificate of Conformance:

Contract Number: DTCG23-02-C-2DW001
DTO Number: DTCG23-02-F-2DW079, CLIN 0055D
Asset: CGC Matagorda, WPB 1303, 1 of 1

Description: This DTO provides the detailed design and construction for major modification of the 110-foot patrol boat Matagorda, including completion of all design, analyses, construction, and testing to deploy the lead vessel of the proposed 123-Ft Cutter Class, and to demonstrate compliance with requirements. Included in the modifications was an extensive ultrasonic survey of the hull was conducted resulting in the replacement of over 800 square feet of wasted hull plate; a new deckhouse providing an enlarged, 360-degree bridge and berthing for a dual-gender crew; a stern extension with a stern ramp and door for launch and recovery of the Short-Range Prosecutor; an upgraded C4ISR suite to ensure interoperability with the IDS; and all related logistics and training.

I certify that on 1 March 2004, the ICGS Deepwater Program furnished the supplies and/or services called for in accordance with all applicable requirements. I further certify that the supplies and/or services are of the quality specified and conform in all respects with the contract requirements, including specifications, drawings, preservation, packaging, packing, marking requirements, and physical item identification, and are in the quantity shown on the attached acceptance document.

Comment: This Certificate of Conformance is based upon;

- LM/MS2 Certificate of Conformance and supporting records.
- NG/SS Certificate of Conformance and supporting records
- Waiver W001 – Superstructure Aluminum Extrusion ABS Test Results
- ICGS audits of LM/MS2, NG/SS, Chand, and Bollinger (BSI).
- Functional Configuration Audit and Physical Configuration Audit performed on 27 Feb 04
- 123 Cutter Certification Matrix

Exception(s):

1) Trial Cards (Attachment A)
2) Provisioning and Spares
   - On Board (estimated date of delivery 30 Mar 04)
   - Shore Side (estimated date of delivery 30 Mar 04)
   - Insurance (estimated date of delivery 30 Mar 04)
3) Training for the Matagorda crew
   - Common Operating Picture (COP estimated completion 30 Mar 04)
4) CDRL Exceptions (Attachment B)
5) Tempest and Classified Testing, (Attachment C)
6) LIMS Testing
7) Low Smoke Cable RFD
8) C005 3.2 Verification
9) Engine Control Cable

Date of Execution: 1 March 2004

Signature: _____

Kevin J. O'Neill
Director of Contracts, ICGS LLC

Attachement A
Matagorda Trial Cards

Trial Card	ESWBS	Description	Résolution	Est. Cost	Target Date
CC004001	57476	C2 displays lose power when port Mde is started	Initiate fix in two steps: 1) install temp solution of installing diodes; 2) install ne 24 v power supply for affected equipment	$22,000	22-Mar-04
OH0026001	05294	First step on ladder down to mess deck lacks sufficient clearance	Screened KI, if investigation reveals in scope, correction will be made	$570	15-Mar-04
DC0026002	05028	Fire Sta should be labeled iaw color and coating manual throughout	Color fire station IAW color and coating manual	$2,060	15-Mar-04
DK0004001	05315	Notch grating in way of SRP ramp has not been installed or demonstrated to USCG	Receive and install grating	$15,160	22-Mar-04
EL0097003	57463	Lower back cover shakes excessively	Secure cover	$1,185	15-Mar-04
OH0005001	05347	50cal gun aft platforms P/S have left no access to the mooring bitts & chocks.	Modify platforms	$7,280	15-Mar-04
DC0039001	05135	Lazarette overhead insulation, in vicinity of door to aft steering is not taped	Tape insulation	$1,010	15-Mar-04
DK0022001	05107	Gasoline for P-250 needs 15 gallons of gas for delivery	Provide 15 gallons of gasoline	$500	15-Mar-04
EL0022001	05453	Portable wing station distribution panel mounted on aft bhd does not have protective cover to cannon plugs when control unit not plugged in	Install protective covers	$620	15-Mar-04
EL0103001	57453	Battery room fan alarm indicated		$5,960	15-Mar-04
HB0027001	05248	Workmanship/installation of overhead insulation is very poor	Secure insulation	$9,800	15-Mar-04

		quality			
AX0051001	57452	Port reduction gear control oil pressure is in the red (10). Units not identified	Investigate, report and repair if determined to be in scope effort	$35,100	15-Mar-04
AX0051002	57452	STBD overspeed trip indicated during operations	Investigate, report and repair if determined to be in scope effort	$3,620	15-Mar-04
AX0051003	57452	Engine lube oil and reduction gear control oil pressure share the same bar, yet reduction gear oil pressure runs locally	Investigate, report and repair if determined to be in scope effort	no cost associated	15-Mar-04
AX0073001	57443	Firemain drain in Magazine is not in compliance with NAVSEA OP 4 sixth revision para 5-4-1.I	Investigate, report and repair if determined to be in scope effort	$2,000	15-Mar-04
DK0005001	05500	Ensign mast back aft is removable, however, given the height above the main deck you cannot reach and safetly remove mast without the 50cal gun platform installed	Investigate, report and repair if determined to be in scope effort	$1,010	15-Mar-04
EL0032001	05318	110WPB arrived with a 24v disconnect switch mounted on the fwd bhd of deckhouse for securing power to the fwd gun	Investigate, report and repair if determined to be in scope effort	$5,820	15-Mar-04
EL0047001	05012	Excess cable not properly secured	Investigate, report and repair if determined to be in scope effort	$530	15-Mar-04
EL0089001	57454	Alarm sound several times a minute when tanks are above 90%	Investigate, report and repair if determined to be in scope effort	$680	15-Mar-04
EL0004001	05480	Power strips installed on pilothouse overhead should be duplex receptacle	If determined to be in scope repair will be made	$1,740	15-Mar-04
CC0010		Cameras need to be mounted on permanent brackets		$10,000	15-Mar-04
CC0002	05369	Secure comms space door		$1,000	15-Mar-04
CC0026002		Excessive cable length under pilothouse		$1,500	15-Mar-04

EL0024		Demonstrate CAPAC system	Needs to be demonstrated in salt water	$500	15-Mar-04
DC0026002		Photolumenescent labels		$1,000	15-Mar-04
MP0002001	05303	P/S MPDEs do not come up to 1500 RPMs	Repair if determined to be in scope	0	
EL0121001	57475	UHF DAMA was not demonstrated	Demonstrate under classified testing	$50,000	22-Mar-04
CC0011001	05253	Install ground cables/bond straps on racks iaw C4ISR cabinet specs and Mil STD 1310	Install grounds	$1,690	22-Mar-04
CC0015001	05071D	LIMS Test steps were not successfully completed	Complete test enroute to NO	$1,000	5-Mar-04
CC0016001	05071E	Radar Test steps were not successfully completed (RDF bearing erratic)	Complete test enroute to NO	$2,950	15-Mar-04
CC0007001	05394	C4ISR cable designation and tags not IAW GENSPEC	If determined to be in scope repair will be made	$0	15 Mar 04
DC0002001	05490	General Alarms have wrong tones	Provide correct tones	$10,000	22-Mar-04

Attachment B
Matagorda CDRL Exceptions

ELIN #	Deliverable Title	Cost to Complete
C002	SW Requirements/Performance Specifications	$1,790
C005	C4ISR Asset Performance Specification	$10,739
C006	123 C4ISR Asset Design Document	$5,369
C007	C4ISR Asset Integration and Installation Plan	$3,132
I012	Quality Assurance Plan	$447
I017	Environmental Management Plan	$313
I022	Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP)	$7,159
I023	Contractor Configuration Management Plan	$1,790
I026	Technology Refreshment Plan	$8,949
I030	Test and Evaluation Program Plan	$3,580
I031-01	Test Plan	$1,342
I032-01	Test Procedure	$716
I033-01	Test/Inspection Report	$1,074
I034	Test Assessment Plan	$7,159
I035	Technical Assessment Report	$8,949
I039	Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS)	$7,159
L002	Logistics Standards Plan	$313
L003-04	Manpower Reqirements Analyses	$313
L004-04	Personnel Allowance Lists (PALS)	$313
L007-01	123 WPB Asset Training Plan	$2,237
L008-01	124 WPB Asset Training Needs Assessment and Analysis (TANA)	$2,237
L011	Human Factors Engineering (HFE) Plan	$2,237
L012-04	Class Maintenance & Modernization Plan (CMMP)	$2,685
L013-09	Level of Repair Analysis (LORA)	$313
L014	Equipment Support Plans	$8,949

L015-09	Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)	$447
L016	Technical Manuals	$16,120
S002	Launching Data	$313
S003	Weight Control Plan	$313
S004	Baseline Weight Estimate	$313
S005	Performance Specification (P-SPEC)	$447
S008	Technical Specification	$2,237
S009	Specific Certification Plan and Cutter Specific Certification Matrix	$716
S011-01	Principal Characteristics Summary	$3,132
S011-02	Hull Lines Drawing	$313
S011-03	Rudder and Appendages Drawing	$313
S011-04	Hull Curves of form	$313
S011-05	General Arrangements Drawing	$313
S011-06	Inboard/Outboard Profile Drawing	$313
S011-07	Topside Configuration Drawing (Mast)	$313
S011-08	Anchoring, Mooring and Towing Arrangement	$313
S011-09	Small Boat Handling Drawing	$313
S011-10	Midship Sections Drawing	$313
S011-11	Auxiliary Systems Diagrams ALL SHEETS.	$313
S011-16	Propulsion Shafting Arrangement	$313
S011-17	Electric One Line Diagram	$313
S011-19	Communications Center Arrangement Drawing	$313
S011-20	Pilot House and Bridge Wing Arrangements	$313
S011-22	C4ISR System Block Diagram	$3,132
S011-23	Integrated Navigation System Block Diagram	$2,685
S011-24	IC System Block Diagram	$1,790
S011-25	Alarm and Indicating Systems Drawing	$716
S011-26	Propulsion Control System (PCS) Block Diagram	$313
S011-27	Master Equipment List	$313
S011-29	Food Service Spaces Arrangements	$313
S011-30	Arrangements of Living Spaces	$313

S012-01	Mooring, Towing and Anchoring Analysis	$1,074
S012-02	Auxiliary System Rib Launch/Retrieval Analysis	$313
S012-03(HVAC)	Auxiliary Systems HVAC Load Calculations	$313
S012-03(HYD)	Auxiliary Systems HYD Load Calculations	$313
S012-04	Electrical Plant Load Analysis (EPLA)	$313
S012-05	Propulsion Powering and Propulsor Analysis	$313
S012-06	Model Test Reports	$1,074
S012-07	Endurance Fuel Calculation	$313
S012-08	Intact & Damage Stability Analysis & Limiting KG Analysis	$313
S012-09	Seakeeping Analysis	$313
S012-10	Maneuvering Analysis	$313
S012-13	Combat System Analysis	$313
S012-16	Replenishment at Sea Analysis	$313
S012-17	Stores Handling Analysis	$313
S012-18	Ammunition Handling Analysis	$313
S013	SW Acquisition, Develop, and Integration Plan	$313
S014	Noise Control Plan	$313
S015	Weight and Mass Properties Estimate	$313
S016	Cutter Specific Certification **Documents**	$44,745
S017-01	**Ship** Vibration Analysis	$313
S017-02	**Shaft** Vibration Analysis	$313
S017-04	Final Propulsion Powering Analysis and Propulsor Design Report	$313
S020	Quarterly Weight Report 1	$313
S023	Inclining Experiment Report	$0
S025	Acceptance Trials (AT) Agenda & Certification	$5,369
S026	Pollution Prevention Certificates of Compliance	$895
S027	Certificate for Sanitary Compliance	$895
S029	Deratting Exemption Certificate	$895
S030-01	Noise Control Design History	$313

S030-02	Airborne Noise Survey Report	$4,474
S030-03	Machinery Vibration Test Reports	$4,474
S030-04	Vibration Survey Report	$4,474
S030-05	Propulsion System Vibration Test Report	$4,474
S032	Master Lubrication Table Report	$313
S033	Material Safety Data Sheets	$716
S035	General Information and Operationals Manual	$8,949
S037	As-Built Drawings	$17,898
S038	Selected Record Drawings	$8,949
	Total	$243,500

Attachment C
Tempest and Classified Testing

ICGS will review the outstanding TEMPEST discrepancies described in the final SPAWAR Instrumented TEMPEST Report conducted on CGC MATAGORDA during the week of 18Feb-24Feb 2004 and correct discrepancies if the required changes are clearly defined within the scope of the contract. ICGS will demonstrate the proper operation of C4ISR systems in a real-world classified environment. Agreed to MATAGORDA TEMPEST discrepancies to be resolved and classified testing to be successfully performed prior to June 24, 2004 (90 days after the receipt of the instrumented survey report). This effort shall be completed in the following phased manner, as each step is successfully completed that portion of the withholding listed will be released:

Step 1 Develop POA&M: Prepare and deliver Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) document which describes the schedule, locations, and resources needed to implement the following activities: (upon completion, ICGS receives 40% of the withholding)

- Development of design solutions to correct within scope MATAGORDA TEMPEST discrepancies outlined in the final SPAWAR TEMPEST Report.
- Installation of within scope design solutions to correct TEMPEST discrepancies aboard a 123 WPB class vessel
- Support of a SPAWAR Instrumented TEMPEST Survey to validate correction of TEMPEST discrepancies scheduled and executed via the CG program office.
- Conduct of Classified Testing aboard a 123 WPB class vessel per AT procedures
- Installation of TEMPEST corrections aboard MATAGORDA.

Step 2 Installation and Test of Tempest solution for 123 Class: (30% of total withholding)

- Install design solutions to correct identified and agreed upon Instrumented TEMPEST discrepancies (from USCG Tempest Report) aboard 123 WPB class vessel in accordance with the design solution.
- Support SPAWAR's Instrumented TEMPEST Survey to validate correction of TEMPEST discrepancies.
- Install approved design solutions to correct identified and agreed upon Instrumented TEMPEST report discrepancies on the Matagorda.

Step 3 Demonstration of Tempest solution for CGC MATAGORDA prior to Matagorda OT&E: (30% of total withholding)

- Conduct of Classified Testing aboard MATAGORDA to validate classified systems are properly installed and configured for operation in an actual (non simulated) classified environment
- Conduct Classified Testing aboard a 123 WPB class vessel to validate classified C4ISR system design in an actual (non simulated) classified environment

TEMPEST re-inspections will not be required if MATAGORDA's C4ISR configuration is the same as the 123 class vessel tested in Step #2)

EXTERNAL CERTIFICATION OF CONFORMANCE

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION
MARITIME SYSTEMS & SENSORS

It is hereby certified that the material supplied on the referenced purchase order/Contract Number fully conforms to all applicable specifications and requirements. The material supplied is in compliance with the latest ECN's / Revision noted. All material supplied under this order was originally purchased or manufactured by Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors (MS2). All original purchasing and/or incoming inspection data is on file at MS2 and available for review upon request.

Date: **3/1/2004**

Customer: **Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS)**

Purchase Order/Contract Number: **DTCG23-02-F-2DW079**

P. O. Line Item Number/Level Code: **N/A**

Part Revision:

Part Number: **C4ISR Equipment for CGC Matagorda -123**

Part Description: **C4ISR Equipment Integration, Installation, Testing & Training for the CGC Matagorda 123.**

Quantity: **N/A**

Shipping Notice Number: N/A

3-1-04
Authorized Quality Representative/Date

1st March 2004
Authorized Contract's Representative/Date

3/1/04

Comment:
The WPB-110 class cutters are receiving extensive upgrades under the USCG Integrated Deepwater System (IDS). Aside from extending the cutter to 123' for a stern boat launch ramp and other physical/mechanical upgrades, these patrol boats are receiving Command, Control, Communication and Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) upgrades.
In accordance with the C4ISR Framework Architecture, IDS CONOP and IDS Requirements, Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) is providing the following C4ISR upgrades making this asset more capable in performance its missions.

This CoC is based on completion of: Design, Installation & Testing of the C4ISR Equipment for the Matagorda. Review of system operational /verification test results were completed. On–site LM Quality surveillance performed; 100% inspection on LM cabinets assemblies 1 through 5, 100% inspection of MES equipment performed, QA checklist completed, 30% spot inspection on cable installation. Receipt of subcontractors' CoC including PROSOFT, FLIR, NGIT, & MES. Conducting training services and material to the USCG personnel. FCA & PCA audit completed. Software Version Description Document (VDD) including password and license keys transferred.

Exceptions:

1.) PROSOFT CoC will be submitted at the completion of COP training, completion of training is dependent upon successful implentation of classified system by 3/17/04.
2.) Open Trial Cards EL0121001,CC0011001,CC0015001,CC0016001,CC0007001 & DC0002001.
3.) Submittal of C006 for final as build CBDs, CRSs, Cabinet Rack Drawings , CSEL and Software Capabilities and Limitation Document to be supplied by May 30, 2004
4) Delivery of C005 with section 3.2 attached, May 30, 2004.
5) Delivery of C005 section 3.2 requirements verification matrix, May 30, 2004.
6.) S016:CCM compliance analysis by May 30, 2004.
7.) Test Report to be submitted by March 31, 2004
8.) Tempest corrections in accordance with the final instrumented tempest survey report provided by the USCG, and completion of classified testing.
9) Delivery of L016 data input to Northrop Grumman
10) Delivery of I026
11) Submittal of low Smoke Cables request for Deviations/Waivers

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Note:
USCG will provide Iridium phone; reference 123 end item P-spec negotiations.

SMH DGW

From: Porter, Ronald
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 9:10 AM
To: Jones, David L.; Wright, Richard; Prokes, Terrence; Wharton, Rick; Wilhelm, Douglas G; Buford, Danny D. (Ship Systems); Calvin, Wally (Ship Systems); Colella, Harry (EXT); Conrad, Robert D. (Ship Systems); Driscoll, John LCDR; Frei, Kevin R; Hajduk, Philip J; Lang, Donald H; McLaverty, Brian; Meredith, Lawrence O; Mihelic, Joseph; Payne, Jeffrey LTJG; Talley, Shonda; Adkins, Steve; Alto, Alan ; Ayala, Hala; Bassolino, John; Bauer, Sarah; Boyd, Barry ELC2; Boyd, Jay; Boyd, Jay; Brewer, George M ENG3; Cownie, Brodie LCDR; Figueroa, Nylsa; Fleming, Benjamin LT; Fontana, Richard CDR; Hartinger, Dan; Harwood, Fred; Henke, Douglas; Hernandez, Glenn LCDR; Hested, Jim; Illuminate, Dave; Jacoby, Chad LCDR; Driscoll, John LCDR; Leeper, Hank; Leeper, Henry; McLaughlin, Daniel CDR; Mitchell, Sean LT; Pearson, Steve; Powers, Geoffrey; Prokes, Terry; Reynolds, James LT; Rishar, David; Russell, Douglas CAPT; Sconiers, Thomas CWO; Walz, Michael CDR; Wood, John CDR
Cc: Carter, Justin LT; Carter, Justin LT
Subject: RE: MATAGORDA_122004_2200, METOMPKIN_122004_2200

Attachments: CGC MATAGORDA.doc

CGC
.TAGORDA.doc (27 k

All,

Attached is pending TEMPEST discrepancy list for Matagorda.

ron
Ronald T. Porter
USCG TISCOM (isd-3b)
TEMPEST Program Manager
703-313-5631 (STU-III)
703-313-5640 (FAX)

From: Jones, David L.
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 8:32 AM
To: 'Wright, Richard'; Prokes, Terrence; Wharton, Rick; Wilhelm, Douglas G; Buford, Danny D. (Ship Systems); Calvin, Wally (Ship Systems); Colella, Harry (EXT); Conrad, Robert D. (Ship Systems); Driscoll, John LCDR; Frei, Kevin R; Hajduk, Philip J; Lang, Donald H; McLaverty, Brian; Meredith, Lawrence O; Mihelic, Joseph CAPT; Payne, Jeffrey LTJG; Porter, Ronald; Talley-Green, Shonda; Adkins, Steve; Alto, Alan; Ayala, Hala; Bassolino, John; Bauer, Sarah LTJG; Boyd, Barry CWO; Boyd, Jay; Boyd, Jay F.; Brewer, George CWO; Cownie, Brodie LT; Figueroa, Nylsa; Fleming, Benjamin LT; Fontana, Richard CDR; Hartinger, Dan; Harwood, Fred; Henke, Doug; Hernandez, Glenn; Hested, Jim; Illuminate, Dave; Jacoby, Chad CDR; Driscoll, John LCDR; Leeper, Hank; Leeper, Henry; McLaughlin, Daniel CDR; Mitchell, Sean LT; Pearson, Steve; Powers, Geoffrey; Prokes, Terry; Reynolds, James LT; Rishar, David; Russell, Douglas CAPT; Sconiers, Thomas CWO; Walz, Michael CDR; Wood, John CDR
Cc: Carter, Justin LT; Carter, Justin LT
Subject: RE: MATAGORDA_122004_2200, METOMPKIN_122004_2200

I confirmed this morning that a copy of the scan results was left with LM engineers on the ship.

From: Wright, Richard [mailto:Richard.Wright@dwicgs.com]

ENCLOSURES(1)

Sent: Tuesday, December 21, 2004 9:50 PM
To: Prokes, Terrence; Wharton, Rick; Wilhelm, Douglas G; Buford, Danny D. (Ship Systems); Calvin, Wally (Ship Systems); Colella, Harry (EXT); Conrad, Robert D. (Ship Systems); Driscoll, John LCDR; Frei, Kevin R; Hajduk, Philip J; Lang, Donald H; McLaverty, Brian; Meredith, Lawrence O; Mihelic, Joseph CAPT; Payne, Jeffrey LTJG; Porter, Ronald; Talley-Green, Shonda; Adkins, Steve; Alto, Alan; Ayala, Hala; Bassolino, John; Bauer, Sarah LTJG; Boyd, Barry CWO; Boyd, Jay; Boyd, Jay F.; Brewer, George CWO; Cownie, Brodie LT; Figueroa, Nylsa; Fleming, Benjamin LT; Fontana, Richard CDR; Hartinger, Dan; Harwood, Fred; Henke, Doug; Hernandez, Glenn; Hested, Jim; Illuminate, Dave; Jacoby, Chad CDR; Jones, David L.; Driscoll, John LCDR; Leeper, Hank; Leeper, Henry; McLaughlin, Daniel CDR; Mitchell, Sean LT; Pearson, Steve; Powers, Geoffrey; Prokes, Terry; Reynolds, James LT; Rishar, David; Russell, Douglas CAPT; Sconiers, Thomas CWO; Walz, Michael CDR; Wood, John CDR
Cc: Carter, Justin LT; Carter, Justin LT
Subject: RE: MATAGORDA_122004_2200, METOMPKIN_122004_2200

Any new status on Matagorda (scans, etc)

Rich

Richard Wright
ICGS C4ISR Domain Program Manager

US Coast Guard Integrated Deepwater System
office: 571.218.3426 / mobile: 571.214.5508

richard.wright@dwicgs.com
"... Mission success IS customer satisfaction!"

-----Original Message-----
From: Prokes, Terrence [mailto:TProkes@comdt.uscg.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, December 21, 2004 4:14 PM
To: Wharton, Rick; Wilhelm, Douglas G; Buford, Danny D. (Ship Systems); Calvin, Wally (Ship Systems); Colella, Harry (EXT); Conrad, Robert D. (Ship Systems); Driscoll, John LCDR; Frei, Kevin R; Hajduk, Philip J; Lang, Donald H; McLaverty, Brian; Meredith, Lawrence O; Mihelic, Joseph CAPT; Payne, Jeffrey LTJG; Porter, Ronald; Talley-Green, Shonda; Wright, Richard; Adkins, Steve; Alto, Alan; Ayala, Hala; Bassolino, John; Bauer, Sarah LTJG; Boyd, Barry; Boyd, Jay; Boyd, Jay F.; Brewer, George CWO; Cownie, Brodie LT; Figueroa, Nylsa; Fleming, Benjamin LT; Fontana, Richard; Hartinger, Dan; Harwood, Fred; Henke, Doug; Hernandez, Glenn; Hested, Jim; Illuminate, Dave; Jacoby, Chad; Jones, David; Driscoll, John LCDR; Leeper, Hank; Leeper, Henry; McLaughlin, Daniel; Mitchell, Sean LT; Pearson, Steve; Powers, Geoffrey; Prokes, Terry; Reynolds, James LT; Rishar, David; Russell, Douglas; Sconiers, Thomas CWO; Walz, Michael; Wood, John
Cc: Carter, Justin LT; Carter, Justin LT
Subject: RE: MATAGORDA_122004_2200, METOMPKIN_122004_2200
Importance: High

Rick,

Metompkin schedule needs some major re-writes so the dates align (i.e. SSAA package not delivered to SMO until 2/8/05 - Testing conducted 1/19/05?). Recommend we review it at the meeting.

Some items I noted:

Line # 21: Vessel schedule to depart BSI on 1/10/05

Line # 41: Vessel will not be launched until 1/4/05

Line #42: Suspect this date will be 1/5/05
Line #?: Need to add update Phone System
Line #90: Re-inspection not required - change to "Notify D7 Security MGR of corrections" & "D7 Security MGR issues letter"

Line # ??: Add line to Visual Tempest Inspection "Install screen in LE Locker Door"
Line #121 & 122: Apply for and ATO approved on 1/26-2/1 conflict with lines 123 thru 130 SSAA package dates 2/2-8/05 (SSAA package must be submitted before ATO is approved).

Lines # 131-138: Dates do not match SSAA Package dates (lines 123-130) and Software Vulnerability dates (lines 106-122)

Line #154: Testing dates are scheduled before all requirements are completed (i.e. Software Vulnerability - line 106, SSAA package - line 123, SIPRNET ATO - line 131.

Thanks,

Terry Prokes
ILS Transition Manager
Commandant (G-DTM)
U.S. Coast Guard
Deepwater Transition Management
e-mail: tprokes@comdt.uscg.mil
PH: 202.267.0445
Cell: 202.498.2591

-----Original Message-----
From: Wharton, Rick [mailto:Rick.Wharton@dwicgs.com]
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 11:21 PM
To: Wilhelm, Douglas G; Buford, Danny D. (Ship Systems); Calvin, Wally (Ship Systems); Colella, Harry (EXT); Conrad, Robert D. (Ship Systems); Driscoll, John LCDR; Frei, Kevin R; Hajduk, Philip J; Lang, Donald H; McLaverty, Brian; Meredith, Lawrence O; Mihelic, Joseph CAPT; Payne, Jeffrey LTJG; Porter, Ronald; Talley-Green, Shonda; Wright, Richard; Adkins, Steve; Alto, Alan; Ayala, Hala; Bassolino, John; Bauer, Sarah LTJG; Boyd, Barry CWO; Boyd, Jay; Boyd, Jay F.; Brewer, George CWO; Cownie, Brodie LT; Figueroa, Nylsa; Fleming, Benjamin LT; Fontana, Richard CDR; Hartinger, Dan; Harwood, Fred; Henke, Doug; Hernandez, Glenn; Hested, Jim; Illuminate, Dave; Jacoby, Chad CDR; Jones, David; Driscoll, John LCDR; Leeper, Hank; Leeper, Henry; McLaughlin, Daniel CDR; Mitchell, Sean LT; Pearson, Steve; Powers, Geoffrey; Prokes, Terry; Reynolds, James LT; Rishar, David; Russell, Douglas CAPT; Sconiers, Thomas CWO; Prokes, Terrence; Walz, Michael CDR; Wharton, Rick; Wood, John CDR
Subject: MATAGORDA_122004_2200, METOMPKIN_122004_2200

Matagorda departed BSI today, one day earlier than planned to avoid weather later in the week. All warranty items corrected with the exception of the steering system breather cap, which will be shipped to the boat in Key West. Several C4ISR items being tested enroute Key West. Low Smoke Cable and Cable Tag DD-250 items pend resolution, but have no operational impact on the cutter. Solid door to LE locker was modified to an expanded metal cage-type door, eliminating the need for a protected distribution system for red cables in the space. If CATV filter/attenuator cannot be obtained in time to support TEMPEST final cert, cable will be disconnected (already discussed with Ron Porter) Talked with Dave Jones this morning - TISCOM personnel were onboard performing a scan of the

C4ISR software enroute New Orleans. Plan for SPAWAR to scan 27 Dec. ATO remains on track to be completed before 12 Jan.

BSI and on-site LM personnel turning their attention to Metompkin. Plan is to complete most of the outstanding warranty/DD-250 items before holiday shutdown. Fins have been removed and port lower bearing housing being replaced. Damaged prop being replaced with props (replaced as a pair) originally intended for Manitou - next set, intended to be spares, will be available early January in plenty of time to support Manitou launch.

<<MATAOGORDA_122004_2200.pdf>> <<MATAOGORDA_122004_2200.mpp>> <<METOMPKIN_122004_2200.pdf>> <<METOMPKIN_122004_2200.mpp>>

--
Rick Wharton
Northrop Grumman Ship Systems
123 WPB Asset Manager
Integrated Coast Guard Systems, LLC
US Coast Guard Deepwater Program
Ph: (571) 218-3221
Cell: (703) 627-0048
Fax: (571) 218-3342

USCGC MATAGORDA – SECOND VISUAL TEMPEST INSPECTION
December 19, 2004

CGC MATAGORDA

1. Secure ground for ARC-210. Ground is loose. Recommend removing nut on front of braid to ensure maximum contact with equipment shelf.
2. Hand-held radios less than one meter from STE. Recommend unit SOP be worded to turn radios off prior to charging. Post sign to emphasize same.

CO's STATEROOM

3. Separate CLASSIFIED and UNCLASSIFIED LAN cables by two inches.

XO's STATEROOM

4. Separate CLASSIFIED and UNCLASSFIED LAN cables by two inches.

CLASSIFIED SERVER ROOM

5. CATV isolator required on cable prior to exiting ship. Recommend placing isolator in Cabinet 5 of UNCLAS Server rack.

6. Recommend CLASSIFED and UNCLASSIFIED stickers on LAN outlet boxes in view of the fact that the connectors and jacks are interchangeable.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
United States Coast Guard

Commander
Maintenance and Logistics Command Atlantic

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2241
05.0381

OCT 28 2005

MEMORANDUM

From: B. J. O'Keefe CAPT
MLCLANT (t)

Reply to: (tp-1)
Attn of: Ernestine Cook
(757) 628-4051

To: CGC MATAGORDA (WPB 1303)

Subj: VISUAL TEMPEST INSPECTION OF USCGC MATAGORDA (WPB 1303)

Ref: (a) DON IA PUB 5239-31 Information Assurance Shipboard Red/Black Installation Publication
(b) NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95 Red/Black Installation Guidance

1. Mr. Timothy Neary of ESU Miami conducted an inspection of the Secure Electrical Information Processing System (SEIPS) onboard CGC MATAGORDA on 3 August 2005. The inspection was conducted as required by references (a) and (b). A summary of corrected discrepancies is listed in enclosure (1). No new discrepancies were found.

2. This summary provides a record of the installation at the time of inspection. Modifications or changes to the SEIPS shall not be made without approval of TISCOM (isd-3b) or MLCA. This summary and amendments to this summary shall be retained in the unit's SEIPS TEMPEST documentation file.

#

Enclosure: (1) Visual TEMPEST Inspection Report

Copy: LANTAREA
TISCOM (isd-3b)
ESU Miami
ESD Key West

ENCLOSURES(3)

Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

USCGC MATAGORDA (WPB 1303)
3 August 2005

This Visual TEMPEST Inspection is for the FTA Visit

The entire Secure Electrical Information Processing System was inspected.

List of spaces with secure processing equipment inspected by the visual TEMPEST inspector:

1. Electronic space
2. Bridge

Discrepancy form legend:

Column A: Sequential discrepancy number

Column B:

SF	Correction of the discrepancy is within the capability of ship's force.
IAC	Correction of the discrepancy was completed by ships force prior to completion of inspection visit.
IA	Indicates that the assistance of an industrial activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
IAC	Indicates that an industrial activity corrected the discrepancy.
SA	Indicates that the assistance of a support activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
SAC	Indicates that a support activity corrected the discrepancy.
CA	Indicates that the Contractor Activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.

Column C: Reference of the paragraph in designated manuals to which the installation does not conform.

Narrative: A brief description of the discrepancy found.

Enclosure (1)

Discrepancies and Corrective Action Report

1. Electronic Space:

A	B	C	Narrative
01	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a/pg16 para 5 IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.1 a, b	Cabinet 3: Black RF transmitter (RT-1794) in same rack as Red Processors. Recommend moving 3 meters away or in adjacent Black Equipment Room. Recommend placing entire ARC-210 system on Bridge. Waived.
02	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2b	Cabinet 3: Red processor less than one meter away from power line to black transmitter (RT-1794 p/o ARC-210). Waived.
03	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 27 Para 2a	Cabinet 3: Red processor less than one meter away from black signal lines connected to RF transmitter (RT-1794). Waived.
04	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 27 Para 4, Para 4.4.1.1, 4.1.1.2 IA PUB 5239-31 Para A.1.7.1 IA PUB 5239-31 MIL-STD 188-124B Para 5.2.12	Signal cable used with RED processors, BLACK processors, ISDN telephones are not terminated. Red data cables for RED LAN have aluminum/mylar shielding. Manufacturer data: DRAKA COMTEQ (F) ShipLan Cable 4PR 24 AWG Screened 307650. Subject cable may pose a TEMPEST hazard. B.1.2.5 (5239): Approved cables. Mil-C-17 (ref k), or MIL-C-915 (reference(l)), MIL-C-24640(reference(n)) or MIL-C-24643 (reference (o)). Researched cable and found that it does NOT meet any of the above MIL-SPECs. Draka sells data cables that are MIL-DTL-24643 compliant. Subject cables are CAT 5e Shiplan '59W' , '59' and '59S' Marine data cables. The cables listed all have a braided shield in addition to the aluminum mylar tape. The braided shield allows for a flexible ground. NSTISSAM 2-95: RED processors meeting the requirements of NSTISSAM TEMPEST/1-92 (Levels I, II, or III) must use optical or shielded wire cables if specified as part of the manufacturer's installation specification, or if specified for compliance with TEMPEST certification. Paragraphs 4.4.1.1, and 4.1.1.2 defines cable characteristics and shield termination. IA Pub 5239-31: RED Shielded Metallic Wire Cable. RED metallic wire cables in all locations shall be shielded, with the exception of desktop computer cables that are provided by the manufacturer, where there is not an offered shielded cable option. This requirement is not applicable to RED fiber optic cables. MIL-STD-188 "Foil shields are not acceptable for peripheral bonding and do not provide mechanical durability" IA Pub 5239-31 pg B-9 Para d. Note: "If both ends of the cable will not have the shield taken to ground, approval by the cognizant CTTA should be obtained prior to installation." Other source (AFMAN33-214V2 DATED 21SEP2001) states that foil shielding is intended for voice or digital signals less than 5Kbps. CG must assume risks associated with using subject cable. This is also documented in Instrumented Test Report. Acceptable risk. No discrepancy.

05	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 28 Para 6	RED processors and RF transmitters in Cabinet 3. RED processors should not be powered from the same circuits as RF transmitters. Waived.
06	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.10	AN/UPX-28 has flexible ground strap with crimped ends. Replace with Class C bond strap. Corrected.
07	CA	IA Pub 5239-31	On racks, install ground cables per IA 5239-31. Where required, use soldered connectors vice crimping. Waived.
08	CA	IA Pub 5259-31	Remove external tooth washers on ground connectors to cabinets. Use lock washers and lug nuts per IA Instruction 5239-31 Figure B-5. Corrected
09	CA	IA Pub 5239 B.1.2.6.12	Keyboard and Monitor in Cabinet #1 has non –manufacturer supplied power cable. Bond shelf to rack. Contends it is manufacturer's cable. Waived.
10	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Para 3 Notes 3	RED/BLACK cable separation. Two inch minimum separation requirement. Six inch separation requirement for RED/BLACK cables that run in parallel for 100 ft runs. The only way to ID is via cable tags. Waived.
11	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.10	Remove flexible ground strap with crimped ends from ANDVT rack and replace with Class C solid. Strap. Corrected.
12	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.	ARC-210 Secure voice cables. Transmit and receive audio lines need to be shielded. Resolved. See 2. Bridge item #4.
13	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	Operator position in Classified C4ISR room has cables from two UNCLAS LAN and three CLASSIFIED LAN connections. Require 2 inch (5 cm) separation. Waived.

2. Bridge:

01	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	LAN (RED) and GPS (BLACK) use common junction box. No RED/BLACK separation. Corrected, moved BLACK LAN and GPS to separate junction boxes. RED LAN is routed in common cable run. Does not have minimum separation. See item #10.
02	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.13	No metal-to-metal contact for ground strap from ARC 210 Tray to ground on shelf. Recommend use SOLID Class C ground strap vice crimped wire. Corrected.
03	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.7.2a	Not clear if Shielded Twisted Pair is used for voice and control wirelines. SPAWAR will inspect and test during Instrumented TEMPEST test. NOTE: No discrepancy noted by SPAWAR testing. Reference to ARC-210. Informed by Harris Corp that kit provided included shielding of all RED cables. Corrected.
04	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.2 Pg A-3	Unshielded cable connected to connector J3 on ARC-210 Tray. Twisted red wires (four) runs to ARC-210 Control head mounted in the forward console of the bridge. This is the Control and Status of the ARC-210. All data is by channel/mode/power only, no audio is routed to the Control head. Replace cable run with proper cable. This cable should be shielded. Corrected.

3. Other:

01	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	CO's cabin. RED and BLACK LAN ports have no cable separation. Recommend 2 inch separation. RED/BLACK cable is tied together. Acceptable risk while underway. No discrepancy.
02	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 1	CO's cabin. Proposed RED laptop on desk top less than 20 inches (20 cm) from black phone. Acceptable risk while underway. No discrepancy.
03	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.3.1.b	RED Fiber optic cable goes through space adjacent to black racks that contains hasp for locking. If the cable passes through normally locked spaces (for example, voids, staterooms, etc), that portion of the cable shall be contained in a metallic conduit. This space is the cutters armory and is considered a restricted area. Corrected.

TEMPEST 2/95

Department of the Navy (DoN) Information Assurance (IA) Publication Module 5239-31

MIL-STD-188-124B Grounding Bonding Shielding for Common Long Haul/Tactical Communications Systems

Air Force Manual 33-214, Volume 2, Communications and Information Emission Security Countermeasures Review

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
United States Coast Guard

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06.0362

DEC 2 6 2006

MEMORANDUM

From: B. J. O'Keefe CAPT
MLCLANT (t)

Reply to: (tp-1)
Attn of: Ernestine Cook
(757) 628-4051

To: CGC MONHEGAN (WPB 1305)

Subj: VISUAL TEMPEST INSPECTION OF USCGC MONHEGAN (WPB 1305)

Ref: (a) DON IA PUB 5239-31 Information Assurance Shipboard Red/Black Installation
(b) NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95A Red/Black Installation Guidance
(c) COMDT COGARD Washington DC//CG-62//042137Z Mar 04

1. Mr. Brian Meetze of ESD Miami Beach, LT Jim Cabase of COMDT (CG-623), and ET2 Michael Harrison of ESD Key West conducted a Visual Tempest Inspection (VTI) of the Secure Electrical Information Processing System (SEIPS) onboard CGC MONHEGAN on 2 November 2006. The inspection was conducted as required by references (a) and (b).

2. A summary of minor discrepancies is listed in enclosure (1). No serious TEMPEST hazards were noted; therefore, you may continue normal operations. In accordance with reference (c), discrepancies must be corrected within 90 days. You should contact Ms. Ernestine Cook to schedule a re-inspection. This summary also provides a record of the installation at the time of inspection. Modifications or changes to the SEIPS shall not be made without approval of TISCOM (isd-3b) or MLCLANT.

3. This summary and amendments to this summary shall be retained in the unit's SEIPS TEMPEST documentation file.

#

Enclosure: (1) Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

Copy: COMDT (CG-623)
LANTAREA
TISCOM (isd-3b)
ESU Miami
ESD Key West

Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

USCGC MONHEGAN (WPB 1305)
2 November 2006

This Visual TEMPEST Inspection is for the FTA Visit.

The entire Secure Electrical Information Processing System was inspected.

List of spaces with secure processing equipment inspected by the visual TEMPEST inspector:

1. Electronic space
2. Bridge
3. Other

Discrepancy form legend:

Column A: Sequential discrepancy number

Column B:

Waived	Discrepancies granted a waiver as a result of instrumented testing and per TISCOM ltr of 12 Jul 05.
SF	Correction of the discrepancy is within the capability of ship's force.
IAC	Correction of the discrepancy was completed by ships force prior to completion of inspection visit.
IA	Indicates that the assistance of an industrial activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
IAC	Indicates that an industrial activity corrected the discrepancy.
SA	Indicates that the assistance of a support activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
SAC	Indicates that a support activity corrected the discrepancy.
CA	Indicates that the Contractor Activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.

Column C: Reference of the paragraph in designated manuals to which the installation does not conform.

Narrative: A brief description of the discrepancy found.

Discrepancies and Corrective Action Report

1. Electronic Space:

A	B	C	Narrative
01	Waived	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95A PG 27 Para 2a/pg16 para 5 IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.1 a, b	Cabinet 3: Black RF transmitter (RT-1794) in same rack as Red Processors. Recommend moving 3 meters away or in adjacent Black Equipment Room. Recommend placing entire ARC-210 system on Bridge.
02	Waived	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95A PG 27 Para 2b	Cabinet 3: Red processor less than one meter away from power line to black transmitter (RT-1794 p/o ARC-210).
03	Waived	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95A pg 27 Para 2a	Cabinet 3: Red processor less than one meter away from black signal lines connected to RF transmitter (RT-1794).
04	Waived	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 28 Para 6	RED processors and RF transmitters in Cabinet 3. RED processors should not be powered from the same circuits as RF transmitters.
05	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95A Para 3 Notes: 3	RED/BLACK cable separation. Two inch minimum separation requirement. Six inch separation requirement for RED/BLACK cables that run in parallel for 100 ft runs. The only way to ID is via cable tags.
06	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.	ARC-210 and ANDVT Secure voice cables. Transmit and receive audio lines need to be shielded.
07	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95A Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	Operator position in Classified C4ISR room has cables from two UNCLAS LAN and three CLASSIFIED LAN connections. Require 2 inch (5 cm) separation.
08	CA	IA 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.2.a.	Outer shield missing on KIV-7 db connector.
09	Waived	IA 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6	Cabinet 1: Not grounded properly to ship's hull (i.e. Spring coils do not constitute a Class C bond).
10	Waived	IA 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6	Cabinet 2: Not grounded properly to ship's hull (i.e. Spring coils do not constitute a Class C bond).
11	Waived	IA 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6	Cabinet 3: Not grounded properly to ship's hull (i.e. Spring coils do not constitute a Class C bond).
12	CA	IA 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6	KG-175/TACLANE in Cabinet 3 missing grounding hardware.

2. Bridge:

01	Waived	NSTISSAM 2-95A Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	LAN (RED) cable is routed in conjunction with common cable run. No RED/BLACK separation.
02	CA	IA 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6	Starboard KITE 1: Replace ground wire with Class C bonding.
03	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95A Pg 30 Para 4.4.1	Starboard KITE 1: Cable shielding not grounded at connector (J1).
04	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95A Pg 30 Para 4.4.1	Port KITE 2: Cable shielding not grounded at connector (J1).
05	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95A Recommendation I	Starboard KITE 1: Missing 3 meter separation between RF transmitter and Red processor.
06	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95A Recommendation I	Port KITE 2: Missing 3 meter separation between RF transmitter and Red processor.

3. Other:

01	Waived	NSTISSAM 2-95A Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	CO's and XO's cabin. RED cables of associated LAN drops are routed through a common cable run (i.e. black signal and power lines). Recommend 2 inch separation.

NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95A

Department of the Navy (DoN) Information Assurance (IA) Publication Module 5239-31

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

United States Coast Guard

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2241
05.0380

OCT 14 2005

MEMORANDUM

From: B. J. O'Keefe CAPT
MLCLANT (t)

Reply to: (tp-1)
Attn of: Ernestine Cook
(757) 628-4051

To: CGC METOMPKIN (WPB 1325)

Subj: VISUAL TEMPEST INSPECTION SUMMARY OF USCGC METOMPKIN (WPB 1325)

Ref: (a) DON IA PUB 5239-31 Information Assurance Shipboard Red/Black Installation Publication
(b) NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95 Red/Black Installation Guidance
(c) TISCOM (isd-3b) Memo 2241 of 12 Jul 05
(d) COMDT COGARD Washington DC//CG-62//042137Z Mar 04

1. Mr. Timothy Neary of ESU Miami conducted an inspection of the Secure Electrical Information Processing System (SEIPS) onboard CGC METOMPKIN on 4 August 2005. The inspection was conducted as required by references (a) and (b). Reference (c) cites waivers that have been given and will not be reported. A summary of a minor discrepancy is listed in enclosure (1).

2. No serious TEMPEST hazards were noted; therefore you may continue normal operations. In accordance with reference (d), discrepancies must be corrected within 90 days. You should contact Ms. Ernestine Cook to schedule a re-inspection. This summary also provides a record of the installation at the time of inspection. Modifications or changes to the SEIPS shall not be made without approval of TISCOM (isd-3b) or MLCA.

3. This summary and amendments to this summary shall be retained in the unit's SEIPS TEMPEST documentation file.

#

Enclosure: (1) Visual TEMPEST Inspection Report

Copy: LANTAREA
TISCOM (isd-3b)
ESU Miami
ESD Key West

Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

USCGC METOMPKIN
4 August 2005

The entire Secure Electrical Information Processing System was inspected.

List of spaces with secure processing equipment inspected by the visual TEMPEST inspector:

1. CIC
2. Radio

Discrepancy form legend:

Column A: Sequential discrepancy number

Column B:

- SF — Correction of the discrepancy is within the capability of ship's force.
- SFC — Correction of the discrepancy was completed by ships force prior to completion of inspection visit.
- IA — Indicates that the assistance of an industrial activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
- IAC — Indicates that an industrial activity corrected the discrepancy.
- SA — Indicates that the assistance of a support activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
- SAC — Indicates that a support activity corrected the discrepancy.

Column C: Document Reference to which the installation does not conform.

Narrative: A brief description of the discrepancy found.

ENCLOSURE (1)

Discrepancies and Corrective Action Report

1. CIC:

A	B	C	Narrative
001	SA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.3.1.b	RED fiber optic passes through armory, which has a solid metal door. If the cable passes through locked spaces, it shall be contained in PDS. The TISCOM compromise, a mesh door to permit physical inspection, is scheduled to be installed during the next shipyard period.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

United States Coast Guard

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SEP 13 2005

MEMORANDUM

From: B. J. O'Keefe CAPT
MLCLANT (t)

Reply to: (tp-1)
Attn of: Ernestine Cook
(757) 628-4051

To: CGC NUNIVAK (WPB 1306)

Subj: VISUAL TEMPEST INSPECTION SUMMARY FOR USCGC NUNIVAK (WPB 1306)

Ref: (a) NSTISSAM 2-95 Red/Black Installation Guidance
(b) DON IA PUB 5239-31 Information Assurance Shipboard Red/Black Installation Publication
(c) COMDT COGARD Washington DC//CG-62//042137Z Mar 04

1. ET2 Timothy Cole of ESD New Orleans conducted an inspection of the Secure Electrical Information Processing System (SEIPS) on CGC NUNIVAK on 7 January 2005. The inspection was conducted as required by references (a) and (b).

2. Enclosure (1) is a summary of minor discrepancies with the SEIPS. No serious TEMPEST hazards were noted; therefore, you may continue normal operations. In accordance with reference (c), discrepancies must be corrected within 90 days. You should contact Ms. Ernestine Cook to schedule a re-inspection. This summary also provides a record of the installation at the time of the inspection. Modifications or changes to the SEIPS shall not be made without the approval of TISCOM (isd-3b) or MLCA.

Subj: VISUAL TEMPEST INSPECTION SUMMARY 2241
FOR USCGC NUNIVAK (WPB 1306) SEP 13 2005

3. This summary and amendments to this summary shall be retained in the unit's SEIPS (TEMPEST) documentation file.

#

Enclosures: (1) Visual Tempest Inspection Summary
(2) TISCOM (isd-3b) Memo 2241 of 12 Jul 05

Copy: COMDT (CG-6, G-DPM-3)
LANTAREA
TISCOM (isd-3b)
ESU New Orleans
ESD New Orleans
ESU Miami
ESD Key West

Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

The entire Secure Electrical Information Processing System was inspected.

List of spaces with secure processing equipment inspected by the visual TEMPEST inspector:

1. Radio Room
2. State Rooms
3. Bridge

Discrepancy form legend:

Column A: Sequential discrepancy number

Column B:

SF	Correction of the discrepancy is within the capability of ship's force.
SFC	Correction of the discrepancy was completed by ships force prior to completion of inspection visit.
IA	Indicates that the assistance of an industrial activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
IAC	Indicates that an industrial activity corrected the discrepancy.
SA	Indicates that the assistance of a support activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
SAC	Indicates that a support activity corrected the discrepancy.
CA	Indicates that a Contractor activity is required to correct the discrepancy.

Column C: Document Reference to which the installation does not conform.

Narrative: A brief description of the discrepancy found.

Discrepancies and Corrective Action Report

1. Radio Room 2-28-O-Q

A	B	C	Narrative
001	IA/SA	IA PUB 5239-31 Paragraph A.1.1.2	The printer (red) uses black power. The printer router (red) uses black power. Recommend plugging printer into UPS.
002	*Waived	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 6	There is no 3meter separation between printer (red) and IFF transmitter. Transmitter is enclosed in metal case. Prototype passed RED LAN instrumented test. WAIVED
003	*Waived	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 6	In Rack #3, there is no 3meter separation between red and black cables before entering the Marcom switch. Tested and evaluated by SPAWAR previously. WAIVED
004	*Waived	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 6	In Rack #3, there is no 3meter separation between cryptographic equipment and RT9000 transceiver. Tested and evaluated by SPAWAR. WAIVED
005	CA	IA PUB 5239-31 Paragraph A.1.1.7.3.1.B	There is not a secure Protected Distribution System (PDS) leaving Radio Room. LE Locker behind Secure Space. Item to be corrected by Contractor. LE locker will have full length locking cage to allow viewing of the subject cables.

Note: Separation of IFF antenna line and Class LAN line may be part of an upcoming GROOM

• Per TISCOM (isd-3b) ltr of 12 Jul 05

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
United States Coast Guard

Commander
Maintenance and Logistics Command Atlantic

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2241
05.0382
OCT 27 2006

MEMORANDUM

From: B. J. O'Keefe CAPT
MLCLANT (t)

Reply to: (tp-1)
Attn of: Ernestine Cook
(757) 628-4051

To: USCGC ATTU (WPB 1317)

Subj: VISUAL TEMPEST INSPECTION SUMMARY OF USCGC ATTU (WPB 1317)

Ref: (a) DON IA PUB 5239-31 Information Assurance Shipboard Red/Black Installation Publication
(b) NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95 Red/Black Installation Guidance

1. Mr. Timothy Neary of ESU Miami conducted a visual TEMPEST inspection of the Secure Electrical Information Processing System (SEIPS) onboard CGC ATTU on 3 August 2005. The inspection was conducted as required by references (a) and (b). A summary of corrected discrepancies is listed in enclosure (1). No new discrepancies were found.

2. This summary provides a record of the installation at the time of inspection. Modifications or changes to the SEIPS shall not be made without approval of TISCOM (isd-3b) or MLCA. This summary and amendments to this summary shall be retained in the unit's SEIPS TEMPEST documentation file.

#

Enclosure: (1) Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

Copy: LANTAREA
TISCOM (isd-3b)
ESU Miami
ESD Key West

Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

USCGC ATTU (WPB 1317)
3 August 2005

This Visual TEMPEST Inspection is for the FTA Visit

The entire Secure Electrical Information Processing System was inspected.

List of spaces with secure processing equipment inspected by the visual TEMPEST inspector:

1. Electronic space
2. Bridge

Discrepancy form legend:

Column A: Sequential discrepancy number

Column B:

SF	Correction of the discrepancy is within the capability of ship's force.
IAC	Correction of the discrepancy was completed by ships force prior to completion of inspection visit.
IA	Indicates that the assistance of an industrial activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
IAC	Indicates that an industrial activity corrected the discrepancy.
SA	Indicates that the assistance of a support activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
SAC	Indicates that a support activity corrected the discrepancy.
CA	Indicates that the Contractor Activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.

Column C: Reference of the paragraph in designated manuals to which the installation does not conform.

Narrative: A brief description of the discrepancy found.

Enclosure (1)

Discrepancies and Corrective Action Report

1. Electronic Space:

A	B	C	Narrative
01	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a/pg16 para 5 IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.1 a, b	Cabinet 3: Black RF transmitter (RT-1794) in same rack as Red Processors. Recommend moving 3 meters away or in adjacent Black Equipment Room. Recommend placing entire ARC-210 system on Bridge. Waived.
02	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2b	Cabinet 3: Red processor less than one meter away from power line to black transmitter (RT-1794 p/o ARC-210). Waived.
03	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 27 Para 2a	Cabinet 3: Red processor less than one meter away from black signal lines connected to RF transmitter (RT-1794). Waived.
04	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 27 Para 4, Para 4.4.1.1, 4.1.1.2 IA PUB 5239-31 Para A.1.7.1 IA PUB 5239-31 MIL-STD 188-124B Para 5.2.12	Signal cable used with RED processors, BLACK processors, ISDN telephones are not terminated. Red data cables for RED LAN have aluminum/mylar shielding. Manufacturer data: DRAKA COMTEQ (F) ShipLan Cable 4PR 24 AWG Screened 307650. Subject cable may pose a TEMPEST hazard. B.1.2.5 (5239): Approved cables. Mil-C-17 (ref k), or MIL-C-915 (reference(l)), MIL-C-24640(reference(n)) or MIL-C-24643 (reference (o)). Researched cable and found that it does NOT meet any of the above MIL-SPECs. Draka sells data cables that are MIL-DTL-24643 compliant. Subject cables are CAT 5e Shiplan '59W' , '59' and '59S' Marine data cables. The cables listed all have a braided shield in addition to the aluminum mylar tape. The braided shield allows for a flexible ground. NSTISSAM 2-95: RED processors meeting the requirements of NSTISSAM TEMPEST/1-92 (Levels I, II, or III) must use optical or shielded wire cables if specified as part of the manufacturer's installation specification, or if specified for compliance with TEMPEST certification. Paragraphs 4.4.1.1, and 4.1.1.2 defines cable characteristics and shield termination. IA Pub 5239-31: RED Shielded Metallic Wire Cable. RED metallic wire cables in all locations shall be shielded, with the exception of desktop computer cables that are provided by the manufacturer, where there is not an offered shielded cable option. This requirement is not applicable to RED fiber optic cables. MIL-STD-188 "Foil shields are not acceptable for peripheral bonding and do not provide mechanical durability" IA Pub 5239-31 pg B-9 Para d. Note: "If both ends of the cable will not have the shield taken to ground, approval by the cognizant CTTA should be obtained prior to installation." Other source (AFMAN33-214V2 DATED 21SEP2001) states that foil shielding is intended for voice or digital signals less than 5Kbps. CG must assume risks associated with using subject cable. This is also documented in Instrumented Test Report. Acceptable risk. No discrepancy.

05	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 28 Para 6	RED processors and RF transmitters in Cabinet 3. RED processors should not be powered from the same circuits as RF transmitters. Waived.
06	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.10	AN/UPX-28 has flexible ground strap with crimped ends. Replace with Class C bond strap. Corrected.
07	CA	IA Pub 5239-31	On racks, install ground cables per IA 5239-31. Where required, use soldered connectors vice crimping. Waived.
08	CA	IA Pub 5259-31	Remove external tooth washers on ground connectors to cabinets. Use lock washers and lug nuts per IA Instruction 5239-31 Figure B-5. Corrected
09	CA	IA Pub 5239 B.1.2.6.12	Keyboard and Monitor in Cabinet #1 has non –manufacturer supplied power cable. Bond shelf to rack. Contends it is manufacturer's cable. Waived.
10	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Para 3 Notes 3	RED/BLACK cable separation. Two inch minimum separation requirement. Six inch separation requirement for RED/BLACK cables that run in parallel for 100 ft runs. The only way to ID is via cable tags. Waived.
11	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.10	Remove flexible ground strap with crimped ends from ANDVT rack and replace with Class C solid. Strap. Corrected.
12	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.	ARC-210 Secure voice cables. Transmit and receive audio lines need to be shielded. Resolved. See 2. Bridge item #4.
13	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	Operator position in Classified C4ISR room has cables from two UNCLAS LAN and three CLASSIFIED LAN connections. Require 2 inch (5 cm) separation. Waived.

2. Bridge:

01	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	LAN (RED) and GPS (BLACK) use common junction box. No RED/BLACK separation. Corrected, moved BLACK LAN and GPS to separate junction boxes. RED LAN is routed in common cable run. Does not have minimum separation. See item #10.
02	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.13	No metal-to-metal contact for ground strap from ARC 210 Tray to ground on shelf. Recommend use SOLID Class C ground strap vice crimped wire. Corrected.
03	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.7.2a	Not clear if Shielded Twisted Pair is used for voice and control wirelines. SPAWAR will inspect and test during Instrumented TEMPEST test. NOTE: No discrepancy noted by SPAWAR testing. Reference to ARC-210. Informed by Harris Corp that kit provided included shielding of all RED cables. Corrected.
04	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.2 Pg A-3	Unshielded cable connected to connector J3 on ARC-210 Tray. Twisted red wires (four) runs to ARC-210 Control head mounted in the forward console of the bridge. This is the Control and Status of the ARC-210. All data is by channel/mode/power only, no audio is routed to the Control head. Replace cable run with proper cable. This cable should be shielded. Corrected.

3. Other:

01	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	CO's cabin. RED and BLACK LAN ports have no cable separation. Recommend 2 inch separation. RED/BLACK cable is tied together. Acceptable risk while underway. No discrepancy.
02	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 1	CO's cabin. Proposed RED laptop on desk top less than 20 inches (20 cm) from black phone. Acceptable risk while underway. No discrepancy.
03	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.3.1.b	RED Fiber optic cable goes through space adjacent to black racks that contains hasp for locking. If the cable passes through normally locked spaces (for example, voids, staterooms, etc), that portion of the cable shall be contained in a metallic conduit. This space is the cutters armory and is considered a restricted area. Corrected.

TEMPEST 2/95

Department of the Navy (DoN) Information Assurance (IA) Publication Module 5239-31

MIL-STD-188-124B Grounding Bonding Shielding for Common Long Haul/Tactical Communications Systems

Air Force Manual 33-214, Volume 2, Communications and Information Emission Security Countermeasures Review

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
United States Coast Guard

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SEP 13 2005

MEMORANDUM

From: B. J. O'Keefe CAPT
MLCLANT (t)

Reply to (tp-1)
Attn of: Ernestine Cook
(757) 628-4051

To: USCGC VASHON (WPB 1308)

Subj: VISUAL TEMPEST INSPECTION SUMMARY OF USCGC VASHON (WPB 1308)

Ref: (a) DON IA PUB 5239-31 Information Assurance Shipboard Red/Black Installation
(b) NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95 Red/Black Installation Guidance

1. ETC David Cooper and ET2 James Bennett of ESD New Orleans conducted an inspection of the Secure Electrical Information Processing System (SEIPS) onboard CGC VASHON on 17 March 2005. The inspection was conducted as required by references (a) and (b). A list of discrepancies is noted in enclosure (1).

2. This summary provides a record of the installation at the time of inspection. Enclosure (2) provides the basis for waiver statements in enclosure (1). Modifications or changes to the SEIPS shall not be made without the approval of TISCOM (isd-3d) or MLCA.

3. This summary shall be retained in the unit's SEIPS (TEMPEST) documentation file.

#

Enclosures: (1) Visual Tempest Inspection Report
(2) TISCOM (isd-3b) Memo 2241 of 12 Jul 05

Copy: COMDT (CG-6, G-DPM-3)
LANTAREA
TISCOM (isd-3b)
ESU New Orleans
ESD New Orleans

Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

The entire Secure Electrical Information Processing System was inspected.

List of spaces with secure processing equipment inspected by the visual TEMPEST inspector:

1. Radio Room
2. State Rooms
3. Bridge

Discrepancy form legend:

Column A: Sequential discrepancy number

Column B:

SF Correction of the discrepancy is within the capability of ship's force.

SFC Correction of the discrepancy was completed by ships force prior to completion of inspection visit.

IA Indicates that the assistance of an industrial activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.

IAC Indicates that an industrial activity corrected the discrepancy.

SA Indicates that the assistance of a support activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.

SAC Indicates that a support activity corrected the discrepancy.

Column C: Document Reference to which the installation does not conform.

Narrative: A brief description of the discrepancy found.

ENCLOSURE (1)

Discrepancies and Corrective Action Report

1. Radio Room 2-29-2-Q

A	B	C	Narrative
001	WAIVED	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 1.A	The printer (red) is closer than 1 M to black IFF power lines. Waived as result of Instrumented Test on prototype.
002	WAIVED	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 2.A	The printer (red) along with Classified LAN line runs parallel with IFF transmitter antenna line. There is no separation of these lines. Waived as result of Instrumented Test on prototype.
003	WAIVED	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 6	There is no 3-meter separation between printer (red) and IFF transmitter. Waived as result of Instrumented Test and IFF metal enclosure.

2. State Rooms 1-16-1-L/1-16-2-L

A	B	C	Narrative
001	WAIVED	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 2.A Note 2	RED LAN Line is in same distribution panel with RF transmission lines. Waived as result of Instrumented Test on prototype.

3. Bridge

A	B	C	Narrative
001	WAIVED	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 2.A Note 2	RED LAN Line is in same distribution panel with RF transmission lines. Waived as result of Instrumented Test on prototype.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
United States Coast Guard

Commander
Maintenance and Logistics Command Atlantic

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MAR - 2 2006

MEMORANDUM

From: B. J. O'Keefe CAPT
MLCLANT (t)

Reply to: (tp-1)
Attn of: Ernestine Cook
(757) 628-4051

To: COMDT (G-DPM-3)

Subj: VISUAL TEMPEST INSPECTION FOR USCGC MANITOU (WPB 1302)

Ref: (a) NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95 Red/Black Installation Guidance
(b) DON IA PUB 5239-31 Shipboard Red/Black Installation
(c) COMDT COGARD Washington DC 042137Z Mar 04

1. ITC Kevin Priddy and ELC2 David Beaver of ESU St. Louis conducted a Visual TEMPEST Inspection (VTI) of the Secure Electrical Information Processing System (SEIPS) onboard CGC MANITOU on 23 January 2006. The inspection was conducted as required by references (a) and (b). A summary of minor discrepancies is listed in enclosure (1).

2. No serious TEMPEST hazards were noted; therefore you may continue normal operations. In accordance with reference (c), discrepancies must be corrected within 90 days. You should contact Ms. Ernestine Cook to schedule a re-inspection. This summary also provides a record of the installation at the time of inspection. Modifications or changes to the SEIPS shall not be made without the approval of TISCOM (isd-3b) or MLCA.

3. This summary and amendments to this summary shall be retained in the cutter's SEIPS TEMPEST documentation file.

#

Enclosure: (1) Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

Copy: COMDT (CG-6)
TISCOM (isd-3b)
LANTAREA
ESU St. Louis
ESU New Orleans
ESU Miami
CGC MANITOU

Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

CGC MANITOU

The Secure Electrical Information Processing System was inspected.

List of spaces with secure processing equipment inspected by the visual TEMPEST inspector:

1. Radio Room (Secure space)
2. State Rooms (Port & Starboard)
3. Bridge

Discrepancy form legend:

Column A: Sequential discrepancy number

Column B:

SF Correction of the discrepancy is within the capability of ship's force.

SFC Correction of the discrepancy was completed by ships force prior to completion of inspection visit.

IA Indicates that the assistance of an industrial activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.

IAC Indicates that an industrial activity corrected the discrepancy.

SA Indicates that the assistance of a support activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.

SAC Indicates that a support activity corrected the discrepancy.

CA Indicates that a Contractor activity is required to correct the discrepancy.

Column C: Document Reference to which the installation does not conform.

Narrative: A brief description of the discrepancy found.

Enclosure (1)

Discrepancies and Corrective Action Report

1. Radio Room (Secure Space) 2-29-2-Q:

A	B	C	Narrative
001	WAIVED	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 1.A	Red printer less than 1M separation from IFF transmitter.
002	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 2.A Note 2	Classified LAN in same wire bundle as black signal cables.
003	IAC	NSTISSAM 2-95 Paragraph 4.9.6	Commercial Television cable entering a secure space requires use of an amplifier/attenuator at the entry point of the space to provide one way filtering of electronic signals. Corrected. Filter is in rack.
004	WAIVED	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 2.A	The printer (red) along with Classified LAN line runs parallel with IFF antenna line. There is no separation of these lines.
005	WAIVED	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 1.B	There is no 1 meter separation between printer (red) and IFF transmitter RF cable.
006	WAIVED	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 1.B	There is no 1 meter separation between printer (red) and IFF transmitter black power line.

2. State Rooms 1-16-1-L/1-16-2-L:

001	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 2.A Note 2	Classified LAN lines are run with BLACK wire lines (no 5 centimeter separation).
002	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 2.B Note 2	Classified LAN lines are run with 120VAC power lines (no separation).
003	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 2.A	Class LAN box located adjacent to BLACK LAN box.

3. Bridge 03-14-01:

001	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 1. A & B	RED processor less than 1 meter from BLACK power lines and BLACK equipment. KITE-1 handset (2 each) physically cannot separate the lines. KITE-1 is an integrated remote hand set for RED and BLACK equipment.
002	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 1. A	Less than 1 meter of separation between RED processor and BLACK equipment on STBD side.
003	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 1. B	Less than 1 meter of separation between RED processor and BLACK wire lines on STBD side.
004	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 1.A	Less than 1 meter of separation between RED processor and BLACK power on STBD side.
005	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 2. B	Less than 5 centimeters of separation between RED wire line and BLACK wire line on STBD side.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION FORCE
7970 DIVEN STREET
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23505-1498

3980
Ser 76/2 [illegible]
APR 27 2005

From: Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force
To: Commandant, United States Coast Guard

Subj: UPDATE OF THE 123-FOOT PATROL BOAT (123' WPB) OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS (OAA) OF 29 SEP 04

Ref: (a) COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC 101705Z Mar 05
(b) COMOPTEVFOR ltr 3980 Ser 76/580 of 29 Sep 04
(c) COMOPTEVFOR ltr 3980 Ser 91/494 of 18 Jul 03

Encl: (1) OAA Update Matrix and Comments

1. **PURPOSE.** Reference (a) requested COMOPTEVFOR to provide an update to the 123' WPB upgrade OAA report (reference (b)).

CAVEAT: This observation does not constitute a formal phase of operational testing (OT), but rather a demonstration in which OT testers are actively involved, providing operational perspective and gaining valuable hands-on familiarity with the system. Data and findings from this observation may be used to supplement formal OT data, provided certain criteria are met. This observation does not resolve critical operational issues (COI) and does not reach conclusions regarding effectiveness or suitability.

2. **BACKGROUND.** COMOPTEVFOR conducted a review and update of the 123' WPB Upgrade OAA, including the supporting command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and Logistics Information Management System (LIMS) as they applied to both the cutter and the supporting operational and maintenance organizations. Observations were conducted in cutters MATAGORDA, METOMPKIN, PADRE, and NUNIVAK at U.S. Coast Guard Sector Key West and included observations at all immediate supporting organizations. This update period was not planned or coordinated by a program test and evaluation master plan and was not part of the 123' WPB OAA test plan (reference (c)). A separate test plan was not developed for this update. A review of the significant risks and associated recommendations provided in reference (b) was conducted and will provide the Deepwater program with current operational assessment of those significant risks to operational effectiveness and suitability, whose associated recommendations should be implemented prior to operational evaluation (OPEVAL).

3. RISK SUMMARY. The following table depicts the current level of risk assessed to be associated with the successful resolution of COIs prior to OPEVAL. Risk assessment is based upon a comparison of previously reported risks with 123' WPB and associated support system program improvements since completion of the OAA.

COI Assessments	OAA (9/29/04)	OAA Update (4/29/05)	Note
Surveillance, Detection, Classification, Identification and Prosecution (SDCIP)	Red	Red	
Tactics	Red	Red	
Survivability	Red	Red	
Joint Interoperability	White	Yellow	1
Connectivity	Red	Red	
Information Assurance (IA)	Yellow	Red	2
Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E^3)	Red	Green	3
Reliability	Red	Red	
Maintainability	Yellow	Red	4
Availability	Red	Red	
Logistic Supportability	Red	Red	
Compatibility	Yellow	Yellow	5
Interoperability	Yellow	Yellow	
Training	Red	Red	
Human Factors	Yellow	Yellow	
Safety	Red	Red	
Documentation	Yellow	Red	6

Color codes for OAAs are:

Red – High level of risk identified.
Yellow – Moderate level of risk identified.
Green - Little or no risk identified.
White – Not evaluated or assessed as a result of system immaturity or lack of information.

Notes:

1 Risk increase due to C4ISR system displaying no improvement in obtaining interface with other service/agency systems. There was no capability for track input, sharing, or for email/chat.

2 Risk increase due to decertification of the capability of the C4ISR installation to meet IA requirements on any cutters.

3 Risk mitigation due to TEMPEST certification and continuing resolution of identified discrepancies.

4 Risk increase due to insufficient progress on developing or updating training and certification programs, operating manuals, technical manuals, maintenance procedures, etc.

5 Although outside the scope of this assessment, it appears that the modifications to the 123' WPB may have contributed to the degradation of the structural integrity of the hull and overall compatibility with the operating environment.

6 Risk increase due to continued lack of operational and maintenance documentation despite significant program experience and cutter delivery.

4. RISK UPDATE COMMENTS. Enclosure (1) provides recommendations from reference (b) and the associated risks that provided the foundation for those initial recommendations. The last column of enclosure (1) provides comments resulting from this update period.

5. SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS

a. 123’ WPB

(1) Command and Control (C2). The C2 equipment and associated software packages provided with the modification have not demonstrated the capability to generate a local tactical picture (LTP), contribute to a collective tactical picture, or receive the Atlantic Area managed common operational picture (COP). Interoperability on classified voice circuits was limited to USCG shore stations, cutters, and aircraft. The C4ISR system was not working as designed and the systems were not capable of operating or maintaining a basic capability in accordance with the CONOPS.

(2) LIMS. The LIMS logistics system (including both the ELLIPSE in-port functionality and the Fleet Logistics Management System (FLMS) underway) has had a negative impact on the maintenance and supply functions of the cutters. Of the twelve projected “iteration zero” capabilities, eleven have not yet been provided.

(3) Short Range Prosecutor (SRP) Recovery. SRP recovery evolutions in higher sea states are being conducted without proven or validated procedures and have the potential to be done at levels of risk beyond what is acceptable for personnel and equipment safety. Decrease in communications capability of the SRP and resulting degradation of C2 between the cutter and the SRP impact operational effectiveness and safety during recovery operations.

(4) Documentation. LIMS operating manuals, C4ISR system technical and operating manuals, training and personal qualification program documentation, towing and SRP recovery equipment certifications, and system operating procedures were either not provided or are incomplete.

(5) Situational Awareness. Various new installations on the cutters provided improvements individually. As a collection of standalone capabilities, they included the digital global positioning system, automated identification system, and the infrared camera system. The crews were able to combine some of the individual outputs of

these equipments and obtain an increased situational awareness during patrols. These equipments were not integrated and were not capable of contributing to a networked tactical picture.

b. The following observations and recommendations are deemed significant beyond the 123’ WPB upgrade in that the associated risks may impact other Deepwater program assets, C4ISR and logistics domains, or the Integrated Deepwater System overall.

(1) LIMS/ELLIPSE/FLMS lack of functionality and increased level of effort is currently isolated to the cutters in Sector Key West. The capability to deal with the deficiencies of the system is only possible as a result of tremendous effort by the ICGS on site representative and the District and Sector maintenance organizations. Extension of the LIMS program in its current state to other USCG locations should be carefully considered pending a near complete development and validation of LIMS capability and functionality.

(2) The C4ISR equipment and software installed in the 123’ WPB are initial production iteration installations for all subsequent Deepwater program assets. The inability to generate a LTP and to contribute to the COP or to receive and display the COP need to be resolved by equipment/software grooms, improved maintenance capability, and better training.

(3) The SRP recovery system in the 123’ WPB serves as a bellwether for future design and installations in the national security cutter, offshore patrol cutter, and the fast response cutter. The critical equipment and safe and effective procedures for conducting astern recoveries in higher sea states for both the SRP and the long range interceptor should be developed and proven by an effective and integrated test and evaluation process prior to continued program development.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS. Within the scope of this assessment, I recommend formal and documented validation of correction of deficiencies be conducted for those risks identified in reference (a) prior to conducting the operational test readiness review for OPEVAL. If the major effectiveness and suitability risks associated with the 123’ WPB modification can not be mitigated, continued conversion of operationally capable 110’ WPBs is not recommended. Current mitigation efforts, if not pursued more aggressively, will adversely impact the effectiveness and safety of operations. For those Deepwater program assets who share the critical components

operations, continued program development for those assets should include a comprehensive test program that is structured to provide timely risk assessment and recommendations to the program manager.

DAVID ARCHITZEL

Copy to:
COMDT HQ (G-O, G-D, G-OC, G-OCU, G-OCD)
COMLANTAREA (AOF)
CCGDSEVEN MIAMI
COMCOGARD SECTOR KEY WEST FL

123' WPB OAA Update Matrix and Comments

Recommendation from OAA Report	Risk #	Associated Risk from OAA Report	OAA Report Update Comments
The following must be implemented prior to OPEVAL:		**High Risks associated with prior to OPEVAL recommendations**	
1.1 Develop and publish detailed procedures, including tabular reference, for recovery of the SRP aboard the cutter in all potential sea states from 0 through 4. Procedures should include the recommended ships course relative to the seas and the recommended ordered speed. Procedures should also address the shaft engagement/disengagement considerations (see page 13, par. 4.3.3). (Tactics)	4.3.3	The propeller wash and "rooster tail" of the 123' WPB created a potentially unsafe environment for boat operations in sea states 1 and higher. In order to recover the SRP, the cutter was required to establish a procedure to provide the dynamic conditions at the ramp for each sea state that provided acceptable conditions for boat recovery. Recovery with no way on was difficult in any sea state, as the stability of the cutter and the SRP jet drive maneuverability was dependent on movement. Higher speed meant more control. The 123' WPB was required to clutch in on one or both shafts in order to establish steerageway and obtain the best relative seas. When clutched in, the 123' WPB generated a significant propeller wash which could not be overcome by the SRP, requiring the 123' WPB to declutch its engine(s) just prior to the commitment of the SRP coxswain to a recovery. Timing was critical. The 123' WPB would lose steerageway and provide an unsafe condition if the SRP was not immediately recovered. This process in heavier seas resulted in a smaller time window for the coxswain to make his approach into the ramp, subjecting the SRP to increased propeller wash during recovery. (This may have significant implications for similar recovery processes in the larger cutter classes (WMSL, WMSM, WPC)).	SRP draft recovery procedures were developed by the contractor subsequent to the OAA report. These procedures were generic, untested, and had not been demonstrated by the developer on any of the delivered cutters. None of the four cutters observed during this assessment review period had been provided with a copy of the procedures for review or possible implementation. Each cutter was developing its own unique set of recovery procedures. Some recovery procedures varied significantly in fundamental processes and each with its own unique safety considerations. While there may be more than one set of procedures developed by individual cutters in order to safely recover the SRP in lower sea states, there was significant risk to personnel and equipment because tested and proven procedures were not developed for this evolution in higher sea states. Safety of recovery remains a significant risk to the effectiveness of the stern notch recovery system.
1.2 Test, certify, and provide documentation validating the safety of all components of the SRP recovery system (see page 53, par. 18.2.1.1). (Safety)	18.2.1.1	The SRP recovery line and securing equipment were unsafe. The cutter's recovery line parted during a recovery attempt and the default solution was to "use a larger line" without a tested and certified replacement. Results of a dynamic study and certification were not available identifying the proper size and length of line for SRP capture. The bits that terminate the securing line had no test certification. The winch assembly (drum, line, and recovery hook) had no certification. Upon completion of the SRP recovery, while the weight of the boat stresses the winch line, the on deck line handler was required to attach the securing cable to the prow of the SRP keel which required reaching between the life rails and under the bow of the SRP and the tensioned recovery line in order to attach the securing hook.	There was no standard SRP recovery line on the cutters. Each of the cutters was delivered a different line and there were no specifications provided for line composition, size, or length. Three of the cutters had replaced the line provided by the developer after they had been evaluated by the cutter as unsuitable or unsafe for use. The length and elasticity of the recovery line are critical design parameters impacting the operational loads that will be experienced by the SRP recovery system components. Risks associated with the large forces generated during SRP recovery compounded by the variation in recovery equipment configurations remain high. None of the bits that are used to recover the SRP had been certified for the function they are performing.
1.3 Replace the prescribed 4-inch nylon tow line (breaking strength of 38,400 lb) on the 123' WPB with a tow line of breaking strength below the safe working load of the tow bit (currently 14,400 lb). This is essential to eliminate the reality of bit failure before line failure (see page 53, par. 18.2.1.3). (Note that	18.2.1.3	The tow bit static load test report certified a safe working load which was less than the safe working load of the tow line. This is a significant safety hazard as the bit is subject to failure before the line.	There were three different sized tow lines provided to four of the cutters, each one with a breaking strength that significantly exceeds the safe working load of the towing bit. Two of the tow lines have a breaking strength that is over twice the 150% static test load of the towing bit. There is no documentation provided to the cutters that provides the static and dynamic forces expected to result from a 500 long ton tow that will be transferred to the unusually high tow post and taff railing. The potential heeling moments and

CGC METOMPKIN was provided with a 5-inch tow line of 60,000 lb safe working load.) (Safety)			stability documentation was not available for cutter use and there was no certification data for any of the towing tackle. This remains a significant safety issue.
1.4 Require the immediate installation of equipment, software, security, and certifications necessary for implementation, testing, and operation of the COP. This is a significant increase in advertised capability that has not been demonstrated after four deliveries (see page 11, par. 3.3.1). (SDCIP)	3.3.1	The sensor suite equipment (including receivers, processing units, and display equipment) was installed but was not delivered by the contractor in a configuration capable of providing a COP. The first two cutters of the 123' WPB class were observed during this test period and were delivered without a secure communications capability or the authority to operate via tactical circuits and were in the same condition 3 months after delivery. The cutters were severely restricted in their capability to conduct SDCIP in accordance with the CONOPS. As delivered, they were limited to use of generic on-board sensors. The new 123' WPB integrated sensor suite was designed to have the capability to provide a significant level of tactical awareness to the 123' WPB crew. The complete sensor suite has an undemonstrated potential for significant capability. It was determined that it may not be possible to effectively employ the suite due to the physical location of equipment and the resulting modifications required of watch stander responsibilities in order to support the equipment.	The equipment and software designed for generation of a local tactical picture (LTP) and contribution to and display of a common operational picture (COP) had been installed and loaded in each cutter. However, the installation had not been groomed for operations and was unable to be certified by SPAWAR. There still was no authority to operate the required C4ISR systems and the COP was not available in the cutters. There were no cutters capable of demonstrating the ability to generate a LTP or that could receive and display a COP. The inability to provide input to and receive a COP in accordance with the CONOPS remains a significant risk. Limited connectivity was demonstrated one time on one cutter, but this was conducted as a focused and dedicated proof of concept requiring significant effort and time. While there was limited equipment familiarity training provided at delivery, there had been no training provided that established a baseline of operator proficiency.
1.5 Resolve the reliability and availability of the modifications to the 123' WPB systems, including the C4ISR equipments and network, logistics support system, and the SRP recovery system, to reduce or eliminate the impact on overall cutter availability. The lack of a functioning C4ISR system, a reliable SRP and SRP recovery system, and a reliable logistics support system has the potential for significant impact on not just cutter, but Group/Sector availability to respond to mission tasking (see page 36, par. 12.3.1). (Availability)	12.3.1	The inability of the 123' WPB and its new systems to be ready for test event tasking provides a significant risk to the cutter being supportive of single asset or overall system readiness for real world mission tasking. The reliability and readiness of the various equipments and software supporting the C4ISR, logistics system, and the SRP and its recovery system contributed to an overall lack of availability of the 123' WPB.	The reliability and availability of C4ISR equipments and software applications for both C4ISR and LIMS systems continued to be significant in the lack of overall cutter availability to perform missions in accordance with the CONOPs. During installation grooms, significant software instability required frequent reboot which was very time consuming. When on station, mission performance continued to be limited by unreliable and unavailable software systems and certifications. Even in its limited state of functionality, the LIMS functionalities embedded in ELLIPSE and FLMS were unable to be manipulated by the crews due to availability or deficiencies in system operation manuals and a lack of operator training. SRP and recovery system component reliability and availability displayed some improvement. The cutters were generally capable of meeting mission sortie and on station requirements, although they were significantly limited in their effectiveness by operational speed and sea state restrictions imposed as a result of structural defects, which could be attributed to the hull modifications.

1.6 Obtain damage control plates and stability diagrams, as well as the documentation and certifications that the cutter is capable of handling potential upsetting forces that may be encountered during operations. Those forces include the pulls applied to the elevated tow bit and the resulting moments towards instability during the static and dynamic forces applied by a 500 ton tow, and the potential moments encountered with the addition of the weight of 150 migrants distributed across the main deck in a standing position (see page 54, par. 18.2.1.5). (Safety)	18.2.1 .5	There were no stability calculations, plans or damage control plates available to validate the stability of the 123' WPB in the following situations:- response to the lateral force potentially applied to the elevated tow bit and the resulting moment towards instability during the static and dynamic forces applied by a 500 ton tow. - response to the additional weight of 150 migrants on deck for 24 hours while in sea state 3 or higher. Partial deck loading was conducted pier side with 75 personnel on the main deck which had obvious impact on cutter trim and list conditions. During the test period, all 75 personnel were shifted to the right of centerline which resulted in a 12 degree list on the cutter while pierside.	Damage control plates and stability documentation have not been provided to the cutters. The stability and loading data report generated by the shipyard did not specifically address the stability impacts of a 7 foot high towing point nor the impact of 150 migrants on the main deck. Interpolation of diagrams included in the stability and loading data report did not provide the detail required for operational decisions that will result in significant impacts on shifts in the center of gravity.
1.7 Relocate the SRP recovery winch so that it is not subject to impact from the SRP upon recovery and subsequent loss of capability (see page 18, par. 5.5.1). (Survivability)	5.5.1	The impact of the SRP into the recovery winch could put the winch out of commission. Should this occur, the recovered SRP will be secured by the recovery line but the SRP stern will extend beyond the length of the ramp and the ship's stern door will not be able to be closed. The SRP can not be secured in the ramp without winching it in from the recovered position and there is no back up winch system.	The winch remained susceptible to being struck by the SRP during recovery and had been rendered inoperable at least once on each of three cutters. One cutter had reduced the risk of winch strike by lengthening the SRP recovery line which captured the SRP further away from the end of the notch and the winch mounting location. However, this modified procedure resulted in the SRP being in a captured condition while not completely contained in the notch of the ship with the increased potential of the SRP coming "alive" in the notch with the right sea condition. The winch was required to retrieve the SRP into the notch rather than serving as the final few feet of the securing process. Documentation certifying that the winch is rated or designed for this purpose was not available.
1.8 Eliminate the potential for electrical shock underneath the bridge console (see page 56, par. 18.2.2.9). (Safety)	18.2.2 .9	The video recorder operator on the bridge was subject to electrical shock when accessing the computer mouse from its storage location inside the ship control console via an access panel.	This risk has been eliminated by redesign of the installation.
1.9 Install a second egress for main deck berthing and the electronics work spaces. The condition of a single egress from both situations could be corrected by installation of escape scuttles to the main deck (see page 54, par. 18.2.1.6). (Safety)	18.2.1 .6	A single point of egress from berthing and working spaces is a significant survivability and safety issue. There are two such instances on the modified 123' WPB. There is only one egress route from the main deck berthing spaces (CO, XO, and three other staterooms). An internal fire on the main deck blocking the ladder to the bridge would trap personnel in their staterooms. A second instance is from the COMSEC and electronics working spaces aft. Escape is not possible in the event of an electronics or engine room fire which restricts egress through the forward part of the electronics work space. (Uncorrected from COMOPTEVFOR letter of concern, reference (e).)	Unchanged. Recommend USCG validate the safety requirement for secondary egress route from berthing and working spaces to the main deck.

1.10 Obtain TEMPEST and COMSEC certifications for all cutters. Require certifications prior to acceptance of future cutters, including crypto installation, software load, and authority to operate for all equipments (see page 22, par. 7.11.1.1). (Connectivity)	7.11.1 .1	The complete C4ISR suite was either not functioning or the functionality was inaccessible due to installation faults, COMSEC problems, or incomplete documentation/training. The identification, friend or foe (IFF) equipment was not functional. MILSATCOM was not available as the ARC-210 had TEMPEST problems and was not programmable. The F77 primary underway INMARSAT data path and the Coast Guard data network (plus) (CGDN+) were not available due to an expired interim authority to connect (IATC). There was no SIPRNET path since the cutter did not meet TEMPEST and COMSEC requirements and there was no IATC. MILSATCOM voice communications were not available because a FORTEZZA card was not loaded after cutter delivery.	TEMPEST and COMSEC certifications are now being conducted satisfactorily within a few months after delivery. Additionally, equipment operational problems have been corrected for IFF, MILSATCOM, and SIPRNET installations.
1.11 Verify the ability of the networks architecture to provide security to all classified information prior to cutter delivery/acceptance (see page 26, par. 8.21.1). (Information Assurance)	8.21.1	The inability of the cutter to pass TEMPEST and to verify secure communications operational capabilities made it impossible to verify the network's capability of securing sensitive information.	Defense Information System Agency (DISA) information assurance security standards were not able to be achieved. As a result, the cutters are not being granted the required authority to operate.
1.12 Develop the tactics and associated checklists for the effective launch of the SRP for all mission requirements in the CONOPS (see page 13, par. 4.3.1). (Tactics)	4.3.1	There were no procedures for SRP launch or associated operating tactics developed or published for the cutter to support the mission requirements of the CONOPS. Although the crews of the two delivered cutters were developing their own procedures for various sea states, the design concept for a stern launch in support of various mission scenarios had not been operationally validated by the developer prior to delivery. The lack of a proven process provides high risk to the safety of the crew while experimenting with options for boat operations.	While SRP recoveries remain a significant risk, the tactics and procedures for SRP launches, although not specifically developed, presented a less severe risk to operational effectiveness of the 123' WPB. Numerous launches of the SRP in many operational situations have demonstrated that the launching procedure is relatively uncomplicated and safely executed when positive control is properly exercised by the bridge watch team and the fantail. Documented procedures and checklists for SRP launches in all sea states are still recommended.
1.13 Resolve access deficiencies with ELLIPSE and validate software and system performance on all delivered cutters. Require program/contractor validation and demonstration of FLMS and ELLIPSE software and system performance prior to acceptance of all future cutters, including the interface with the shore and deployable tool sets (see page 31, par. 10.4.1.1). (Reliability)	10.4.1 .1	The ELLIPSE logistics management program was delivered to the cutter with serious access deficiencies. Crew members, working with the Integrated Coast Guard System (ICGS) site representative, were able to resolve access and password discrepancies. However, the capability to display a common product structure that combines legacy and IDS data was not demonstrated. Configuration of the on-board asset by feeding information from maintenance and inventory software was not demonstrated. Interface with the shore and deployable tool sets has not been demonstrated.	LIMS software is installed on all cutters but is unable to provide the required functionalities, either in port with ELLIPSE or underway with FLMS. ELLIPSE capabilities were limited to work order generation and shore side PMS. This is only about 10% of the twelve projected "iteration zero" ELLIPSE system capabilities. The following ELLIPSE functionalities were not able to be demonstrated: shipboard PMS (due to the lack of the scheduling module being available), financial tracking, report generation, configuration management, parts requisitioning, man-hour tracking, inventory management, work order alert notification, MILSTRIP processing, PHS&T management and purchasing management. FLMS operational functionality could not be demonstrated by any of the cutters.
1.14 Resolve the inability of the cutters to create logistics work orders via the ELLIPSE system. The capability to conduct inventory management, maintenance scheduling, and finance interfaces must also be resolved (see page	10.4.1 .3	The capability to push mobile requisitions to the operations support center was demonstrated with limited success. During the test period, only one requisition was successfully processed. The crew has reverted to the casualty reporting process to fill requisitions for critical parts. The system did not demonstrate the capability to conduct inventory management, maintenance scheduling, and finance interfaces. The system was able to	All four cutters were using ELLIPSE to generate work orders on their local terminals, but manual intervention was required at the next level (Sector, District, or ICGS site rep) to make documents visible on the shore maintenance side of the system. All four cutters observed in Key West remained unable to conduct inventory management and maintenance scheduling using ELLIPSE. They were also

32, par. 10.4.1.3). (Reliability)		generate internal work orders after several days of on-the-job training by the site representatives; however, those work orders are not available to be accessed within the ELLIPSE system.	unable to track any financial data that is a requirement for not only Deepwater supported parts, but for legacy equipment as well. Also, in order to print a work order, the text had to be copied to a word document and then printed, which was an extra step that added time to the work day when compounded by each cutter and their individual work orders. ELLIPSE did not provide any financial accounting, so the MAT reverted to using paper logs. There was no capability for the project engineers of Lockheed Martin in Moorestown to participate or observe any work done against a work order due to firewall issues with CGDN+ connectivity in Moorestown. Accordingly, all Lockheed Martin work order responses were being accomplished by either e-mail or telephone.
1.15 Provide ELLIPSE system functionality to all delivered cutters enabling them to generate supply requisitions. Require system capability prior to acceptance of all future cutters (see page 32, par. 10.4.1.5). (Reliability)	10.4.1 .5	The supply department at Group Key West received no requisitions during the test period. The one requisition processed, was handled by the ICGS site representative, therefore this capability has not been demonstrated. Legacy requisitions could not be generated by ELLIPSE. Numerous legacy requisitions were attempted, but all attempts failed.	Supply requisitions were not being generated by the cutters because of difficulties in using the catalog function of ELLIPSE. Locating the ELLIPSE--required "stock code" was a tedious and time-consuming effort that had too little return for the amount of work required. Parts requisition function was not possible as it required a "stock code" which could not be found by the crew in the ELLIPSE catalog. The Site Rep had become the single source of Deepwater supply for the Sector Key West cutters. Sector Key West personnel had received LIMS training but were still unable to process requisitions using ELLIPSE. The permissions and approval processes were not clear to all users. The lack of financial tracking capability rendered the tool ineffective to the shore side supply activity. As a result of the cumbersome requisition processes, many items were being procured commercially.
1.16 Install, test and exercise the FLMS at-sea portion of LIMS. Require FLMS system capability prior to acceptance of all future cutters (see page 32, par. 10.4.1.6). (Reliability)	10.1.4 .6	The fleet logistics management system (FLMS) portion of LIMS was not demonstrated during the test period.	FLMS software was installed and basic connectivity was demonstrated with limited success amongst the cutters. However, FLMS was not able to demonstrate an at sea operational capability.
1.17 Establish a billet capable of managing the new C4ISR computer suite and to perform COP track data management, including required training for operation, system administration, and operational maintenance (see page 40, par. 13.7.1.5). (Logistic Supportability)	13.7.1 .5	The new upgrade contains a networked C4ISR suite including navigation, radar, and a COP. This enterprise contains six servers; two UNIX based and four Windows based. This points to a strong requirement for either OS or ET functionality to manage the computer suite and to perform track data management. There are no billets or training identified to support the system on board. All system administration functions are planned to reside ashore in the electronic support units/detachments. The level of C4ISR expertise for current 110' WPB crew and shore support facilities is minimal and the planned training in support of the 123' WPB upgrade appears insufficient. (Uncorrected from COMOPTEVFOR letter of concern, reference (e).)	The proposed changes to the Master Training List for the 123' WPB include the recommendations for adding CG-C2 equipment operation and bridge watch standing courses of instruction for the CO, XO, and four BMs. An undefined but limited portion of the C2 maintenance and management course of instruction has been recommended for the XO and a BM1. There appears to be a misalignment between required tasks to operate and support the C4ISR system and the practical factors of the billets assigned to the 123' WPB.

1.18 Conduct a thorough review of formal training courses being developed to support the new cutter systems. Ensure that appropriate training courses and lesson plans, for both schoolhouse and self-study, are adequate for formal training and shipboard study and are being provided to the USCG training commands for implementation (see page 46, par. 16.3.1). (Training)	16.3.1	IDS training was not compatible with legacy training systems for an experienced 110 crew who transferred to the 123' WPB (CGC NANTUCKET to CGC MATAGORDA). Training for ELLIPSE/COMDAC INS/EO/IR Surveillance System was found to be severely inadequate and there were many areas where the crew received no training at all. There were no formal training course handouts, no electronic on-board training programs, no revised or new personnel qualification standards documents, and no formal lesson plans provided to USCG training commands to support current operators and maintainers. Delivery training may prove adequate for current crews, but there is no pipeline training planned for follow-on crew members or support personnel.	A draft 123' WPB Master Training List (MTL) is in the early stages of development as well as identification of possible courses of instruction that may be possible for inclusion in the TRACEN training architectures. The processes required to create the required courses and develop the administrative and personnel infrastructure to support their effectiveness will take time. Nine new courses of instruction are currently included in the draft 123' WPB MTL. In the interim, there are no self study courses, no electronic on-board training courses, no updated PQS booklets, or other training systems developed to fill the period until and if formal courses of instruction can be developed. While the current crews of delivered cutters were provided some introductory level of training by the developer at delivery, that training was not sufficient to give even these now experienced crews the ability to effectively operate and maintain their new equipments. There is no process in place to train the relieving crewmembers arriving this summer for those cutters already delivered. Because of this, the long-term sustainability of current/qualified crews for the 123' WPB in the Coast Guard's existing personnel accession, training, and assignment process is at risk.
1.19 Install a second ARC-210 UHF transceiver so that the 123' WPB can conduct simultaneous line-of-sight and satellite communications (see page 22, par. 7.11.1.2). (Connectivity)	7.11.1 .2	The 123' WPB was provided with a single ARC-210 UHF transceiver which replaced two UHF transceivers currently in use on the 110'. During representative missions, a WPB routinely requires both UHF radios to be in simultaneous use. The 123' WPB ARC-210 can function in either line-of-sight or satellite communications (SATCOM) mode but not simultaneously. This represents a loss of functionality and a single point of failure with respect to UHF communications.	This remains a reduction in capability from the 110' WPB. The current performance of the ARC-210 was hampered by lack of training for both operations and the programming and loading of crypto material. With the elimination of UHF satellite radio redundancy, there was a single point of failure in satellite comms that impacts the capability for both voice and tactical data (COP) connectivity.
1.20 Incorporate special emergency operations training and onboard team training including update of drill and grade sheets based on revised navigation standards and main space fire doctrine (see page 46, par. 16.3.1). (Training)	16.3.1	IDS training was not compatible with legacy training systems for an experienced 110 crew who transferred to the 123' WPB (CGC NANTUCKET to CGC MATAGORDA). Training for ELLIPSE/COMDAC INS/EO/IR Surveillance System was found to be severely inadequate and there were many areas where the crew received no training at all. There were no formal training course handouts, no electronic on-board training programs, no revised or new personnel qualification standards documents, and no formal lesson plans provided to USCG training commands to support current operators and maintainers. Delivery training may prove adequate for current crews, but there is no pipeline training planned for follow-on crew members or support personnel.	An updated main space fire doctrine had been drafted and was being exercised by the crews, and satisfactory execution was part of the ready for operations certification by Sector Key West. No other updates were observed that modified other onboard operational procedures, training packages and drill sheets for ship evolutions that have been impacted by the modifications.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

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2241
July 12, 2005

MEMORANDUM

Ronald T. Porter

From: Mr. Ronald T. Porter
CG TISCOM (isd-3b)

Reply to TISCOM (isd-3b)
Attn of: Ronald T. Porter
703.313.5631

To: Commander, Maintenance and Logistics Command Atlantic (t)
DIRECTOR, Deepwater Integrated Coast Guard Systems

Subj: 123 WPB CLASS TEMPEST WAIVER

Ref: (a) NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95
(b) IA PUB 5239-31 INFORMATION ASSURANCE SHIPBOARD RED/BLACK INSTALLATION PUBLICATION

1. The Secure Electrical Information Processing System (SEIPS) on CGC MATAGORDA was inspected by Ronald Porter, USCG TEMPEST Program Manager on 14 December 2004. The inspection was conducted using criteria listed in references (a) and (b), and below is the list of discrepancies waived. If there is a configuration change which includes, but is not limited to replacement of Classified server(s) with different model(s) or addition of equipment in the Secure Communications space, an Instrumented TEMPEST Survey will be required. DWICGS shall identify funding for future Instrumented Testing.

2. Below waivers are class-wide and should be considered when reviewing Visual TEMPEST Inspection Reports.

3. A waiver is granted for the location of the RT-1794 (p/o AN/ARC-210) transceiver within three meters of Classified servers. This waiver is based on the results of the Instrumented TEMPEST Test

4. A waiver is granted for three meter separation between RED and BLACK cables entering the MARCOM switch. Subject switch provides adequate isolation and is approved for multi-level signal switching.

5. A waiver is granted for three meter separation between cryptographic equipment and RT9000 transceiver. The distance is approximately one meter, however a bulkhead separates the Unclassified and Classified equipment racks. Due to a favorable Instrumented TEMPEST test, and the fact that the RT-9000 transceiver is enclosed in its original metallic enclosure, and there are metal side panels on the equipment racks.

6. A waiver is granted for three meter separation between RED printer and IFF Transmitter (UPX-28). Subject equipment is also less than three meters from Classified Servers. Subject transmitter is enclosed in its original enclosure and there is a metallic barrier on the side of the RED server rack adjacent to the UPX-28.

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ENCLOSURES(4)

Subject: Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

1. This Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary is for the FTA Visit

2. The entire Secure Electrical Information Processing System was inspected.

3. List of spaces with secure processing equipment inspected by the visual TEMPEST inspector:

   A. Visited space

4. Discrepancy form legend:

Column A:	Sequential discrepancy number
Column B:	
SF	Correction of the discrepancy is within the capability of ship's force.
IAC	Correction of the discrepancy was completed by ships force prior to completion of inspection visit.
IA	Indicates that the assistance of an industrial activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
IAC	Indicates that an industrial activity corrected the discrepancy.
SA	Indicates that the assistance of a support activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
SAC	Indicates that a support activity corrected the discrepancy.
CA	Indicates that the Contractor Activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy
CAC	Indicates that the Contractor Activity corrected the discrepancy.
Column C:	Reference of the paragraph in designated manuals to which the installation does not conform.
Narrative:	A brief description of the discrepancy found.

5. Discrepancy

A	B	C	Narrative
01	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a/pg16 para 5 IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.1 a, b	**BLACK RF Transmitter (RT-1794) is in the same rack as RED Processors.** This items is waived as the result of the Instrumented TEMPEST Inspection. Any reconfiguration of equipment, which includes new equipment or replacement of existing CPUs with a different model would require another Instrumented Inspection.
02	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2b	**Cabinet 3: Red processor less than one meter away from power line to black transmitter (RT-1794 p/o ARC-210).** Refer to Item #1.
03	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 27 Para 2a	**Cabinet 3: Red processor less than one meter away from black signal lines connected to RF transmitter (RT-1794)** Refer to Item #1.
04	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 27 Para 4, Para 4.4.1.1, 4.1.1.2 IA PUB 5239-31 Para A.1.7.1 IA PUB 5239-31 MIL-STD 188-124B Para 5.2.12	**Red data cables for RED LAN have aluminum/mylar shielding. Manufacturer data: DRAKA COMTEQ (F) ShipLan Cable 4PR 24 AWG Screened 307650. Subject cable may pose a TEMPEST hazard.** **B.1.2.5 (5239): Approved cables. Mil-C-17 (ref k), or MIL-C-915 (reference(l)), MIL-C-24640(reference(n)) or MIL-C-24643 (reference (o)). Researched cable and found that it does NOT meet any of the above MIL-SPECs. Draka sells data cables that are MIL-DTL-24643 compliant. Subject cables are CAT 5e Shiplan '59W', '59' and '59S' Marine data cables. The cables listed all have a braided shield in addition to the aluminum mylar tape. The braided shield allows for a flexible ground.** Resolved. Subject cable passed Instrumented TEMPEST test. Both RED and BLACK cables are grounded to the aluminum mylar shield. Recommend use shielded braid cable.
05	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a/pg16 para 5 IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.1 a, b	**BLACK transmitters (RT-9000) within 3 meters of RED processors.** Waived. Subject transmitters are enclosed in metallic case and bulkhead separates the cabinets containing the transmitters and RED processors.
06	CAC	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.16 pg B-8 and B-9	**Missing pins on CRYPTO cable to KYV-5. Missing ground terminal connection on backshell.** Completed.
07	CAC	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.16 pg B-8 and B-9	**ANDVT cable has no ground terminal connection on backshell. Strain relief clamp is not on outer coating of cable. Redo connection.** Completed.
08	CAC	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.10	**AN/UPX-28 has inadequate green wire ground. Replace with Class C bond strap.** Completed.
09	CAC	IA Pub 5259-31	**Remove external tooth washers on ground connectors to cabinets.**

			Use lock washers and lug nuts per IA Instruction 5239-31 Figure B-5. Completed
10	CAC	**NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a/pg16 para 5 IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.1 a, b**	**UPX-28 is less than 3 meters from RED printers and processors.** Waived. UPX-28 is in original enclosed cabinet and favorable Instrumented test.
11	CAC	**IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.10**	**Remove green wire grounds from CRYPTO rack and replace with Class C solid bond strap.** Completed.
12	CA	**IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.3**	**Telephone cables connected to shore tie via telephone switch cannot be routed with red cables..** Resolved. Marcom switch provides adequate isolation.
13	CA	**IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.**	**ARC-210 Secure voice cables. Transmit and receive audio lines need to be shielded.** Resolved.. Subject lines are shielded per TISCOM TEMPEST PM communication Harris Corp. Only unshielded cables are BLACK.
14	CAC	**NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation 1 Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2**	**Operator position in Classified C4ISR room has cables from two UNCLAS LAN and three CLASSIFIED LAN connections. Require 2 inch (5 cm) separation.** Completed.

Bridge

15	CAC	**NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a**	**Motorola VHF FM DES transceiver less than three meters from C2 Network flat panel display monitors LC 06-04-16, LC 06-04-72 and LC 06-04-84.** Completed. Monitors replaced by TEMPEST compliant models.
16	CAC	**NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a**	**Cellular phone next to Secure LAN junction box less than three meters from flat panel display monitors LC 06-04-82 and LC 06-04-72. If a RED laptop uses the Secure LAN junction box, it will be less than three meters from cellular phone** Resolved. RED LAN cables rerouted and LAN box relocated..
17	CAC	**IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.13**	**No metal-to-metal contact for ground strap from ARC 210 Tray to ground on shelf. Recommend use Class C ground strap and remove paint for proper bonding.** Completed.
18	CA	**IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.2 Pg A-3**	**Unshielded cable connected to connector J3 on ARC-210 Tray. Twisted red wires (four) runs to C4ISR Cabinet #3. Replace cable run with proper cable.** Resolved. Wires are used for control circuitry only.
19	CA	**NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95**	**Issue of wireless bridge for RHIB comms.** RESOLVED. Wireless connectivity is via exterior antenna. PDAs will not use wireless connectivity

Other:

20	CAC	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	CO's cabin. RED and BLACK LAN ports have no cable separation. Recommend 2 inch separation. RED/BLACK cable is tied together. Corrected.
21	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 1	CO's cabin. Proposed RED laptop on desk top less than 20 inches (20 cm) from black phone. Waived due to space limitations.
22	CAC	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.3.1.b	RED fiber optic cable goes through space adjacent to black racks that contains hasp for locking. If the cable passes though normally locked spaces (for example, voids, staterooms, etc), that portion of the cable shall be contained in a metallic conduit (PDS). Completed. Cage will be constructed that will provide complete viewing of the space.
23	CAC	NSTISSAM 2-95 PARA 4.9.6	Television and shipboard video (external cameras) can be viewed from the same VIDEO output jack. The shipboard video has been designated RED. Corrected. CATV isolator will be installed in Rack #5 to prevent compromising emanations from exiting inspectable space.

Derived From: NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 with Amendment 2-95A

Department of the Navy (DoN) Information Assurance (IA) Publication Module 5239-31

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
United States Coast Guard

Commander
U.S. Coast Guard
Telecommunication & Information Systems Command

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2241
July 12, 2005

MEMORANDUM

Ronald T. Porter

From: Mr. Ronald T. Porter
CG TISCOM (isd-3b)

Reply to TISCOM (isd-3b)
Attn of: Ronald T. Porter
703.313.5631

To: Commander, Maintenance and Logistics Command Atlantic (t)
DIRECTOR, Deepwater Integrated Coast Guard Systems

Subj: 123 WPB CLASS TEMPEST WAIVER

Ref: (a) NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95
(b) IA PUB 5239-31 INFORMATION ASSURANCE SHIPBOARD RED/BLACK INSTALLATION PUBLICATION

1. The Secure Electrical Information Processing System (SEIPS) on CGC MATAGORDA was inspected by Ronald Porter, USCG TEMPEST Program Manager on 14 December 2004. The inspection was conducted using criteria listed in references (a) and (b), and below is the list of discrepancies waived. If there is a configuration change which includes, but is not limited to replacement of Classified server(s) with different model(s) or addition of equipment in the Secure Communications space, an Instrumented TEMPEST Survey will be required. DWICGS shall identify funding for future Instrumented Testing.

2. Below waivers are class-wide and should be considered when reviewing Visual TEMPEST Inspection Reports.

3. A waiver is granted for the location of the RT-1794 (p/o AN/ARC-210) transceiver within three meters of Classified servers. This waiver is based on the results of the Instrumented TEMPEST Test

4. A waiver is granted for three meter separation between RED and BLACK cables entering the MARCOM switch. Subject switch provides adequate isolation and is approved for multi-level signal switching.

5. A waiver is granted for three meter separation between cryptographic equipment and RT9000 transceiver. The distance is approximately one meter, however a bulkhead separates the Unclassified and Classified equipment racks. Due to a favorable Instrumented TEMPEST test, and the fact that the RT-9000 transceiver is enclosed in its original metallic enclosure, and there are metal side panels on the equipment racks.

6. A waiver is granted for three meter separation between RED printer and IFF Transmitter (UPX-28). Subject equipment is also less than three meters from Classified Servers. Subject transmitter is enclosed in its original enclosure and there is a metallic barrier on the side of the RED server rack adjacent to the UPX-28.

#

Subject: Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

1. This Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary is for the FTA Visit

2. The entire Secure Electrical Information Processing System was inspected.

3. List of spaces with secure processing equipment inspected by the visual TEMPEST inspector:

   A. Visited space

4. Discrepancy form legend:

Column A:	Sequential discrepancy number
Column B:	
SF	Correction of the discrepancy is within the capability of ship's force.
IAC	Correction of the discrepancy was completed by ships force prior to completion of inspection visit.
IA	Indicates that the assistance of an industrial activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
IAC	Indicates that an industrial activity corrected the discrepancy.
SA	Indicates that the assistance of a support activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.
SAC	Indicates that a support activity corrected the discrepancy.
CA	Indicates that the Contractor Activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy
CAC	Indicates that the Contractor Activity corrected the discrepancy.
Column C:	Reference of the paragraph in designated manuals to which the installation does not conform.
Narrative:	A brief description of the discrepancy found.

5. Discrepancy

A	B	C	Narrative
01	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a/pg16 para 5 IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.1 a, b	BLACK RF Transmitter (RT-1794) is in the same rack as RED Processors. This items is waived as the result of the Instrumented TEMPEST Inspection. Any reconfiguration of equipment, which includes new equipment or replacement of existing CPUs with a different model would require another Instrumented Inspection.
02	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2b	Cabinet 3: Red processor less than one meter away from power line to black transmitter (RT-1794 p/o ARC-210). Refer to Item #1.
03	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 27 Para 2a	Cabinet 3: Red processor less than one meter away from black signal lines connected to RF transmitter (RT-1794) Refer to Item #1.
04	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 27 Para 4, Para 4.4.1.1, 4.1.1.2 IA PUB 5239-31 Para A.1.7.1 IA PUB 5239-31 MIL-STD 188-124B Para 5.2.12	Red data cables for RED LAN have aluminum/mylar shielding. Manufacturer data: DRAKA COMTEQ (F) ShipLan Cable 4PR 24 AWG Screened 307650. Subject cable may pose a TEMPEST hazard. B.1.2.5 (5239): Approved cables. Mil-C-17 (ref k), or MIL-C-915 (reference(l)), MIL-C-24640(reference(n)) or MIL-C-24643 (reference (o)). Researched cable and found that it does NOT meet any of the above MIL-SPECs. Draka sells data cables that are MIL-DTL-24643 compliant. Subject cables are CAT 5e Shiplan '59W', '59' and '59S' Marine data cables. The cables listed all have a braided shield in addition to the aluminum mylar tape. The braided shield allows for a flexible ground. Resolved. Subject cable passed Instrumented TEMPEST test. Both RED and BLACK cables are grounded to the aluminum mylar shield. Recommend use shielded braid cable.
05	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a/pg16 para 5 IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.1 a, b	BLACK transmitters (RT-9000) within 3 meters of RED processors. Waived. Subject transmitters are enclosed in metallic case and bulkhead separates the cabinets containing the transmitters and RED processors.
06	CAC	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.16 pg B-8 and B-9	Missing pins on CRYPTO cable to KYV-5. Missing ground terminal connection on backshell. Completed.
07	CAC	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.16 pg B-8 and B-9	ANDVT cable has no ground terminal connection on backshell. Strain relief clamp is not on outer coating of cable. Redo connection. Completed.
08	CAC	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.10	AN/UPX-28 has inadequate green wire ground. Replace with Class C bond strap. Completed.
09	CAC	IA Pub 5259-31	Remove external tooth washers on ground connectors to cabinets.

			Use lock washers and lug nuts per IA Instruction 5239-31 Figure B-5. Completed
10	CAC	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a/pg16 para 5 IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.1 a, b	UPX-28 is less than 3 meters from RED printers and processors. Waived, UPX-28 is in original enclosed cabinet and favorable Instrumented test.
11	CAC	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.10	Remove green wire grounds from CRYPTO rack and replace with Class C solid bond strap. Completed.
12	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.3	Telephone cables connected to shore tie via telephone switch cannot be routed with red cables.. Resolved. Marcom switch provides adequate isolation.
13	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.	ARC-210 Secure voice cables. Transmit and receive audio lines need to be shielded. Resolved. Subject lines are shielded per TISCOM TEMPEST PM communication Harris Corp. Only unshielded cables are BLACK.
14	CAC	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation 1 Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	Operator position in Classified C4ISR room has cables from two UNCLAS LAN and three CLASSIFIED LAN connections. Require 2 inch (5 cm) separation. Completed.

Bridge

15	CAC	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a	Motorola VHF FM DES transceiver less than three meters from C2 Network flat panel display monitors LC 06-04-16, LC 06-04-72 and LC 06-04-84. Completed. Monitors replaced by TEMPEST compliant models.
16	CAC	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a	Cellular phone next to Secure LAN junction box less than three meters from flat panel display monitors LC 06-04-82 and LC 06-04-72. If a RED laptop uses the Secure LAN junction box, it will be less than three meters from cellular phone Resolved. RED LAN cables rerouted and LAN box relocated..
17	CAC	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.13	No metal-to-metal contact for ground strap from ARC 210 Tray to ground on shelf. Recommend use Class C ground strap and remove paint for proper bonding. Completed.
18	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.2 Pg A-3	Unshielded cable connected to connector J3 on ARC-210 Tray. Twisted red wires (four) runs to C4ISR Cabinet #3. Replace cable run with proper cable. Resolved. Wires are used for control circuitry only.
19	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95	Issue of wireless bridge for RHIB comms. RESOLVED. Wireless connectivity is via exterior antenna. PDAs will not use wireless connectivity.

Other:

20	CAC	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	CO's cabin. RED and BLACK LAN ports have no cable separation. Recommend 2 inch separation. RED/BLACK cable is tied together. Corrected.
21	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 1	CO's cabin. Proposed RED laptop on desk top less than 20 inches (20 cm) from black phone. Waived due to space limitations.
22	CAC	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.3.1.b	RED fiber optic cable goes through space adjacent to black racks that contains hasp for locking. If the cable passes though normally locked spaces (for example, voids, staterooms, etc), that portion of the cable shall be contained in a metallic conduit (PDS). Completed. Cage will be constructed that will provide complete viewing of the space.
23	CAC	NSTISSAM 2-95 PARA 4.9.6	Television and shipboard video (external cameras) can be viewed from the same VIDEO output jack. The shipboard video has been designated RED. Corrected. CATV isolator will be installed in Rack #5 to prevent compromising emanations from exiting inspectable space.

Derived From: NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 with Amendment 2-95A

Department of the Navy (DoN) Information Assurance (IA) Publication Module 5239-31

STEPS TO CGC MATAGORDA RECEIVING ATO

PHYSICAL SECURITY					
ACTION ITEM	***SUB-ELEMENT***	***RESP PARTY***	***STATUS***	***DUE DATE***	***COMMENTS***
Complete Physical Security Inspection		D7/D8 Security Manager	**Completed**	**12/14**	All Physical Security Discrepancies Have Been Corrected And Letter Issued
Correct Physical Security Discrepancies	Correct Door Discrepancies		**Completed**	**12/14**	
	Install Peep Hole		**Completed**	**12/14**	
	Install Security Lock		**Completed**	**12/14**	
	Install Automatic Door Closure		**Completed**	**12/14**	
	Install Vent Louver		**Completed**	**12/14**	
Submit Physical Security Correction Letter	PMRO	PMRO	**Completed**	**12/14**	
Final Physical Security Letter Issued		D7 Security Manager	**Completed**	**12/14**	
TEMPEST INSPECTION					
ACTION ITEM	***SUB-ELEMENT***	***RESP PARTY***	***STATUS***	***DUE DATE***	***COMMENTS***
Complete Instrumented Inspection	Complete Instrumented Inspection		**Completed**	**12/14**	
	Correct Instrumented Identified Discrepancies		**Completed**	**12/14**	
	Re-inspect????			**12/14**	
	Submit Required Documentation			**12/14**	
Physical Inspection	Complete TEMPEST Physical Inspection		**Completed**	**12/14**	
TEMPEST Waiver	Submit Waiver Request	**Porter**		**12/17**	
	Waiver Request Approved				
Correct Physical Inspection Discrepancies	Radio Room 2-28-O-Q: There Is No Separation Between Classified LAN And Unclassified LAN Outlets		**Completed**	**12/14**	
	Radio Room 2-28-O-Q: Classified LAN Lines Are Run With 120VAC Power Lines (No Separation)		**Completed**	**12/14**	
	Radio Room 2-28-O-Q: Coax TV Line Runs Along With Classified LAN Line.		**Completed**	**12/14**	
	Radio Room 2-28-O-Q: There Is No Separation Between Alarm Panel Line And Classified LAN Line.		**Completed**	**12/14**	
	Radio Room 2-28-O-Q: The Printer (Red) Along With Classified LAN Line Runs Parallel With IFF Antenna Line. There Is No Separation Of These Lines		**Completed**	**12/14**	
	Radio Room 2-28-O-Q: The Printer (Red) Uses Black Power. The Printer Router (Red) Uses Black Power		**Completed**	**12/14**	

	Radio Room 2-28-O-Q: There Is No 3-Meter Separation Between Printer (Red) And IFF Transmitter.	**Porter**		**12/14**	**Waiver Request**
	Radio Room 2-28-O-Q: In Rack #3, There Is No 3-Meter Separation Between Red And Black Cables Before Entering The Marcom Switch.	**Porter**		**12/14**	**Waiver Request**
	Radio Room 2-28-O-Q: In Rack #3, There Is No 3-Meter Separation Between Cryptographic Equipment And RT9000 Transceiver	**Porter**		**12/14**	**Waiver Request**
	Radio Room 2-28-O-Q: There Is Not A Secure Protected Distribution System (PDS) Leaving Radio Room. LE Locker Behind Secure Space.	**Buford / Sconiers**		**12/14**	**RED cables identified in space. Awaiting determination for fix.**
	Radio Room 2-28-O-Q: Cable TV System Needs To Use An Amplifier/Attenuator At The Point Of Entry Into The Secure Space And Needs To Be A Type That Provides One-Way Filtration.	**Harvey/ Sconiers**		**12/14**	**Resolution agreed upon. Will be implemented upon receipt of parts (filter/attenuator).**
	Stateroom 1-16-1-L / 1-16-2-L: There Is No Separation Between Classified LAN Outlets And 117 VAC, Unclassified LAN, And TV Jack Outlets		**Completed**	**12/14**	
	Stateroom 1-16-1-L / 1-16-2-L: There Is No Separation Between Classified LAN Line And MF/HF Line		**Completed**	**12/14**	
	In Stateroom 1-16-2-L: Classified LAN Line Runs Parallel With Horn Generator Line		**Completed**	**12/14**	
	Bridge: There Is No 3-Meter Separation Between Red Output And Black Lines For The Kite Handset #1 And #2				**Not a Tempest Issue per Ron Porter**
	Bridge: Classified LAN Line Runs Parallel With 117 VAC, Black Data Lines, And Cellular Antenna Line	**Harvey/ Sconiers**	**Completed**	**12/14**	**Verify/Moved**
Complete TEMPEST Physical Security Re-inspection ??			**Completed**	**12/14**	**CWO Sconiers to arrange with D8**
Issue TEMPEST Letter		**Porter**		**12/17**	**Waiver Request**

SOFTWARE UPDATE					
ACTION ITEM	***SUB-ELEMENT***	***RESP PARTY***	***STATUS***	***DUE DATE***	***COMMENTS***
Update Version 5.3.2	Update Software To Correct Venerability Issues	**Merideth**		**12/3**	**L. Merideth / B. Mclaverty to deliver plan to accomplish by 12/3**
Install Updated Version Of Software		**Merideth**		**12/3**	**L. Merideth / B. Mclaverty to deliver plan to accomplish by 12/3**
Scan Updated Version Of Software		**Merideth**		**12/3**	**L. Merideth / B. Mclaverty to deliver plan to accomplish by 12/3**

Submit Updated Scan Data To ????		**Merideth**		**12/3**	**L. Merideth / B. Mclaverty to deliver plan to accomplish by 12/3**
SOFTWARE & HARDWARE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN					
ACTION ITEM	***SUB-ELEMENT***	***RESP PARTY***	***STATUS***	***DUE DATE***	***COMMENTS***
Hardware	Develop Detailed Configuration Management Plan IAW CSEL		**Completed**		**B. Mclaverty / H. Colella to verify CSEL addresses**
Software	Develop Detailed Software Configuration Management Plan Including Software Update Management Responsibilities	**Colella**		**1/12**	**H Colella to review plan with CDR Wood prior to CDR**
SSAA PACKAGE					
ACTION ITEM	***SUB-ELEMENT***	***RESP PARTY***	***STATUS***	***DUE DATE***	***COMMENTS***
What Is Needed For Documentation To Complete SSAA Package ????		**Talley-Green**			**Needs input by 12/22**
ATO					
ACTION ITEM	***SUB-ELEMENT***	***RESP PARTY***	***STATUS***	***DUE DATE***	***COMMENTS***
What Is Needed To Issue ATO ???		**CG6**			**Need Input by 1/10**
OTHER ITEMS					
ACTION ITEM	***SUB-ELEMENT***	***RESP PARTY***	***STATUS***	***DUE DATE***	***COMMENTS***
Cop Training	Conduct Cop Training				**To be scheduled on BSI Departure**
Arc–210 Correction					**Ongoing**
HF Voice And Data Comms					**Ongoing**

General Questions:

1. TEMPEST Physical Inspection:
   - What items have been corrected?
   - Waiver:
     a. Specifically what items will a waiver be requested for?
     b. Will the waiver apply to all vessels (delivered and under conversion)?

c. Will the waiver be a dated waiver (i.e. must be corrected within a specific time or waiver will be good for an indefinite time)?
d. Has the waiver request been submitted? If so:
    i. Who submitted the request?
    ii. What is the status of the request?
    iii. Specifically what items were identified in the request?

- Will a re-inspection be required after the discrepancies have been correct? If not:
    a. What action is required to close the loop?
    b. Who will complete the required action?

Items copied and pasted from Mr. Ron Porter's discrepancy list:

Subject: Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

1. This Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary is for the FTA Visit

2. The entire Secure Electrical Information Processing System was inspected.

3. List of spaces with secure processing equipment inspected by the visual TEMPEST inspector:

    A. Visited space

4. Discrepancy form legend:

    Column A: Sequential discrepancy number

    Column B:

    SF Correction of the discrepancy is within the capability of ship's force.

    IAC Correction of the discrepancy was completed by ships force prior to completion of inspection visit.

    IA Indicates that the assistance of an industrial activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.

    IAC Indicates that an industrial activity corrected the discrepancy.

SA Indicates that the assistance of a support activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.

SAC Indicates that a support activity corrected the discrepancy.

CA Indicates that the Contractor Activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.

Column C: Reference of the paragraph in designated manuals to which the installation does not conform.

Narrative: A brief description of the discrepancy found.

A	B	C	Narrative
01	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a/pg16 para 5 IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.1 a, b	Cabinet 3: Black RF transmitter (RT-1794) in same rack as Red Processors. Recommend moving 3 meters away or in adjacent Black Equipment Room. Recommend placing entire ARC-210 system on Bridge. **Anticipate waiver w/caveat from Ron Porter.**
02	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 27 Para 2a/pg16 para 5 IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.1 a, b	Cabinet 2: RF transmitter (PCRP 211/802) in same rack as Red Processors. Recommend moving 3 meters away or in adjacent Black Equipment Room. **Anticipate waiver w/caveat from Ron Porter.**
03	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2b	Cabinet 3: Red processor less than one meter away from power line to black transmitter (RT-1794 p/o ARC-210) **Anticipate waiver w/caveat from Ron Porter.**
04	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 27 Para 2a	Cabinet 3: Red processor less than one meter away from black signal lines connected to RF transmitter (RT-1794) **Anticipate waiver w/caveat from Ron Porter.**
05	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 27 Para 4, Para 4.4.1.1, 4.1.1.2 IA PUB 5239-31 Para A.1.7.1 IA PUB 5239-31 MIL-STD 188-124B Para 5.2.12	Signal cable used with RED processors, BLACK processors, ISDN telephones are not terminated. Red data cables for RED LAN have aluminum/mylar shielding. Manufacturer data: DRAKA COMTEQ (F) ShipLan Cable 4PR 24 AWG Screened 307650. Subject cable may pose a TEMPEST hazard. B.1.2.5 (5239): Approved cables. Mil-C-17 (ref k), or MIL-C-915 (reference(l)), MIL-C-24640(reference(n)) or MIL-C-24643 (reference (o)). Researched cable and found that it does NOT meet any of the above MIL-SPECs. Draka sells data cables that are MIL-DTL-24643 compliant. Subject cables are CAT 5e Shiplan '59W' , '59' and '59S' Marine data cables. The cables listed all have a braided shield in addition to the aluminum mylar tape. The braided shield allows for a flexible ground. NSTISSAM 2-95: RED processors meeting the requirements

			of NSTlSSAM TEMPEST/1-92 (Levels I, II, or III) must use optical or shielded wire cables if specified as part of the manufacturer's installation specification, or if specified for compliance with TEMPEST certification. Paragraphs 4.4.1.1, and 4.1.1.2 defines cable characteristics and shield termination. IA Pub 5239-31: RED Shielded Metallic Wire Cable. RED metallic wire cables in all locations shall be shielded, with the exception of desktop computer cables that are provided by the manufacturer, where there is not an offered shielded cable option. This requirement is not applicable to RED fiber optic cables. MIL-STD-188 "Foil shields are not acceptable for peripheral bonding and do not provide mechanical durability" IA Pub 5239-31 pg B-9 Para d. Note: "If both ends of the cable will not have the shield taken to ground, approval by the cognizant CTTA should be obtained prior to installation." Other source (AFMAN33-214V2 DATED 21SEP2001) states that foil shielding is intended for voice or digital signals less than 5Kbps. **Passed during instrumental inspection.**
06	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 pg 28 Para 6	RED processors and RF transmitters in Cabinet 2 and Cabinet 3. RED processors should not be powered from the same circuits as RF transmitters. **Passed during instrumental inspection.**
07	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.16 pg B-8 and B-9	Missing pins on CRYPTO cable to KYV-5. Missing ground terminal connection on backshell. **Completed**
08	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.16 pg B-8 and B-9	ANDVT cable has no ground terminal connection on backshell. Strain relief clamp is not on outer coating of cable. Redo connection. **Completed**
09	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.10	AN/UPX-28 has inadequate green wire ground. Replace with Class C bond strap. **Completed**

11	CA	IA Pub 5239-31	On racks, install ground cables per IA 5239-31. Where required, use soldered connectors vice crimping. **Completed**
12	CA	IA Pub 5259-31	Remove external tooth washers on ground connectors to cabinets. Use lock washers and lug nuts per IA Instruction 5239-31 Figure B-5. **Completed**
13	CA	IA Pub 5239 B.1.2.6.12	Keyboard and Monitor in Cabinet #1 has non –manufacturer supplied power cable. Bond shelf to rack. **Completed**
14	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Para 3 Notes 3	RED/BLACK cable separation. Two inch minimum separation requirement. Six inch separation requirement for RED/BLACK cables that run in parallel for 100 ft runs. No way to physically identify RED/BLACK data cables from each other or from the ISDN phone lines. **Anticipate waiver w/caveat from Ron Porter.**
15	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 Recommendation I Pg 27	PCRP (Model 211/802) is Black transmitter in RED Cabinet #3. PCRP (RADAR) is less than three meters away from RED processing equipment. Recommend moving outside of C4ISR Classified Room. **Completed**
16	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.10	Remove green wire grounds from CRYPTO rack and replace with Class C solid bond strap. **Completed**
17	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.3	Telephone cables connected to shore tie via telephone switch cannot be routed with red cables. More info on MARCOM switch required. **Completed (per Harris input)**
18	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.	ARC-210 Secure voice cables. Transmit and receive audio lines need to be shielded. **Completed (per Harris input)**
19	CA		Request complete wiring diagram of Marcom Compact IVCS Switch with PABX. Issue is port isolation for RED/BLACK connections. All ISDN phones, cellular wireless, shore connection box and KITEs have inputs to MARCOM. TISCOM TEMPEST program manager will check on configuration on SIPRNET. Wireline inputs to MARCOM in current configuration appear to be unshielded. During discussion with SPAWAR and L3, it was not clear if the MARCOM switch would be used in the same configuration it was approved for. **Not sure if this has been given to Ron Porter.**

20	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	Operator position in Classified C4ISR room has cables from two UNCLAS LAN and three CLASSIFIED LAN connections. Require 2 inch (5 cm) separation. **Completed**

Bridge

21	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a	Motorola VHF FM DES transceiver less than three meters from C2 Network flat panel display monitors LC 06-04-16, LC 06-04-72 and LC 06-04-84. Pending Instrumented Test. **Waived w/caveat from Ron Porter.**
22	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a	Ross VHF FM transceiver less than three meters from C2 Network flat panel display monitors LC 06-04-16, LC 06-04-72 and LC 06-04-84. Pending Instrumented Test **Waived w/caveat from Ron Porter.**
23	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95 PG 27 Para 2a	Cellular phone next to Secure LAN junction box less than three meters from flat panel display monitors LC 06-04-82 and LC 06-04-72. If a RED laptop uses the Secure LAN junction box, it will be less than three meters from cellular phone. Request information on proposed operation (will cellular phone be ON within X miles of coast, or will it be left OFF while in the cabinet.). What is the composition of the enclosure? Does it provide shielding? Request information on external antenna (is the cellular antenna disabled when connected to the external antenna?). **Completed/Moved**
24	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para B.1.2.6.13	No metal-to-metal contact for ground strap from ARC 210 Tray to ground on shelf. Recommend use Class C ground strap and remove paint for proper bonding. **Completed**
25	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 A.1.1.7.2a	Not clear if Shielded Twisted Pair is used for voice and control wirelines. SPAWAR will inspect and test during Instrumented TEMPEST test.

			Completed
26	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.2 Pg A-3	Unshielded cable connected to connector J3 on ARC-210 Tray. Twisted red wires (four) runs to C4ISR Cabinet #3. Replace cable run with proper cable. **Resolved**
27	CA	NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2/95	Issue of wireless bridge for RHIB comms. **RESOLVED.** Wireless connectivity is via exterior antenna. PDAs will not use wireless connectivity.

Other:

28	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 3 Notes: 2	CO's cabin. RED and BLACK LAN ports have no cable separation. Recommend 2 inch separation. RED/BLACK cable is tied together. **Completed**
29	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Recommendation I Pg 27 Para 1	CO's cabin. Proposed RED laptop on desk top less than 20 inches (20 cm) from black phone. **Resolved due to space limitations in stateroom.**
30	CA	IA Pub 5239-31 Para A.1.1.7.3.1.b	RED fiber optic cable goes through space adjacent to black racks that contains hasp for locking. If the cable passes though normally locked spaces (for example, voids, staterooms, etc), that portion of the cable shall be contained in a metallic conduit. **Resolution options being researched. Not complete to date.**
31	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Para 4.9	Does security system enunciator go through MARCOM switch or does it bypass the switch? If it bypasses the switch, is an isolator used? **Resolved**
32	CA	NSTISSAM 2-95 PARA 4.9.6	Television and shipboard video (external cameras) can be viewed from the same VIDEO output jack. The shipboard video has been designated RED. **Resolution agreed upon. Will be implemented upon receipt of parts (filter/attenuator).**

Department of the Navy (DoN) Information Assurance (IA) Publication
Module 5239-31
MIL-STD-188-124B Grounding Bonding Shielding for Common Long
Haul/Tactical Communications Systems
Air Force Manual 33-214, Volume 2, Communications and Information Emission Security Countermeasures Review

Additional items noted during secondary inspection:

1. **Secure grounds for ARC-210. Ground is loose (I anticipate resolution today).**
2. **Recommend Class/Unclass stickers on LAN drop boxes. Class (red) and Unlcass (green) stickers.**

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

United States Coast Guard

Commander
Maintenance and Logistics Command Atlantic

300 East Main Street, Suite 700
Norfolk, VA 23510-9103
Staff Symbol: (tp-1)
Phone: (757) 628-4051
Fax: (757) 628-4035

2241
05.0041
8 March 2005

MEMORANDUM

From: B.J. O'Keefe CAPT
MLCLANT (t)

Reply to (tp-1)
Attn of: Ernestine Cook
(757) 628-4051

To: CGC PADRE (WPB 1328)

Subj: TEMPEST INSPECTION OF USCGC PADRE (WPB 1328)

Ref: (a) NSTISSAM 2-95 Red/Black Installation Guidance
(b) DOD IA PUB 5239-31 Information assurance Shipboard Red/Black
(c) COMDT COGARD Washington DC//CG-62//042137Z Mar 04

1. ET2 Timothy Cole, ESD New Orleans, conducted a re-inspection of the Secure Electrical Information Processing System (SEIPS) on CGC PADRE on 28 January 2005. The re-inspection was conducted as required by references (a), (b), and (c).

2. Enclosure (1) is a summary of minor discrepancies with the SEIPS. No serious TEMPEST hazards were noted; therefore, you may continue normal operations. In accordance with reference (c), discrepancies must be corrected within 90 days. You should contact Ms. Ernestine Cook to schedule a re-inspection. This summary also provides a record of the installation at the time of inspection. Modifications or changes to the SEIPS shall not be made without approval of TISCOM (isd-3d) or MLCA.

3. This summary and amendments to this summary shall be retained in the unit's SEIPS (TEMPEST) documentation file.

#

Enclosure: (1) Visual Tempest Inspection Summary

Copy: COMDT (CG-6, G-DPM-3)
LANTAREA (AOFC)
TISCOM (isd-3b)
ESU New Orleans
ESD New Orleans
ESU Miami
ESD Key West

Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

The entire Secure Electrical Information Processing System was inspected.

List of spaces with secure processing equipment inspected by the visual TEMPEST inspector:

1. Radio Room
2. State Rooms
3. Bridge

Discrepancy form legend:

Column A: Sequential discrepancy number

Column B:

SF Correction of the discrepancy is within the capability of ship's force.

SFC Correction of the discrepancy was completed by ships force prior to completion of inspection visit.

IA Indicates that the assistance of an industrial activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.

IAC Indicates that an industrial activity corrected the discrepancy.

SA Indicates that the assistance of a support activity is probably required to properly correct the discrepancy.

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Column C: Document Reference to which the installation does not conform.

Narrative: A brief description of the discrepancy found.

Discrepancies and Corrective Action Report

1. Radio Room 2-28-O-Q

A	B	C	Narrative
001	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 3.B Note 2	There is no separation between Classified LAN and Unclassified LAN outlets. CORRECTED
002	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 3.B Note 2	Classified LAN lines are run with 120VAC power lines (no separation). CORRECTED
003	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 3.B Note 2	Coax TV line runs along with Classified LAN line. CORRECTED
004	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 3.B Note 2	There is no separation between alarm panel line and Classified LAN line. WAIVED
005	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 2.B	The printer (red) along with Classified LAN line runs parallel with IFF antenna line. There is no separation of these lines. WAIVED
006	IA/SA	IA PUB 5239-31 Paragraph A.1.1.2	The printer (red) uses black power. The printer router (red) uses black power. WAIVED
007	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 6	There is no 3-meter separation between printer (red) and IFF transmitter. WAIVED
008	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 6	In Rack #3, there is no 3-meter separation between red and black cables before entering the Marcom switch. WAIVED
009	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 6	In Rack #3, there is no 3-meter separation between cryptographic equipment and RT9000 transceiver. WAIVED
010	IA/SA	IA PUB 5239-31 Paragraph A.1.1.7.3.1.B	There is not a secure Protected Distribution System (PDS) leaving Radio Room. LE Locker behind Secure Space. WAIVED
011	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Paragraph 4.9.6	Cable TV system needs to use an amplifier/attenuator at the point of entry into the secure space and needs to be of a type that provides one-way filtration. CORRECTED
012	SA	IA PUB 5239-31 Paragraph B.1.2.6.2	IFF transmitter needs ground. Removal of paint and dirt from ground. NEEDS TO BE COMPLETED

2. State Rooms 1-16-1-L / 1-16-2-L

001	IA/SA	IA PUB 5239-31 Paragraph B.1.2.6.2	There is no separation between Classified LAN outlets and 117 VAC, Unclassified LAN, and TV Jack outlets. WAIVED
002	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 3.A	There is no separation between Classified LAN line and MF/HF line. CORRECTED
003	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 3.	In State Room 1-16-2-L, Classified LAN line runs parallel with horn generator line. CORRECTED

3. Bridge

A	B	C	Narrative
001	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 6	There is no 3meter separation between red output and black lines for the Kite handset #1 and #2. WAIVED
002	IA/SA	IA PUB 5239-31 Paragraph B.1.2.6.2	Classified LAN line runs parallel with 117 VAC, Black Data lines, and cellular antenna line. CORRECTED
003	SA	IA PUB 5239-31 Paragraph B.1.2.6.2	Need to remove paint and add clean ground for RCU-9310 radio. NEEDS TO BE COMPLETED

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
United States Coast Guard

Commander
Maintenance and Logistics Command Atlantic

300 East Main Street, Suite 700
Norfolk, VA 23510-9103
Staff Symbol: (tp-1)
Phone: (757) 628-4051
Fax: (757) 628-4035

2241
05.0041
8 March 2005

MEMORANDUM

From: B. J. O'Keefe CAPT
MLCLANT (t)

Reply to (tp-1)
Attn of: Ernestine Cook
(757) 628-4051

To: CGC PADRE (WPB 1328)

Subj: TEMPEST INSPECTION OF USCGC PADRE (WPB 1328)

Ref: (a) NSTISSAM 2-95 Red/Black Installation Guidance
(b) DOD IA PUB 5239-31 Information assurance Shipboard Red/Black
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MATERIAL INSPECTION AND RECEIVING REPORT

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0248

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR COMPLETED FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
SEND THIS FORM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN THE DFARS, APPENDIX F-401.

1. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION (CONTRACT) NO.	ORDER NO.	6. INVOICE NO./DATE	7. PAGE	OF	8. ACCEPTANCE POINT
DTCG23-02-C-2DW001	03-F-2DW247	ICGS030023 06/24/04	1	2	D

2. SHIPMENT NO.	3. DATE SHIPPED	4. B/L / TCN	5. DISCOUNT TERMS
NA	24 Jun 04	B/L NA TCN NA	None

9. PRIME CONTRACTOR CODE 1UYZ2	10. ADMINISTERED BY CODE
Integrated Coast Guard Systems, 1530 Wilson Blvd., Suite 400, Arlington, VA 22209, USA	Commandant (G-ACS-6) U.S. Coast Guard Deepwater SIPO, 1530 Wilson Blvd., Suite 400, Arlington, VA 22209

11. SHIPPED FROM (If other than 9) CODE / FOB:	12. PAYMENT WILL BE MADE BY CODE
Bollinger Shipyards Lockport, L.L.C. PO Box 250 8365 Highway 308 Lockport, LA. 70374-0250	Commandant (G-ACS-6) U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, 2100 Second St. SW, Room 5208, Washington, DC 20591-0001, USA

13. SHIPPED TO CODE WPB - 1328	14. MARKED FOR CODE
USCGC PADRE (WPB - 1328), C/O Coast Guard 8365 Highway 308 Lockport, LA. 70374-0250	LT. Hammond

15. ITEM NO.	16. STOCK/PART NO. / DESCRIPTION (Indicate number of shipping containers - type of container - container number.)	17. QUANTITY SHIP/REC'D*	18. UNIT	19. UNIT PRICE	20. AMOUNT
0055 EB	Services and Supplies: Padre, (thru/mod 2)	1/1	Lot	$7,080,060.00	$7,080,060.00
	WPB 123 conversion,				
	Item short shipped of the following components: Details				
	on Certificate of Conformance				
01	Trial Cards	1	Lot	$114,850.00	$114,850.00
02	Provisioning and Spares	1	Lot	$35,433.50	$35,433.50
03	Training	1	Lot	$10,000	$10,000.00
04	CDRL Exceptions	1	Lot	$17,500.00	$17,500.00

21. CONTRACT QUALITY ASSURANCE

a. ORIGIN
☐ CQA ☒ ACCEPTANCE of listed items has been made by me or under my supervision and they conform to contract, except as noted herein or on supporting documents.

DATE | SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE
TYPED NAME: Certificate of Conformance
TITLE:
MAILING ADDRESS:
COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE NUMBER:

b. DESTINATION
☐ CQA ☒ ACCEPTANCE of listed items has been made by me or under my supervision and they conform to contract, except as noted herein or on supporting documents.

DATE | SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE
TYPED NAME:
TITLE:
MAILING ADDRESS:
COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE NUMBER:

22. RECEIVER'S USE

Quantities shown in column 17 were received in apparent good condition except as noted.

6-24-2004 | SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE
DATE RECEIVED
TYPED NAME: Daniel Hartinger
TITLE: Contract Officer
MAILING ADDRESS: U.S. Coast Guard Deepwater SIPO
1530 Wilson Blvd., Suite 400, Arlington, VA
COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE NUMBER: 571-218-3253

** If quantity received by the Government is the same as quantity shipped, indicate by (X) mark; if different, enter actual quantity received below quantity shipped and encircle.*

23. CONTRACTOR USE ONLY

DD FORM 250, AUG 2000 PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE.

SHIPMENT NO.	DATE SHIPPED	PROC INSTRUMENT IDEN. (CONTRACT)	(ORDER) NO.	INVOICE NO.
NA	20040624	DTCG23-02-C-2DW001	03-F-2DW247	ICGS030023 6/24/04

ITEM NO.	STOCK/PART NO. DESCRIPTION *(Indicate number of shipping containers - type of container - container number.)*	QUANTITY SHIP/REC'D	UNIT	UNIT PRICE	AMOUNT
55	Continued				$0.00
5	Tempest POA&M	1	lot	$5,000.00	$5,000.00
6	Classified Testing	1	lot	$3,000.00	$3,000.00
7	LM/MS2 C4ISR TRFs / Problem Sheets	1	lot	$3,000.00	$3,000.00
8	FCC License Authorization	1	lot	$4,000.00	$4,000.00
9	SRP Launch and Retrieval POAM	1	ea	$0.00	$0.00
10	LIMS POAM	1	lot	$600.00	$600.00
11	Dual Service Inmarsat POAM	1		$600.00	$600.00
12	IFF Cable Replacement	1		$3,000.00	$3,000.00
13	P-Spec Adjustment	1		$8,062.00	$8,062.00
14	Credit for Secure Comm Lock	1		-$2,000.00	-$2,000.00
15	Credit for Move to New Orleans	1		-$8,467.00	-$8,467.00
	0055EBB (de-obligate unexpended OE funds)	1		$21,496.29	$21,496.29
	0055EBA (de-obligate unexpended CA funds)	1		$2,803.42	$2,803.42
	Amount Paid to Date	1		$5,746,348.00	$5,746,348.00
	Total Invoice Amount Due	1		$1,114,834.29	$1,114,834.29

ICGS Certificate of Conformance:

Contract Number: DTCG23-02-C-2DW001
DTO Number: DTCG23-03-F-2DW247, CLIN 0055EB
Asset: CGC Padre, WPB 1328, 1 of 1

Description: This DTO provides the detailed design and construction for major modification of the 110-foot patrol boat Padre, including completion of all design, analyses, construction, and testing to deploy the lead vessel of the proposed 123-Ft Cutter Class, and to demonstrate compliance with requirements. Included in the modifications was an extensive ultrasonic survey of the hull was conducted resulting in the replacement of over 75 square feet of wasted hull plate; a new deckhouse providing an enlarged, 360-degree bridge and berthing for a dual-gender crew; a stern extension with a stern ramp and door for launch and recovery of the Short-Range Prosecutor; an upgraded C4ISR suite to ensure interoperability with the IDS; and all related logistics and training.

I certify that on 24 June 2004, the ICGS Deepwater Program furnished the supplies and/or services called for in accordance with all applicable requirements. I further certify that the supplies and/or services are of the quality specified and conform in all respects with the contract requirements, including specifications, drawings, preservation, packaging, packing, marking requirements, and physical item identification, and are in the quantity shown on the attached acceptance document.

Comment: This Certificate of Conformance is based upon;

- LM/MS2 Certificate of Conformance and supporting records.
- NGSS Certificate of Conformance and supporting records
- ICGS audits of LM/MS2, NG/SS, Chand, and Bollinger (BSI).
- Functional Configuration Audit and Physical Configuration Audit performed on 4 June 2004
- 123 Cutter Certification Matrix

COMDAC INS navigation system, gyrocompass, and Radar engineering changes have been installed in the CGC Padre. ICGS is in receipt of Amendment of Solicitation / Modification of Contract, Modification 002, requisition/Purchase Reg. No. 24-03-2332DW247, signed by Catherine A Martindale, Contracting Officer, United States Coast Guard, Date Signed, 9 June 2004, providing USCG unilateral determination of contract value to incorporate the COMDAC INS navigation system, gyrocompass, and Radar engineering changes into the installation for the USCG 110'/123' conversion of Padre. ICGS reserves its right to submit a Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA) to the value associated with the contracting officer's unilateral determination.

Exception(s):

1) Trial Cards (Attachment A)
2) Provisioning and Spares (Attachment B)
3) Training for the Padre crew
   - Common Operating Picture (COP estimated completion 30 days after Classified System IATO)
4) CDRL Exceptions (Attachment C)
5) Tempest POA&M, (Attachment D, with Enclosure 1)
6) Classified Testing (Attachment D)
7) LM/MS2 C4ISR TFR/ Problem Sheets (Attachment E)
8) UHF paging system/FCC License Authorization (9 Jul 04)
9) SRP launch and retrieval system POA&M, (Attachment F)
10) LIMS POA&M, (Attachment G)
11) Dual Service INMARSAT POAM (Attachment H)
12) IFF Cable Replacement
13) P-Spec Adjustment
14) Credit for Secure Comm Space Lock
15) Credit for Move to New Orleans

Date of Execution: 24 June 04

Domain Program Manager: _____

Quality Assurance Manager: _____

ICGS Signature: _____

Kevin J. O'Neill
Director of Contracts, ICGS LLC

Attachment A
Padre Trial Cards

Disputed

TRIAL CARD NUMBER	CODE	EQUIPMENT	DESCRIPTION	HOLD BACK	Estimated Completion Date
CC0005001	KA	Cable labels	All C4ISR cable labeling is not iaw with genspec.	$5,000	
DK0004001	KA	Deck plate in forward axuiliary space	Portion of deck in forward auxiliary space has belzona cover over pitted deteriorated metal and is in need of repair	$15,000	
EL0085001	KA	Number 1 SSDG (RPR)	Reverse power relay test unsatisfactory. Exceeded the hme-3 test requirement	$2,000	
EL0088001	KA	#2 SSDG RPR	RPR test was unsatisfactory. test exceeded hme-3 requirement of 4% (tripped at 40 Kw)	$2,000	
EL0106001	KI	Shore tie	No shoreline interface to remotely view video, video shore tie not provided. Also per section 3.2.4.1, shore f	$7,500	
			Disputed Total	**$31,500**	

Open

TRIAL CARD NUMBER	CODE	EQUIPMENT	DESCRIPTION	HOLD BACK	Estimated Completion Date
AX0025001	KA	Water maker	Aft water maker out of commission	$10,000	23 August 2004
AX0029002	KA	Port fin stabilizer	Port fin stabilizer is inoperable in manual and auto mode.	$2,500	23 August 2004

AX0030001	KA	STBD fin stabilizer	STBD fin stabilizer is inoperable in manual and auto mode.	$2,500	23 August 2004
CC0008001	KI	LORAN-C	There is no power connector on the LORAN-C. gfe has been taken apart and modified for installation.	$2,000	23 August 2004
CC0010001	KA	COMMS system	At demonstration BT event C4ISR-4 rev e the following steps failed	$3,000	23 August 2004
CC0011001	KI	Demonstration	At sea SRP communications system demonstration BT event C4ISR-5 rev e the following steps failed	$3,000	23 August 2004
CC0012001	KA	At sea radar/sensor	At sea radar/sensor demonstration BT event C4ISR-3 Rev "E" the following steps failed	$3,000	23 August 2004
DC0016001	KA	Alarm tone generator	General alarm has wrong tones.	0	23 August 2004
EL0008001	KA	Fin stabilizer panel	Fin stabilizer panel is missing dimmer knob and light cover	$100	23 August 2004
EL0027001	KA	Classified lan junct	Classified lan labels have inadequate separationg from power and unclassified LAN cables, also cable bend	$5,000	23 August 2004
EL0036002	KA	HF Messenger Terminal	HFmessenger terminal board strips/end cables are not labelled	$500	23 August 2004
EL0080001	KI	Ethernet cable	Excess ethernet cable loops.	$250	23 August 2004
EL0092001	KA	Battery chargers	Both battery chargers show dc ground.	$5,000	23 August 2004
EL0097002	KA	Port exhaust flapper valve	Port exhaust flapper valve is inoperative, stays open at all speeds	$2,500	23 August 2004
EL0098001	KA	STBD exhaust flapper valve	STBD exhaust flapper valve is inoperative, stays open at all speeds	$2,500	23 August 2004
EL0099001	KA	STBD shaf t tach	New STBD shaf t tachometer reading astern when shaf t is turning for ahead	$500	23 August 2004
EL0100001	KA	Power panel 2-27-4	Power panel 2-27-4 (24v)is indicating a ground	$2,500	23 August 2004
EL0101001	KA	Power panel 2-27-2	Power panel 2-27-2(24v)is indicating a ground	$2,500	23 August 2004

EL0133001	KA	#1 MDE hot start	#1 MDE hot star t is inoperative at 6kw, 12kw, and 18kw. engine is being started coldas winnessed by at team.	$7,500	23 August 2004
EL0134001	KA	#2 MDE hot start	#2 MDE hot star t is inoperative at 12kw,and 18kw. engine is being started at 110 degrees f	$7,500	23 August 2004
EL0138002	KI	Port shaft tach	Port shaft tachometer is inoperative(local board)	$2,000	23 August 2004
EL0139001	KA	STBD shaft tach	STBD shaf t tachometer is inoperative(local board)	$2,000	23 August 2004
EL0145001	KA	Digital video record	Video recording system not tested..	$2,000	23 August 2004
EL0146001	KA	CCTV monitor (03-05-	Horizontal interference lines on monitor, possible emi related	$500	23 August 2004
EL0150001	KI	Fax machine	Ships fax machine is not receiving incoming faxes	$500	23 August 2004
EL0152001	KA	FLIR system	FLIR IR system not verified	$1,500	23 August 2004
MP0008001	KA	MDE pyrometers	Pyrometers for both main diesel engines not working properly. they give erroneous temperatures.	$10,000	23 August 2004
RP0001001	KA	Bilge plate	Bilge area on centerline, between Frame 13-13.5 show thick layers of rust/corrosion blooms	$2,500	23 August 2004
			Open Total	**$83,350**	
			Total (Open and Disputed)	**$114,850**	

INTEGRATED COAST GUARD SYSTEMS
DEEPWATER

Attachment B

USCGC PADRE OBRP Shortage

CatNum	PartNum	Cage Num	Description	Qty	ExtCost	PONum	PODate	PromDate
1061947	HQ-3000-TEST	06UL2	KIT,TEST	1	$1,850.00	50215	5/20/2004	8/8/2004

$1,850.00

USCGC PADRE Insurance Spares Shortage

CatNum	PartNum	CageNum	Description	Qty	ExtCost	PONum	PODate	PromDate
1004430	5389110	64513	Prop, Left Hand	1	$33,583.50	49369	1/14/2003	7/30/2004

$33,583.50

Attachement C
Padre CDRL Exceptions

ELIN #	Title	Cost to Complete	ECD
I033-01	123 WPB Test Reports	$1,500	7/23/2004
L016	Technical Manuals	$4,000	7/23/2004
S016	123 Cutter Certification Documents	$10,000	8/7/2004
S026	Pollution Prevention Certificates of Compliance	$500	Not Required, to be adjudicated by 6/30/2004
S027	Certificate for Sanitary Compliance	$500	Not Required, to be adjudicated by 6/30/2004
S035	Cutter Information Booklet	$1,000	7/23/2004
	Total	**$17,500**	

Attachment D
Padre Tempest and Classified Testing
POA&M

TEMPEST Visual Inspection Discrepancy Resolution. (Holdback $2,000)

- ICGS to resolve all visual TEMPEST discrepancies as described in the Visual Inspection report (enclosure 1) date for closure is 60 days post DD250 sign-off.

TEMPEST Hardware Discrepancy. (Holdback $3,000)

- ICGS will correct outstanding SPAWAR instrumented TEMEPEST survey hardware discrepancy on Padre.

Conduct Classified Testing. (Holdback $3,000)

Conduct classified systems testing on CGC Padre. Target date for completion of classified testing is 15 days post USCG IATO for Padre. Prerequisite actions:

- ICGS to resolve all outstanding physical security discrepancies on the 123 to be used to execute classified testing. This must completed in order to hold the necessary classified keymat.
- ICGS to resolve all visual TEMPEST discrepancies
- Prior to performing any classified testing on a 123 WPB, the USCG must provide an IATO to allow transmit/receive of classified communications.
- ICGS will execute 123 classified tests (from AT procedures), with support as required from USCG personnel.

Enclosure: Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

Enclosure 1 to Padre Tempest and Classified Testing POA&M

Visual TEMPEST Inspection Summary

The entire Secure Electrical Information Processing System was inspected.

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001	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 3.B Note 2	There is no separation between Classified LAN and Unclassified LAN outlets.
002	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 3.B Note 2	Classified LAN lines are run with 120VAC power lines (no separation).
003	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 3.B Note 2	Coax TV line runs along with Classified LAN line.
004	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 3.B Note 2	There is no separation between alarm panel line and Classified LAN line.
005	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 2.B	The printer (red) along with Classified LAN line runs parallel with IFF antenna line. There is no separation of these lines.
006	IA/SA	IA PUB 5239-31 Paragraph A.1.1.2	The printer (red) uses black power. The printer router (red) uses black power.
007	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 6	There is no 3-meter separation between printer (red) and IFF transmitter.
008	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 6	In Rack #3, there is no 3-meter separation between red and black cables before entering the Marcom switch.

009	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 6	In Rack #3, there is no 3-meter separation between cryptographic equipment and RT9000 transceiver.
010	IA/SA	IA PUB 5239-31 Paragraph A.1.1.7.3.1.B	There is not a secure Protected Distribution System (PDS) leaving Radio Room. LE Locker behind Secure Space.
011	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Paragraph 4.9.6	Cable TV system needs to use an amplifier/attenuator at the point of entry into the secure space and needs to be of a type that provides one-way filtration.

Discrepancies and Corrective Action Report

2. State Rooms 1-16-1-L / 1-16-2-L

001	IA/SA	IA PUB 5239-31 Paragraph B.1.2.6.2	There is no separation between Classified LAN outlets and 117 VAC, Unclassified LAN, and TV Jack outlets.
002	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 3.A	There is no separation between Classified LAN line and MF/HF line.
003	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 3.	In State Room 1-16-2-L, Classified LAN line runs parallel with horn generator line.

Discrepancies and Corrective Action Report

3.Bridge

A	B	C	Narrative
001	IA/SA	NSTISSAM 2-95 Rec I Paragraph 6	There is no 3meter separation between red output and black lines for the Kite handset #1 and #2.
002	IA/SA	IA PUB 5239-31 Paragraph B.1.2.6.2	Classified LAN line runs parallel with 117 VAC, Black Data lines, and cellular antenna line.

Attachment E
LM/MS2 C4ISR TFR / Problem Sheets

Identification Number	Description	Cost to Complete	ECD
513001	INSTALLATION OF CABINET 3 PS6 CABLE	$600	60 days after delivery
328G0000048A (LC 061004	CACHE ENGINE GROUND CABLE IS MISSING AND LW446 UNIT NOT INSTALLED PER ECN 373466	$600	60 days after delivery
328G0000033A (LC 060366)	UNIT IS NOT ADEQUATELY SECURED TO THE CABINET FRONT RETMA RAIL. SOCKET HEAD SCREWS PREVENT THE UNIT FROM SEATING FULLY WHEN CLOSED. RESOLUTION WILL BE PER ECN 373467	$600	60 days after delivery
328G0000058A (LC 060104)	RETMA RAIL MOUNT SOCKET SCREWS	$600	60 days after delivery

Attachment F
SRP Launch and Retrieval POAM
6/9/2004

Purpose

The purpose of this plan of action and milestone is to outline the steps to address the SRP stern launch and recovery process on the 123 Ft WPB. This plan is to address the failed sampson post experienced by the CGC MATAGORDA's SRP and to review capture mechanism process to correct any shortcomings. At the same time, this POAM will also address the metal to metal contact experience by the Matagorda and Metompkin's SRP prior to and during trials.

History

The Matagorda and SRP #1 was delivered to the Coast Guard 1 March 2004. At delivery, SRP #1 had a dent in stem approximately12 to 18 inches below the bow eye. The cause of the dent was unknown but believed to have occurred during a recovery evolution either during trials or training prior to Matagorda delivery.
During the Metompkin's Builder's Trials, the SRP #2 struck the stern of the Metompkin during an aborted recovery evolution. SRP #2 bow eye struck the stern plating on the Metompkin puncturing the shell plating above the waterline in the way of the fresh water tank. In addition, during the Metompkin's Builder's Trials, the retrieval lasso (constructed of 5/8 inch diameter braided nylon) became untied during the capture process as the SRP slide down the ramp taking a strain on the lasso. Prior to the Metompkin's Acceptance Trials, Metompkin's shell plating and retrieval lasso was repaired. In repairing the retrieval lasso, the loop was shortened.
During Metompkin Acceptance Trials, the SRP either failed to accelerate high enough in the stern ramp or the retrieval lasso was too short to lasso the SRP Sampson post. As a result, there were numerous attempts in which the SRP was not captured by the retrieval lasso. Following Acceptance Trials during SRP training with Metompkin crew members, each crew member using a 6 ft long retrieval lasso captured the SRP the first time each time as the boat drove up the ramp.

Discussion

The 123 Ft stern ramp angle, 123 Ft trim, 123 Ft speed , relative speed between SRP and WPB as it drives into the ramp, sea state direction, shape of ramp, SRP hull lines, SRP full load weight, retrieval lasso length, retrieval lasso material, and strength of SRP sampson post are all critical factors of the retrieval system. Change the entering assumptions and the end product is affected. In order to analyze the SRP sampson post

failure and mitigate potential for retrieval difficulties, ICGS needs to validate the design and construction of the SRP and 123 Ft WPB retrieval system. Was the SRP constructed in accordance with the drawings? Has ICGS documented the operating envelop such as the relative speed to drive up the ramp, optimum retrieval lasso length, and has the retrieval lasso forces on the Sampson post been accurately modeled? Has the design considered the fatigue over the SRP life? Due to the failure of the SRP sampson post, the design assumptions must be documented, reviewed, and validated. Calculations must be reviewed including the cyclic loading on the capture mechanisms.
As a result of lessons learned on the first two WPBs, a wider range of approach angles must be considered in the SRP 123 Ft WPB interface. To accommodate a wider range of approach angles and to provide a greater "sweet spot" for recovery of the SRP, the "D" bumper which is currently at center of the aft edge of the 123 Ft WPB notch will be extended further off the centerline. The stern door will be modified to accommodate this enhanced bumper and still close tightly. This will greatly reduce the potential for metal-to-metal contact between the SRP hull and the 123 Ft WPB hull during a poorly-aligned recovery attempt or an attempt which is aborted while crossing the sill.
This enhanced design should be ready for delivery on Padre. As it requires a redesign of the stern door, it will be retrofit on Matagorda and Metompkin once the new doors are available.

Process

ICGS will implement the following three step solution to resolve the launch and retrieval issues. The first step will be to implement corrections to SRP #1 (CGC MATAGORDA), SRP #2 (Metompkin), and SRP#3. This correction will enable the SRP to be fully operational. The second step will be a rigorous examination of the sampson post failure and documenting a final solution. The third step will address the metal to metal contact experienced during trials and post trial launch and retrieval process.

Implement sampson post corrections to SRP#1, SRP#2, and SRP#3

1. Perform a quick look to examine design strength and provide a more robust design.
2. Review the design with Coast Guard
3. Move SRP#1 to a repair facility, implement repairs and return to cutter.
4. Implement repairs on SRP #2 and #3

Develop integrated SRP retrieval system solution

1. ICGS will document the details associated with the failure of the sampson post for analysis:
    a. Retrieval lasso length and material properties
    b. Number of POB during the failure

c. Sea state
d. Speed
e. Trim

2. Document the sampson post installation
   a. Constructed in accordance with the drawings
   b. Examine failure mode
   c. Workmanship in accordance with applicable standards
3 Review and document all design assumptions associated with the capture mechanism and the capture loading.
   a. Retrieval lasso length and material properties.
   b. SRP full load weight.
   c. Did we assume any WPB pitch?
   d. Did we assume any dynamic trim?
   e. Did we assume any acceleration and associated loading from a longer slide back due to longer retrieval lasso?
   f. Did we make any fatigue assumptions based on a 15 year SRP service life?
4. Review all design assumptions with Coast Guard
5. Update the design calculations based upon the updated assumptions.
6. Validate design assumptions during a Hull #3 trials period to validate relative speeds to achieve ramp height, to validate retrieval lasso length, to validate sea condition assumptions.
7. Adjust SRP design consistent with revised calculations
8. Develop a plan to implement 123 or SRP changes
   a. 123s and SRPs in production
   b. Post production SRP not yet delivered to Coast Guard
   c. 123s and SRPs delivered to Coast Guard
   d. Update documentation – Drawings, Cutter Information Book, and Training to include contingency retrieval methods.
9. Implement desired changes.

Address 123 Ft WPB D Bumper and Stern Gate

ICGS will implement the following to accommodate a wider range of approach angles and to provide a greater "sweet spot" for recovery of the SRP. The "D" bumper which currently protects the center aft edge of the 123 notch will be extended further off the centerline. The stern door will be modified to accommodate this enhanced bumper and still close tightly. This will greatly reduce the potential for metal-to-metal contact between the SRP hull and the 123 hull during a poorly-aligned recovery attempt or an attempt which is aborted while crossing the sill.

Milestones

Step	Task	Milestone Date
	Sampson post corrections (SRP#1 thru SRP#3)	
1	Examine design strength and provide a more robust design.	4/12/04 thru 5/21/04
2	Review the design with Coast Guard	4/12/04 thru 5/21/04
3	Implement repairs and return to cutter	5/28/04
4	Complete repairs on SRP #2 and #3	#2 by 5/28/04 #3 by 6/4/04 #1 by 6/11/04 #4 by 6/18/04
	SRP Retrieval System Solution	
1	ICGS will document the details associated with the failure of the sampson post for analysis	Complete
2	Document the Sampson post installation	Complete
3	Review and document all design assumptions associated with the capture mechanism and the capture loading	Complete
4	Update the design calculations based upon the updated assumptions	Complete
5	Review all design assumption with Coast Guard	Complete
5	Complete SRP sampson post redesign	Complete
6	Validate design assumptions during a Hull #3 trials period to validate relative speeds to achieve ramp height, to validate retrieval lasso length, to validate sea condition assumptions.	Hull #4 Trial period
7	Develop a plan to implement 123 or SRP changes	5/26/04
8	Implement desired changes	5/26 - 7/26
	123 Ft WPB D Bumper and Stern Gate	
1	Analyze potential impact areas	Completed
2	Propose recommended solution	6/16/04
3	Review changes with Coast Guard	6/21/04
4	Prototype change on Attu	BT and AT
5	Evaluate installation on Attu	BT and AT
6	Coordinate update schedule with cutter's operational schedule to complete retrofit within two weeks of PDMA delivery	7/15/04
7	ICGS will retrofit delivered cutters in their homeports	PDMA plus two weeks

Attachment G
LIMS POAM

ID		Task Name	Duration	Start	Finish
1		**PADRE Support Schedule**	**32 days**	**Tue 6/1/04**	**Wed 7/14/04**
2		PADRE Delivery/Acceptance by USCG	1 day	Mon 6/7/04	Mon 6/7/04
3		COBRA receives/processes/delivers data to CPM	7 days	Tue 6/8/04	Wed 6/16/04
4		CPM receives/processes/delivers data to ELLLIPSE	5 days	Thu 6/17/04	Wed 6/23/04
5		**PADRE Support Prior to ELLIPSE Implementation**	**32 days**	**Tue 6/1/04**	**Wed 7/14/04**
6		**Site Reps on Site**	**32 days**	**Tue 6/1/04**	**Wed 7/14/04**
7		**Support Prior to FLMS load**	**18 days**	**Mon 6/7/04**	**Wed 6/30/04**
8		Site Reps capture LIMS transactions using Excel Spreadsheet	18 days	Mon 6/7/04	Wed 6/30/04
9		Provide Excel spreadsheets to Support Infrastructure	3 days	Mon 6/7/04	Wed 6/9/04
10		**Load FLMS DB for PADRE**	**10 days**	**Tue 6/1/04**	**Mon 6/14/04**
11		Modifiy and Test MATAGORDA FLMS data for PADRE	8 days	Tue 6/1/04	Thu 6/10/04
12		Perform initial FLMS data load	2 days	Fri 6/11/04	Mon 6/14/04
13		**Support after FLMS load**	**22 days**	**Tue 6/15/04**	**Wed 7/14/04**
14		USCG begins entering LIMS transactios using FLMS	1 day	Tue 6/15/04	Tue 6/15/04
15		Site Rep forwards FLMS DB to Supprt Infrastructure	22 days	Tue 6/15/04	Wed 7/14/04
16		**PADRE ELLIPSE IMPLEMENTATION**	**29 days**	**Tue 6/1/04**	**Fri 7/9/04**
17	✓	**ICED Dev Environment**	**16.88 days**	**Tue 6/1/04**	**Wed 6/23/04**
18	✓	Build Oracle database schema	8 hrs	Tue 6/1/04	Tue 6/1/04
19	✓	Create Ellipse District	13 days	Wed 6/2/04	Fri 6/18/04
20	✓	Configure District	12.33 days	Wed 6/2/04	Fri 6/18/04
21	✓	Build Milstrip Structure	1.88 days	Mon 6/21/04	Tue 6/22/04
22	✓	Test & Validation	1 day	Tue 6/22/04	Wed 6/23/04
23		**CGDN+ Prod Environment - Test Instance**	**4.5 days**	**Thu 6/17/04**	**Wed 6/23/04**
24		Build Oracle database schema	8 hrs	Thu 6/17/04	Thu 6/17/04
25		Create Ellipse District	2.81 days	Fri 6/18/04	Tue 6/22/04
26		Configure District	3.5 days	Fri 6/18/04	Wed 6/23/04
27		Build Milstrip Structure	1.88 days	Fri 6/18/04	Mon 6/21/04
28		Test & Validation	1 day	Mon 6/21/04	Tue 6/22/04
29		**CGDN+ Prod Environment - Production Instance**	**16.94 days**	**Thu 6/3/04**	**Fri 6/25/04**
30	✓	Build Oracle database schema	8 hrs	Thu 6/3/04	Thu 6/3/04
31	✓	Create Ellipse District	3 days	Wed 6/9/04	Mon 6/14/04
32	✓	Configure District	4 days	Mon 6/14/04	Fri 6/18/04
33	✓	Build Milstrip Structure	2 days	Fri 6/18/04	Tue 6/22/04
34		FLMS	2 days	Tue 6/22/04	Thu 6/24/04
35	✓	Test & Validation	1 day	Thu 6/24/04	Fri 6/25/04
36		QA CPM Data to Flat File	8 days	Thu 6/24/04	Mon 7/5/04
37		**IMPORT DATA TO ELLIPSE**	**8 days**	**Wed 6/30/04**	**Fri 7/9/04**
38		Cutter Inventory	2 days	Wed 6/30/04	Thu 7/1/04
39		Standard Jobs	2 days	Fri 7/2/04	Mon 7/5/04
40		Equipment Register	2 days	Tue 7/6/04	Wed 7/7/04
41		APLs	2 days	Thu 7/8/04	Fri 7/9/04
42		Perform FLMS/ELLIPSE Synchronization - LIMS Fully Functional on USCGC PADRE	3 days	Mon 7/12/04	Wed 7/14/04

Project: Metompkin 04152004 che
Date: Thu 6/24/04

Task		Project Summary	
Split		External Tasks	
Progress		External Milestone	
Milestone		Deadline	
Summary			

Attachment H
Dual Service INMARSAT POAM

- This upgrade will establish Dual-Service INMARSAT F77 capability on 123' Patrol Boats by providing MPDS capability in addition to the existing ISDN capability. Requires the addition of two cables in C4ISR Cabinet 4 and C4ISR software changes.
- 123 P-Spec negotiations in Feb 2004 resulted in an agreement to waive compliance with the INMARSAT MPDS requirement for 12 months from Matagorda sell-off.

Implementation

- ECP # DW00000486 to add MPDS capability (Dual Service) to the INMARSAT F77 has been approved by the LM ERB. LM CCB approval is expected by 24 June 2004.
- Perform testing of the proposed upgrade at IS&S and MDAC by 30 June 2004.
- Procure 8 shipsets of cabling, and prepare/approve Cabinet 4 ECN and Field Modification Bulletin (FMB) by 31 July 2004.
- Begin installation on Commissioned 123 WPBs (notionally Hull #1) and 123 WPBs in construction (notionally Hull #6) by early August 2004. Complete installation on all 8 contracted WPBs prior to 31 December 2004, pending availability.
- Include MPDS capability in the baseline C4ISR configuration for Hulls 9 and follow, if contracted.

Holdback: $600